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Dissertation supervised by Calvin L. Troup 
Subscribing to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s belief that human beings are called to be 
insightful and discerning, this dissertation explores Gadamer’s idea and practice of 
listening to language in order to understand the relationship between a constitutive theory 
of language and a life of wisdom. As Gadamer’s texts reveal, the hermeneutic practice of 
listening to language is a reflective engagement of language that is theoretically grounded 
in a constitutive view of language. First, we need to listen to language because language, 
not consciousness, is the critical element in understanding. Second, the ontological 
priority of language over subjectivity comes with the nature of our primary relationship 
to language—we belong to it. Language is the medium in which we think and live, which 
makes us human. This means that our primary and most consequential relationship to 
language is as hearers, not users, of language. Third, the nature of language is both 
binding and expansive; hence the problems that come with its binding nature can be 
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attended to from within language itself, by engaging its expansive nature. In other words, 
Gadamer does not believe in linguistic determinism. 
The first chapter explores the conversation between Gadamer and communication 
studies by surveying what communication scholars have found significant for 
communication theory and practice in Gadamer’s thought. The next three chapters 
examine Gadamer’s idea and practice of listening to language through a close interpretive 
reading of Gadamer’s texts. This reading reveals three key relationships that define the 
hermeneutic practice of listening to language: the relationship between ordinary language 
and conceptual thought (chapter two); the relationship between hearing and 
understanding (chapter three); and the relationship between language and reason (chapter 
four). The last chapter takes the conversation between Gadamer and communication 
studies further by considering some ways in which the hermeneutic practice of listening 
to language can assist communication scholars and practitioners in becoming discerning 





My wholehearted gratitude goes to ... 
... my sisters for their generous hearts and unconditional love, which have literally 
supported me on this journey ... 
... my friends, especially John, Meredith, and Alexandra, who have faithfully walked 
beside me …  
... my Duquesne community: my professors, particularly Ronald C. Arnett, who 
introduced me to phenomenology, and Janie Harden Fritz, for her encouraging words and 
joyful presence; the Gumberg library staff for their wonderful service; and my fellow 
travelers in dissertation writing for their friendship …  
... my dissertation director, Calvin L. Troup, a wise and kind guide, with an inner sense 
for the right word spoken at the right time. I hope to be for my students the kind of 
mentor he was for me. 
 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv 
Acknowledgement ............................................................................................................. vi 
1. Entering the Conversation: Gadamer and Communication Studies ............ 1 
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Understanding ....................................................................................................... 4 
The objective consciousness of communication studies ................................... 4 
Gadamer’s alternative ....................................................................................... 5 
Towards a disciplinary hermeneutic consciousness ......................................... 7 
1.3 Rhetoric .................................................................................................................. 10 
Gadamer’s humanist rhetoric ............................................................................ 10 
Praxis and phronesis ......................................................................................... 12 
1.4 Conversation .......................................................................................................... 15 
The subject matter ............................................................................................. 17 
1.5 Language ................................................................................................................ 19 
The self-revelation of the subject matter .......................................................... 21 
World and medium ........................................................................................... 22 
Constitutive and/or representational ................................................................. 24 
1.6 Listening................................................................................................................. 27 
1.7 Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 30 
2. Back to the Words Themselves ......................................................................... 31 
2.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 31 
2.2 Heidegger’s Destruktion and Hermeneutic of Facticity ..................................... 33 
 
viii 
2.3 Back to Experience ............................................................................................... 37 
2.4 The Self-Forgetfulness of Language .................................................................... 42 
2.5 The Thinking Use of Language ............................................................................ 49 
2.6 Concept-Historical Consciousness ....................................................................... 57 
2.7 Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 62 
3. Tarrying with Language .................................................................................... 64 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 64 
3.2 Hearing, Belonging, and Language ..................................................................... 66 
The hermeneutic circle ...................................................................................... 66 
The primacy of hearing ..................................................................................... 68 
Our default hearing ........................................................................................... 73 
3.3 The Event of Understanding ................................................................................ 75 
The self-presentation of meaning ...................................................................... 75 
The evocative power of language ..................................................................... 78 
3.4 The Art of Listening.............................................................................................. 84 
Tarrying............................................................................................................. 84 
The intuitive ear ................................................................................................ 87 
3.5 Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 92 
4. Trusting Language ............................................................................................. 95 
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 95 
4.2 We Think in Language: Gadamer’s Practical Philosophy ............................... 96 
4.3 We Think through Language: Gadamer’s Dialectical Hermeneutics .............. 109 
4.4 Thinking with Language: Gadamer’s Hermeneutics of Trust .......................... 124 
 
ix 
4.5 Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 129 
5. Continuing the Conversation: The Wisdom of Language .............................  131 
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 131 
5.2 Listening to Language: A Summary ................................................................... 131 
5.3 The Social Practice of Listening .......................................................................... 134 
5.4 The Wisdom of Language .................................................................................... 142 
Gadamer’s understanding and Aristotle’s phronesis ........................................ 142 
Thinking in language: awareness ...................................................................... 146 
Thinking through language: appropriateness.................................................... 149 
Thinking with language: reasonableness .......................................................... 155 







ENTERING THE CONVERSATION: GADAMER AND COMMUNICATION STUDIES 
 
I do not believe that the full potential that lies in language, and that 
enables language to keep pace with reason, has been properly considered. 
(Gadamer, “Boundaries of Language” 10) 
INTRODUCTION 
In his 1978 review of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method, John Angus 
Campbell introduced Gadamer’s seminal book to communication scholars by saying that 
this text was too important to be left to its target audience—the philosophers (101). 
However, as John Arthos notes, despite the fact that Gadamer makes communication the 
center, he is misunderstood by communication scholars. Arthos aims to correct some of 
these misunderstandings through in-depth explorations of the intellectual traditions that 
influenced Gadamer’s thought. It is these traditions that Stanley Deetz credits with the 
appeal as well as difficulty of Gadamer’s reception in American communication studies 
(“Conceptualizing Human Understanding” 12). This ambivalence towards Gadamer may 
also be explained by the fact that his ideas constitute a paradigm shift that calls into 
question “some of Western humanity’s most entrenched and cherished beliefs” (Stewart, 
“One Philosophical Dimension” 343). Campbell, Arthos, Deetz, Stewart, and others 
agree that this paradigm shift places the discipline of communication on higher ground, 
granting it deeper, greater significance.  
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This chapter explores the conversation between Gadamer and communication 
studies by surveying what communication scholars have found significant for 
communication theory and practice in Gadamer’s thought. This literature survey has five 
sections, corresponding to five topics that are essential to philosophical hermeneutics and 
that have captured the attention of communication scholars: understanding, rhetoric, 
conversation, language, and listening. These topics are also central to the question that 
drives this dissertation project, namely, What is the relationship between a constitutive 
theory of language and a life of wisdom? In order to understand how a constitutive view 
of language can help us become insightful and discerning thinkers and speakers, this 
dissertation explores Gadamer’s idea and practice of listening to language.  
Gadamer’s view of understanding has captured the attention of communication 
scholars because it constitutes a paradigm shift from a reproductive and psychological 
view of understanding to a productive and ontological view. Unlike the idea of 
understanding in traditional American communication studies, which is circumscribed by 
empathy, correctness, and statements, Gadamer’s idea of understanding focuses on the 
content of messages, is concerned with the incompleteness of meaning, and is driven by 
questions. Scholars have found that, because of its ontological ground, Gadamer’s view 
of understanding promises to connect communication research with practice, hence leads 
to a genuine understanding of communication phenomena—something that has been 
needed in the field. 
Dissatisfied with the presumption that the ground of the discipline must be 
scientific, some scholars have found an alternative theoretical ground in Gadamer’s 
broad, humanist view of rhetoric. His grounding of rhetoric in logos grants rhetoric an 
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epistemic role. Communication scholars have also found Gadamer’s efforts to articulate 
the differences between scientific and prudential reasoning significant towards extending 
and deepening traditional rhetorical theory.  
As communication scholars have observed, the conversation that lies at the heart 
of Gadamer’s hermeneutics accounts for his broad, dialogic view of rhetoric. Scholars 
have found Gadamer’s idea of conversation particularly helpful in addressing the 
problems raised by modernity, such as Enlightenment rationalism, Cartesian dualism, and 
scientific objectivism. The centrality of the subject matter (die Sache) to Gadamer’s view 
of conversation has captured the scholars’ attention in particular because it brings a 
reversal of emphasis from traditional American communication studies, namely, from the 
author of a discourse to the content of that discourse.  
Gadamer’s focus on the subject matter is grounded in his ontology of language. 
Communication scholars turned to Gadamer’s ontological view of language as 
constitutive because they found it intellectually compelling, offering solutions to 
problems caused by Cartesian thinking, and representing a more encompassing view of 
language than the representational-instrumental view. Gadamer’s view of language has 
also provided our field with the ontological and phenomenological ground for a critique 
of an instrumental-representational theory of language.  
Gadamer’s view of listening has received much less attention in our discipline 
than the other ideas surveyed in this chapter. However, a few communication scholars 
have acknowledged the centrality of listening to Gadamer’s productive view of 
understanding, his idea of conversation, dialogic view of rhetoric, and constitutive theory 
of language. This dissertation project explores Gadamer’s view of listening in the 
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framework of his ontology of language and the hermeneutic practice of listening to 
language.  
UNDERSTANDING 
The objective consciousness of communication studies 
This section deals primarily with the self-understanding of the communication 
field. Deetz is a leading communication scholar who has developed in more depth than 
others the relevance of Gadamer’s view of understanding to the self-understanding of the 
field. Therefore, this section will rely substantially on his work. The main problem 
identified early on by communication scholars who turned to Gadamer’s texts was the 
scientific ground of the discipline—in Deetz’ words, “the ‘objective consciousness’ 
which dominates the field” (”Conceptualizing Human Understanding” 15). In 1978 Deetz 
mentioned communication scholars’ disillusionment with the results of research in the 
previous twenty-five years (12). Deetz identified the lack of historical self-awareness of 
the discipline as the cause; Michael J. Hyde blamed the disciplinary situatedness “outside 
the experience where the communication scientist can maintain a distanced, ‘objective’ 
point of view” (81). Stewart, Arthos, and Jeffery Bineham concur with Deetz and Hyde. 
According to Deetz, the negative outcomes of the fact that the field of 
communication is “largely unaware of its own prejudices” (i.e., it lacks historical self-
awareness) are the following: concepts and methods “dominate experience without 
responsibility”; communication research has not increased understanding of 
communication phenomena, leading, instead, to the reification of experience; and, the 
discipline is unable to separate appropriate from inappropriate prejudices 
(“Conceptualizing Human Understanding” 14, 15, 22; “Negation” 436). The situatedness 
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of communication studies outside experience is seen to have led to objectification, to not 
tackling the “essential nature” of human communication as “a lived-through experience 
(Erlebnis)” (Hyde 81), and to the reproduction of “past intentions and perceptions of the 
world,” thus failing “to come to grips with the originary moves in experience and 
understanding—with truth itself” (Deetz, “Negation” 435). This cluster of problems 
motivated communication scholars to explore alternative theoretical grounds for the 
discipline, and so they turned to continental philosophers such as Heidegger, Gadamer, 
Buber, and Ricoeur. This work of exploration began with questioning the presuppositions 
of a scientific ground for communication studies and continued with a work of 
reconceptualization of basic concepts, theories, and presuppositions. 
Gadamer’s alternative 
In addressing the problem of the scientific ground of the study of communication, 
scholars have found Gadamer helpful because he discusses the problem of grounding the 
humanities in science and provides a “philosophy of inquiry” as an alternative to 
contemporary social science (Stewart, “Philosophy of Qualitative Inquiry” 118). Insofar 
as the problem is concerned, Robert L. Scott points out that Gadamer showed how “the 
typical attitudes of science leave experience incompletely understood” (“On Viewing 
Rhetoric as Epistemic: Ten Years Later” 263) and Deetz mentions that Gadamer warned 
against the human tendency “to subjectivize (psychologize) the nature of experience and 
understanding” (“Negation” 435). As for the alternative provided by Gadamer, it 
addresses the problems identified with an objective consciousness, provides the discipline 
with a historical self-awareness, and grants it greater significance.  
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Deetz points out that Gadamer’s philosophy of inquiry provides a way to think 
outside of dichotomies such as “subjectivity and objectivity” and “idealism and 
empiricism” which are central to the objective consciousness that characterizes the 
communication field (“Conceptualizing Human Understanding” 12). Bineham and 
Stewart reach the same conclusion as they discuss Gadamer’s views of language and 
conversation. Also, as Stewart and Deetz point out when they discuss Gadamer’s 
relevance to interpersonal communication and organizational communication, and Arthos 
to rhetoric, by providing the intellectual history of concepts central to communication 
studies, Gadamer responds to the particular disciplinary need for historical self-awareness 
(Stewart, “One Philosophical Dimension” 343). Moreover, Campbell and Deetz urge 
communication scholars to consider the questions Gadamer asks because they are more 
appropriate to the nature of communication than those asked by American 
communication studies and they also place the discipline on higher ground. Gadamer’s 
questions are concerned with “the process rather than the results of interaction” 
(Campbell 101; Deetz, “Conceptualizing Human Understanding” 20). Stewart says that 
Gadamer’s view of understanding as a process instead of product makes it “ontologically 
not just epistemologically significant” (“Philosophy of Qualitative Inquiry” 119). Finally, 
Arthos credits Gadamer with “the inestimable service of returning the culture of inquiry 
to its rightful home in the studia humanitatis” in a way that runs counter to the 
interpretation of “rhetorical humanism as sophistry” that has followed under Nietzsche’s 
and Heidegger’s influence (“Hermeneutic Version” 77). 
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Towards a disciplinary hermeneutic consciousness 
The concept1 of understanding is central to this exploration of alternative 
theoretical grounds for communication studies and can help us understand Deetz’s 
commitment to “the development of a ‘hermeneutic consciousness’” in the discipline 
(“Conceptualizing Human Understanding” 15). In order to understand the need for a 
hermeneutic consciousness in our discipline, we need to understand the idea of 
understanding as traditionally understood in American communication studies. 
According to Deetz, the traditional American communication studies view of 
understanding is summed up by three words: empathy, correctness, and statement (15, 
17). As Deetz notes, as long as understanding is viewed as empathy, the primary 
communicative task is “to build bridges or remove barriers so the self can get into the 
other and recreate [the other’s] subjective experience or see the world as [the other] sees 
it” (16). Deetz also finds fault with “the desire for the correct understanding” in 
American scholarship because it transforms “the communicant” into a scientist by 
expecting him or her “to give up prejudices and deny his/her own role as actor” (17). 
Furthermore, Deetz remarks, the underlying assumption that sameness makes 
understanding easier leads to the reification of concepts and the psychologization of the 
elements of the communication process. As a result, the statement becomes the “unit of 
meaning most under consideration” (16-17).  
Deetz notes that Gadamer’s view of understanding constitutes “a reversal in 
emphasis from most American communication studies” because for Gadamer 
“understanding fundamentally is a problem of understanding messages rather than 
                                                 
1 The English translations of Gadamer’s texts indicate that Gadamer uses the words concept and 
idea interchangeably, unless the context or the topic being discussed calls for one or the other. 
This project follows this usage pattern.  
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people” (“Conceptualizing Human Understanding” 18). He also points out that Gadamer 
argued against the idea of a perfect or correct understanding (18). When understanding is 
fundamentally related to messages, the concern becomes incompleteness, and not 
misunderstanding. In contrast to the idea of correctness that defines the American 
communication studies view of understanding, Gadamer’s understanding is dialectical 
and prejudiced, i.e., it is productive, not reproductive of meaning. A dialectical view sees 
understanding as always exceeding each participant’s understanding; thus, it has “a 
speculative character forming and exceeding itself with every movement” (19). A 
productive view of understanding also makes the question replace the statement as the 
fundamental unit of meaning. Deetz points out the significance of this reversal, saying 
that “Gadamer’s strength is in demonstrating the primacy of the question over the 
assertion in the development of human thought” (“Negation” 437). Arthos shows the link 
between the question and hermeneutic consciousness: “Gadamer appears to be saying 
that the closure of the Enlightenment individualism is the absence of a question, and the 
openness of the hermeneutic person is the cultivation of the question” (“Humanity of the 
Word” 489). The other idea that is essential to Gadamer’s dialectical, productive view of 
understanding is difference or otherness. Deetz mentions the central function of otherness 
in questioning prejudices and thus allowing the subject matter to emerge (“Negation” 
437). Arthos also mentions the productivity of Gadamer’s idea of difference when he 
writes that “Gadamer’s difference is always a productive relation” (“Who Are We” 32).  
Deetz writes that in Gadamer’s view understanding “is always prejudiced” 
(“Conceptualizing Human Understanding” 18). Therefore, the communicative task for 
the communication researcher is, he says, not to “give up prejudices and deny his or her 
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role as actor,” but to enhance his or her “ability to distinguish productive from 
unproductive prejudices” (18). The peculiar centrality of prejudice to Gadamer’s view of 
understanding is captured by Deetz with insightful clarity when he says, “Prejudices are 
necessary to prepare understanding but are denied in the very process of understanding” 
(“Negation” 436). Deetz, Stewart, and Bineham mention Gadamer’s restoration of 
prejudice—as a condition necessary for understanding and characteristic of the human 
condition (“Negation” 436; “Interpretive Listening” 383; “Hermeneutic Medium” 9). In 
1983 Stewart expressed regret that this new understanding of prejudice had had no 
impact on communication textbooks (“Interpretive Listening” 383). Bineham tries to 
correct a common misunderstanding of prejudice (i.e., read through modern lens) by 
noting that, to Gadamer, “prejudices are not individual or subjective character traits,” but 
are social in nature (“Hermeneutic Medium” 6-7). Bineham explains: “Within this 
perspective, true subjectivity is impossible. From the moment of experience one is 
already biased, one already assumes certain basic agreements about what the world is 
like—politically, morally, ontologically. One does not subjectively assent to these 
agreements” (6-7). Deetz also points out the centrality of prejudice to Gadamer’s idea of 
conversation which, unlike Habermas’ ‘ideal speech situation’ “does not seek to escape 
from prejudices but to speak out of them in the most thorough and committed form” 
(“Keeping the Conversation Going” 275). Deetz explains how prejudice defines 
Gadamer’s productive view of understanding by redefining the idea of openness as “the 
willingness to put one’s expressions to the test rather than an empathic understanding of 
another as held in the liberal ideas. Understanding is, thus, conceptualized as a productive 
fusion of prejudice” (276).  
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As these communication scholars have observed, not only does Gadamer provide 
a critique of the scientific ground of the human sciences, but he also offers an alternative 
ground: rhetoric. It is Gadamer’s rhetoric as taken up in communication scholarship that 
will be the focus of the next section.  
RHETORIC 
The contribution that Gadamer’s conception of rhetoric brings to rhetorical 
studies, as acknowledged in our field so far, can be summed up as follows: along with 
praxis, rhetoric provides the ground for the human sciences, whose distinctive mode of 
knowledge is phronesis (practical knowledge).  
Gadamer’s humanist rhetoric 
Arthos’ commitment to the task of describing “hermeneutics as the depth 
dimension of rhetoric” and his familiarity with Gadamer’s texts and his intellectual 
traditions enable him to see Gadamer’s contributions to rhetoric in an unprecedented 
fashion. He writes that 
in spite of the obliqueness of his attention to rhetoric, [Gadamer] made 
extraordinary contributions to many facets of the canon that are somewhat 
camouflaged by the tack he took toward civic humanism. He advances 
with inestimable depth and originality a number of rhetorical cruces—to 
name a few, the structure of deliberative judgment (phronesis, krisis), the 
nature of issues (res, Sache), the function of starting points (topoi, loci, 
sensus communis), the role of audience, the definition of praxis, the 
location of agency. The lacuna for which he felt some responsibility was 
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less a deficit of attention as a question of framing. (“Hermeneutic 
Version” 77) 
Gadamer’s conception of rhetoric developed by Arthos more fully in the 2000’s had been 
already mentioned by Hyde and Smith, and Scott in the 70‘s—by Hyde and Smith in their 
seminal article “Hermeneutics and Rhetoric: A Seen but Unobserved Relationship,” and 
by Scott in his article “On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic: Ten Years Later” (266). 
Arthos explains that Gadamer’s view of rhetoric is as broad as “all discourse that seeks a 
shared understanding and builds community,” limited only by the fact that “it does not 
depend on separate proof to make its truth self-evident” (“Hermeneutic Version” 71). 
Arthos presents Gadamer’s idea of rhetoric in stark contrast to modern rhetoric. If the 
latter is the kind encountered in handbooks and is defined by “instrumental agency and 
persuasive stratagems,” Gadamer’s view fits the emerging definition in rhetorical studies, 
which Arthos describes as “dialogic, attendant on listening as much as speaking, 
grounded existentially, resistant to the dichotomy of meaning and style, and as broad in 
scope as living speech” (“Hermeneutic Version” 70, 71).  
Although a “humbler path” which departs from the “royal road of Western 
philosophy”—as Arthos calls Gadamer’s view of rhetoric—this view is of significant 
importance. Arthos writes, “Rhetoric’s notorious problem of persuasive deception is 
replaced by language’s function of showing and concealing as the constitutive truth of 
human being” (“Hermeneutic Version” 71). After exploring Gadamer’s contribution to 
epistemic rhetoric, Hyde and Smith wrote in 1979: “rhetoric is far more inherent, far 
more pervasive, and far more instrumental in the epistemic function than most scholars 
have supposed. Once the proper place of rhetoric is recognized, theories of 
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communication, and particularly rhetorical criticism, will become deeper, more 
important, and more enduring” (363).  
Interested in Gadamer’s “extraordinary contributions” to the rhetorical canon, 
Arthos traces Gadamer’s view of rhetoric back to “the ‘indirect’ or ‘unwritten’ tradition 
of Greek thought” and sees it as “a conscious and unconscious appropriation of 
Heidegger’s Aristotle” (“Hermeneutic Version” 77, 71). He believes that Gadamer read 
Aristotle “against Aristotle’s manifest intention, because Gadamer understood the key 
insight of ancient rhetoric to be that reason is embodied, that logos is thinking and 
speaking, that rhetoric is the locus of social discursivity” (73). Arthos’ particular 
contributions in presenting Gadamer’s thought to communication scholars come with his 
explorations of Gadamer’s humanism. He believes that “Gadamer owes much to the 
humanism Heidegger rejected” (“Humanity of the Word” 491) and that he was more able 
to understand humanism than we are with “our Enlightenment eyes” (484). Arthos claims 
that Gadamer’s hermeneutical project is an effort “to rejoin what [Gadamer] called the 
‘unbroken tradition of rhetorical and humanist culture’ to its own thought” (477). He sees 
that Gadamer tries “to place the metaphysical tradition under the sign of a humanist 
rhetoric, tracing an unbroken line from Socrates to Vico” (“Hermeneutic Version” 73). 
Gadamer’s appropriation of the humanist tradition and his turn to Vico in Truth and 
Method had been earlier mentioned, if only briefly, by Jost and Hyde (11).  
Praxis and phronesis 
Communication scholars have also recognized the significance for rhetorical 
studies of Gadamer’s grounding of philosophical hermeneutics in praxis and phronesis. If 
Jost and Hyde appreciate that the contemporary hermeneutic (philosophic) reflections on 
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praxis “deepen and extend traditional rhetorical theory in ways not yet appreciated” (11), 
Michael Calvin McGee remarks that Gadamer locates the difference between 
hermeneutics and social science in Aristotle’s distinctions between the different kinds of 
knowledge, and Bineham notes how Gadamer’s appropriation of praxis and phronesis 
brings the two disciplines, hermeneutics and rhetoric, together (“Displacing Descartes” 
309). As for Gadamer’s view of phronesis, McGee sees Gadamer’s practical philosophy 
as grounded in a theory of the ideal person—the phronimos, which “can be taken as the 
key not only to Truth and Method, but to all of Gadamer’s projects since 1960” (20). In 
response to McGee’s treatment of Gadamer’s phronesis, Arthos clarifies a potential 
misunderstanding, namely, that phronesis, at its best, is not “an individual’s possession,” 
i.e., “not the ideal of the isolated reflective subject,” but rather “the transit point where 
experience is transformed into judgment and judgment replenishes the store of 
knowledge” (“Humanity of the Word” 478; “Who Are We” 23).  
Despite their recognition of Gadamer’s contribution to a philosophical and 
rhetorical understanding of phronesis and praxis, various communication scholars see 
Gadamer’s restoration of praxis and engagement of phronesis as insufficiently helpful for 
social and political theory. Arthos and Hariman find Gadamer politically naïve and see 
Gadamer’s approach to praxis and phronesis too bourgeois to be able to respond to the 
complexities of modern political societies (Arthos, “Who Are We” 18; Hariman 291). 
While Arthos grounds his critique in the intellectual traditions behind Gadamer’s thought, 
Hariman blames it on philosophy.  
Despite Gadamer’s not being able, to use Deetz’ words, “to offer social and 
political guidance” (“Keeping the Conversation Going” 277), Arthos acknowledges 
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Gadamer’s contribution as being that of transforming the ontological turn into a social 
phenomenon: “In so far as the ontological turn had taken direction from its subjectivist 
roots, sociality was subordinate. Gadamer has attempted to restore the majesty of its 
claim to the being who we are . . . Out of the traditions of the self he has tried to extract a 
tradition of community coming to be in the ongoing conversation that we are” (“Who Are 
We” 32). Hariman sums up Gadamer’s contribution (despite its limitations) as follows: 
Although Gadamer allows the political register of prudence to be wholly 
obscured while he highlights ethical and rhetorical concerns, he brings out 
the full significance of the contrast between scientific and prudential 
reasoning. In addition, by elevating prudence to the stature of a 
philosophical vocabulary capable of encompassing the problems of 
hermeneutics, Gadamer in a single stroke clarifies the relationships 
between various modes of knowledge, valorizes practical experience and 
ordinary language, identifies how understanding occurs through 
application, provides a means for understanding various realms of practice 
while still recognizing their relative autonomy, and posits a theoretical 
succession from the tradition of practical philosophy to philosophical 
hermeneutics. (290-291)  
Since “Gadamer claims for himself the distinctive role of discovering the basis of 
phronesis in dialogue rather than virtue,” as Arthos writes, and since he replaces the 
intentionality and instrumentalism of modern rhetoric with what Arthos calls the “ideal 
speech community,” the next section will tackle Gadamer’s idea of conversation 




Communication scholars have found that Gadamer’s view of conversation helps 
with the problems raised by Enlightenment rationalism, Cartesian dualism, and scientific 
objectivism in the field of communication. Stewart and Deetz have shown the 
significance of Gadamer’s conversation for communication research, interpersonal 
communication, and communication ethics, while Bineham and Arthos have done the 
same for rhetoric.  
Arthos sees dialogue and community as “the absolute center” of Gadamer’s 
thought and “his most innovative departure from Heidegger” (“Who Are We” 18). He 
places “the conversational community which lies at the heart of [Gadamer’s] thought” in 
the historical context of the intellectual traditions that shaped his views (15). Arthos 
further notes that the fact that ”the ontological event of being is apart from subjective 
origins, and in its deepest nature communal” is central to Gadamer’s attack against 
Enlightenment rationalism, Cartesian dualism, Romantic subjectivism, and scientific 
objectivism (15).  
Distance and fusion of horizons are two interrelated ideas that define Gadamer’s 
conversation and have often been misunderstood by communication scholars. Deetz 
explains the central role played by distance in Gadamer’s view of conversation:  
Distance between human traditions, rather than needing bridging in 
communication, makes both self and other more understandable since that 
which is normally taken for granted in an unaware sense is now brought 
into inspection. Conversations out of the same historic traditions may flow 
smoothly and transmit information but leave un-understood the total 
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matrix of experience which led the information to mean what it did and 
the array of possibilities the information might have had for experience 
and existence. (“Conceptualizing Human Understanding” 18) 
Arthos answers the frequent misunderstanding of Gadamer’s fusion of horizons when he 
writes that “distance is constitutive of the history of who ‘we’ are” because by fusion of 
horizons Gadamer does not mean “the utopian desideratum of organic wholeness, but an 
unfolding conversation of an infinite finitude . . . the reading as it unfolds” (“Who Are 
We” 31). In a voice similar to Arthos and informed by his commitment to identity 
formation, Deetz explains Gadamer’s fusion of horizons (consensus) as being “reached in 
the formation of new integrative concepts rather than by the force of the better argument” 
(“Keeping the Conversation Going” 275-276). Stewart brings up Gadamer’s fusion of 
horizons in his discussion of hermeneutic listening, where he says, “Differences still 
remain, and one critical aspect of hermeneutic consciousness is acceptance and even 
celebration of the tension between irreconcilable horizons” (“Interpretive Listening” 
388). 
Stewart offers a helpful description of Gadamer’s view of conversation, saying 
that a genuine conversation has five characteristics: 
(1) The informed and thoughtful pursuit of substantive, consequential 
questions. . . . the subject matter (die Sache) is focal; . . . the point is that 
the topic is larger than the subjectivities of the interlocutors. (2) A 
commitment to increased insight rather than self-glorification or self-
defense. The point is not to ‘win,’ ‘excel,’ or defend one’s position but to 
further one’s ability to articulate a problematic. (3) An interest not only in 
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the otherness of the other but also in his or her strongest case. . . . (4) An 
acknowledgment that every outcome, no matter how resolved it may 
appear, is necessarily unfinished and incomplete, and (5) The willingness 
to persevere through dissension and apparent irreconciliabilities. 
(“Dialogue and Deconstruction” 262-263)  
Regarding the second point in Stewart’s description, Hyde muses: “Perhaps Gadamer, 
like Plato in the Thaetetus (167e), equates argumentation with ‘debate’—that inauthentic 
way of examining Being when contrasted with the dialectical inquiry of ‘conversation’” 
(96). And Deetz puts it best: “The concern is not with supporting one’s claims but finding 
the key questions” (“Conceptualizing Human Understanding” 20).  
The subject matter 
Gadamer’s focus on the subject matter (die Sache), which is essential to his view 
of conversation (as Stewart’s description makes clear), has captured the attention of 
communication scholars. Campbell puts it concisely and beautifully: “All genuine 
meeting, from Gadamer’s perspective, is over something” (347); Hyde refers to the 
subject matter as the “object” that distinguishes, for Gadamer, between “hermeneutical 
conversation” and “therapeutic” conversation (97); and Arthos clarifies the meaning of  
the “hermeneutic ‘object’” by grounding it historically: “a rather misleading synonym for 
affair, issue or matter-at-hand that harkens back more to the Roman res or causa than to 
our conventional notions of empirical ‘object’” (“Humanity of the Word” 487). Deetz 
explains Gadamer’s emphasis on the subject matter with the natural dynamics of a 
genuine conversation, which we have all experienced: “The driving force of a genuine 
conversation is not the participants but the subject matter. . . . As the conversation 
 
18 
develops it takes on a life of its own; it becomes difficult, if not irrelevant, to determine 
who said what” (“Negation” 437). And here Gadamer’s approach is, again, a reversal of 
the customary view in communication studies, as Deetz points out: “while most in 
communication studies turn to consider what each person has to say about the subject 
matter, Gadamer focuses on what the subject matter ‘says’ to each” (“Reclaiming the 
Subject Matter” 232). Perhaps Deetz sums up best the rhetorical and ethical significance 
of the shift from subjectivity to the subject matter in Gadamer’s view of conversation 
when he says, “It is not the insides of the other or the self that is to be understood for 
either would be covering up the objective demand of the subject matter with one’s 
subjective reaction;” and also: “to the extent that the object or other is silenced by the 
success, the capacity to engage in conceptual expansion and reach open consensus on the 
subject matter is limited” (232). As Deetz remarks, because of its focus on the subject 
matter, Gadamer’s conversation “has the character of progressively opening the 
prejudicial certainty of each individual to question” (232).   
Deetz sees the centrality of the subject matter to Gadamer’s conversation as a 
valid ground for an interpersonal system ethics, a subject-matter-focused communication 
ethic. The problem identified by Deetz in interpersonal ethics is its foundation—
Enlightenment rationalism. He finds that the 18th-century concepts of language, 
experience, communication, and the individual are seriously flawed because they start 
from the individual standpoint, hence lead to a concern with expression and 
representation (“Reclaiming the Subject Matter” 228). Because of his interest in identity 
formation, Deetz finds that the liberal traditions of ethics do not address concerns such as 
the suppression of open formation of opinion, beyond those already possessed, i.e., they 
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do not answer ethical questions such as How can interests be ethically produced rather 
than how are they appropriately represented? This is why he sees stoppages in an 
interaction system as the clearest measure of an unethical communication system (232). 
Therefore, Deetz’s ethical principle inspired by Gadamer’s view of conversation is, Keep 
the conversation going! This means that “the communicative act should be responsive to 
the subject matter of the conversation and at the same time establish the conditions for 
future unrestrained formation of experience” (232).  
Gadamer’s hermeneutical and rhetorical emphasis on the subject matter is 
grounded ontologically in logos. In his review of Truth and Method Campbell writes that 
the “surprising thing” about Gadamer’s view of conversation is its ontological ground, 
logos: “From Gadamer’s standpoint, every dyad is a triad. That is, when two are gathered 
together the logos, the word, the ideality of language is there too. And the great play 
begins again. One falls into a genuine conversation and in the play of language, which is 
after all the only game in town” (345). Gadamer’s constitutive view of language helps 
explain why Gadamer finds conversation paradigmatic for the nature of language. His 
view of language makes the topic of the next section.  
LANGUAGE 
Communication scholars familiar with Gadamer’s view of language have 
provided several reasons for exploring it: it is intellectually compelling, it offers solutions 
to problems caused by Cartesian thinking, and various communication research programs 
have already argued for it. Also, Gadamer’s view of language constitutes a more 
encompassing view than the representational-instrumental view; hence it provides a 
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higher ground for the communication discipline. Finally, contemporary society calls for 
it.  
In his 1973 article “Words without Things: Toward a Social Phenomenology of 
Language” Deetz introduces communication scholars to Gadamer’s view of language and 
provides them with a couple of reasons for exploring it. These reasons are still valid 
today, almost four decades later: “This view of language is not totally new and perhaps 
even now its time has not properly come. Yet the view seems intellectually compelling 
even though specific potential implications of the view are only partially apparent. 
Further, present day society seems to demand a new view of language” (51). Bineham 
and Stewart concur with Deetz that, despite the fact that Gadamer’s view of language is 
not new, it demands the attention of communication scholars: Bineham sees Gadamer’s 
approach as unique (“Hermeneutic Medium” 3) and Stewart finds it the best articulation 
of a post-semiotic view of language. While Gadamer’s constitutive view of language 
challenges some communication research programs, as Stewart notes in his review of 
Dialogue and Deconstruction (262), he also remarks that the view has already received 
recognition in our field—research areas such as epistemic rhetoric, rhetoric of science, 
ethnographic communication research and pragmatics have already “argued for the 
primary as contrasted with the secondary or derived significance of speech” (“Speech and 
Human Being” 55). Finally, there is unanimous consent among the communication 
scholars familiar with Gadamer’s view of language that “by positing linguisticality as the 
ontological ground of human being,” Gadamer “restores communication scholarship to a 
position of even more importance than rhetoric enjoyed in the Middle Ages” (Stewart, 
“Philosophy of Qualitative Inquiry” 120, emphasis removed).  
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Communication scholars develop several ideas that are essential to understanding 
Gadamer’s constitutive view of language. These are the primacy of its revealing function 
over its signifying function, the concepts of world and medium, its unreflective and social 
nature, and the paradox of the subject matter inherent in it. An idea foregrounded in these 
discussions is how Gadamer’s constitutive view of language grounds his efforts towards 
“removing the privilege attendant on the subjective self enshrined in Western thought” 
(Arthos, Inner Word 159).  
The self-revelation of the subject matter 
Deetz describes Gadamer’s constitutive view of language by explicating what it 
means to say that the primary mode of being of language is to reveal, not to signify. The 
revelatory dimension of language—the fact that “words have no raison d'être other than 
to reveal what they bring to language”—stems from its ontological relationship to human 
experience: “an experience is not first wordless and then subsumed under the generality 
of a word through naming” (“Words without Things” 47). Arthos captures the primary 
revealing function of language beautifully: the word is “a conceptual point of access to 
the real” because “Reality is the cooperation of intellectual act with material possibility, 
and there is never no cooperation” (Inner Word 148).  
Deetz also introduces communication scholars to the paradox of the subject 
matter (die Sache) that is intrinsic to Gadamer’s constitutive view of language: “Each 
word ‘discloses’ or brings into perspective its subject matter in a particular dimension. 
Language makes possible the meaningfulness of things by disclosing the life-world and 
by developing the projective stance from which the subject matter’s implications arise or 
are revealed” (“Words without Things” 48). Deetz refers to Richard Palmer’s example of 
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the sentence The tree is green to explain how the paradox of the Sache corrects the 
representational view of language centered in the speaking subject: “‘The tree is green’ 
does not designate a perception or a mental concept but the subject matter itself disclosed 
in a certain light: the tree is disclosed in its greenness” (47). Arthos’ book-length 
exploration of Gadamer’s reflections on the inner word in Truth and Method explicates 
the intellectual background of Gadamer’s non-reflective view of language: “In his 
appropriation of the Thomistic doctrine of the inner word, Gadamer cautions that the 
word is not the reflection of the mind (and we hear here again the constant fear of a return 
to subjectivism), but of the subject matter to which language is addressed” (“Who Are 
We” 21).  
World and medium 
Bineham introduces communication scholars to Gadamer’s view of language as 
the medium in which we live as human beings. He explains how Gadamer’s view of 
language as a medium corrects the modern subject-object dichotomy inherent in the 
instrumental view of language: “Language brings both humans and the human world into 
being. It is the point at which human reality is generated. . . . The possibilities of an 
objective world or a subjective observer are extinguished, for all that is experienced and 
all who experience are shaped by the medium” (“Hermeneutic Medium” 6, 12). Along 
with Deetz, and Hyde and Smith, Stewart explains Gadamer’s concept of world, which is 
foundational to an understanding of language as constitutive: the human world is “a 
world not of things but of meaning” (Language as Articulate Contact 116). Stewart gives 
the example of a neighborhood and explains that what makes it a neighborhood is “not its 
number of persons per block but one’s comfort or discomfort, preference or resistance, 
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enjoyment or distress” (116). Finally, as Deetz and others remark, for Gadamer, the 
world that is revealed in language is a social world, namely, “the cumulative experience 
of a society” (Deetz, “Words without Things” 48). One implication for communication 
studies, as Stewart notes, is that language ceases to be merely an instrument used to reach 
communication because “the traditional distinction between language and communication 
is materially altered, or even effaced” (Language as Articulate Contact 112). 
Understanding the nature of language as a medium, not a tool, also helps us understand 
why Gadamer views conversation as defining the nature of language: “features of human 
worlds do not first exist and then get spoken or written of; they come into being in talk” 
(Stewart, Language as Articulate Contact 113). Stewart coins terms such as 
“languaging,” “worlding,” and “articulate contact” in order to emphasize the ontological, 
social, and communicative nature of Gadamer’s constitutive view of language, as 
opposed to a monologic, psychological, and individual view (119). Arthos acknowledges 
this shift in Gadamer’s view of language from the individual mind to a social world too:  
For Gadamer, language has its constitutive role for human being precisely 
because it ‘is not a creation of reflexive thinking’ . . . There is no world 
over here and language over there, but a world that emerges out of our 
being creatures of language. He associates reflexivity with the Cartesian 
isolation of the mind and the ascendency of the subject. . . . language is the 
medium of our being together, that which links us to each other and our 
common concerns. . . . So Gadamer’s polemical insistence on the 
unreflective character of the word is about the organic, or at least holistic, 
 
24 
relation of reason and speech, history, culture, tradition, and community. 
(Inner Word 136) 
The fact that language constitutes the medium in which we think and live does not mean, 
to Gadamer, that language is a prison for thought. Deetz and Bineham point that out 
clearly. Deetz writes that Gadamer’s view of language “has the nature of an open-ended 
social institution, i.e., words are already meaningful but with multiple implications,” 
making possible both “exact designation” and “creative authentic communication” 
(“Words without Things” 51). Bineham clarifies the particularity of the human world 
shaped by language, as understood by Gadamer:  
[T]hough people live within a medium, they are not totally captive to one 
particular manner of interpretation, understanding, and experience. . . . 
People live within a medium that does exhibit preferred understandings 
and interpretations, but other often unnoticed possibilities do exist within 
the medium and can be embraced and cultivated. (“Hermeneutic Medium” 
13) 
Arthos connects Gadamer’s unreflective idea of language to his productive view of 
understanding—as an increase in Being: “the word is not reflective because it is not a 
rebounding back upon itself or the speaker, but rather it is an emanation into the world 
that works to constitute that world. It does not come back to the sender like the sound 
waves off a flat surface, but with additions, in the response of another” (Inner Word 160). 
Constitutive and/or representational  
Communication scholars have found that Gadamer’s approach to language 
addresses problems associated with representational views of language. Deetz identifies a 
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couple of these problems, which are captured by Bineham under the umbrella of 
“Cartesian problems traditionally associated with the Western linguistic heritage” 
(“Displacing Descartes” 305). In Deetz’s view, “the derivative, representational, 
functional views” of language “seem unnecessarily limited and have undesirable 
ramifications” (“Words without Things” 41). Among these undesirable ramifications is 
the fact that the representational views of language “tend toward abstractionism” because 
they objectify language. By this Deetz means that they destroy the “identity” between 
language, experience and meaning (41, 47). In other words, the representational views of 
language cover over the constitutive view, which is grounded in the ontological 
relationship between language and experience.  
Second, Deetz writes that the objectification of language that comes with “the 
formalistic, nominalistic, derivative conceptions of language” leads to a view of 
communication that is intimately connected to control—a view that seems fit for “a 
technological society intent on controlling the environment and mankind and for 
transmitting facts rather than generating insight” (“Words without Things” 51). And 
Deetz continues, “If we wish to understand the possibilities and implications of what 
another says rather than merely know what he says,” we would need to embrace a 
constitutive view of language like Gadamer’s (51). By granting language “only the ability 
to order and transmit that which is already possessed by both speaker and listener” Deetz 
believes that a representational view of language is “inadequate to describe the formative 
human experiences of coming to see a thing in a new way or our understanding of the 
dissimilar experiences of another made available in language” (41). Finally, Deetz 
captures Gadamer’s critique of the representational view of language when he writes that 
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“the scientific ideal for signs of exact designation and unambiguous concepts narrows the 
human World, robs natural words of their fundamental formative power, and allows 
words to be seen as separate from the being of the thing that is thought” (47). 
The question of compatibility between the representational and the constitutive 
view is answered both affirmatively and negatively by communication scholars. Deetz 
and Bineham see the constitutive view as primary and encompassing the representational 
view. Bineham writes: “Any ‘objects’ of reference exist within a linguistic medium and, 
consequently, are ontologically constituted by language before any specific acts of 
reference occur. While language does operate referentially, it always does so within a 
linguistic medium that generates the referents” (“Hermeneutic Medium” 6). Deetz 
believes that “the most apparent” advantage of the constitutive view of language is that 
“it can encompass most or all other views without reduction, for it stands as a background 
or source for derivative views” (“Words without Things” 50).  
Stewart brings up the core problem behind the question of compatibility, as 
mentioned by Heidegger and Gadamer, namely, that the constitutive dimension of 
language “is covered over by the semiotic assumption” (“Speech and Human Being” 66-
7). Deetz and Bineham agree with Stewart’s reading. If in his 1986 article “Speech and 
Human Being” Stewart sees the two views as compatible—human speech being “a 
phenomenon that not only signifies or symbolizes but that also (perhaps 
primordially)reveals, constitutes, or embodies ‘world’ between persons”—in his book-
length study of language published nine years later, he sees the constitutive and the 
representational-instrumental views as “incommensurable” (61, 113). Through an in-
depth analysis of the conceptuality used in communication scholarship, Stewart identifies 
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five commitments of the semiotic view of language. He points out that scholars’ use of 
the vocabulary of sign/symbol brings them close to embracing the representational model 
(Language as Articulate Contact 12). Stewart’s exploration leads him to the following 
conclusion: “the same phenomena cannot be both constitutive and representational or 
instrumental. Language cannot be coherently treated as simultaneously a world-
constituting, characteristically human way of being, and as a system that is instrumentally 
employed by already-constituted humans to represent aspects of their worlds and 
accomplish their goals” (113). Stewart believes that “one cannot make instrumental use 
of the constitutive mode of one’s being-in-the-world” (114). 
As this dissertation project will show, Gadamer’s constitutive view of language 
grounds his view of listening. Although Gadamer’s view of listening is not as developed 
in communication studies as the other topics discussed so far, the work that has been 
done needs to be acknowledged because it points out the need for further exploration. 
LISTENING 
Gadamer’s view of listening, or the centrality listening occupies in his 
hermeneutics, has been mentioned by communication scholars in three contexts: the 
discussion of empathic listening, the relationship between listening and communication 
ethics, and Gadamer’s dialogic, humanist rhetoric. However, apart from Stewart’s 
development of a hermeneutic approach to listening based on ideas central to Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics, the discussion of Gadamer’s view of listening in our field is still in an 
exploratory stage. 
In his review of Truth and Method Campbell contrasts Gadamer’s view of 
listening to empathic listening: “listening does not mean that fraudulent attending which 
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is merely empathic and which meets the standpoint of the other with no standpoint of its 
own. Listening here means that even if one says nothing, one is present to the discussion 
as a partner in it” (106). In his 1983 article, “Interpretive Listening: An Alternative to 
Empathy,” Stewart contrasts Gadamer’s interpretive listening with empathic listening, 
aiming to show how hermeneutic phenomenology is relevant to listening theory and 
practice (380). Informed by four of Gadamer’s ideas—openness, linguisticality, play, and 
the fusion of horizons—Stewart creates a model of hermeneutic listening that opposes 
empathic listening (“Interpretive Listening” 382). According to Stewart, “productive” or 
“interpretive listening” is first characterized by openness, in the sense that “the listener is 
open to the meanings that are being developed between oneself and one’s partner” (382, 
384). Second, by recognizing “that each person’s speaking is functioning to disclose—in 
the Heideggerian sense—not just to represent or symbolize,” the listener focuses on “the 
present language-event that the communicators are bringing into being” instead of 
“listening ‘behind’ or ‘beyond’ the words for clues to covert intentions or psychological 
states” (386). Third, “interpretive listening follows the dynamic of play,” which means 
that the “structural to-and-fro that engages the interlocutors in a genuine conversation” is 
more important than “one’s intent, expectations, or attitudes” because of its potential for 
creative insight (387). Finally, Stewart conceptualizes interpretive listening as a fusion of 
horizons in order to “emphasize the global breadth of prejudices that always affect one’s 
interpreting, to highlight the open, fluid nature of those prejudices, and to underscore the 
fact that understanding is not a static state but a tensional event, a stasis defined by the 
contact of two lifeworlds” (388).  
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Discussing the role played by listening in communication ethics, Molly Stoltz 
brings in Gadamer as support for the role played by bias in defining and practicing ethical 
listening. Informed by Gadamer’s restoration of prejudice as the condition of all human 
understanding, and acknowledging the human tendency to bring our bias into what we 
hear and listen to, Stoltz sees any act of listening—whether to a person or a text—as a 
listening for something. Therefore, for Stoltz, choice lies at the core of ethical listening, 
namely, the choice to listen for something different from what we expect to hear (178). 
Also concerned with the relationship between listening and communication ethics,  
Lisbeth Lipari acknowledges Gadamer as one of the sources of inspiration for her thought 
(“Listening Otherwise” 2). However, she seems to be departing from Gadamer when she 
claims that compassion, instead of understanding, should constitute the grounds of ethical 
listening, an idea that will be taken up in her 2010 article “Listening, Thinking, Being.” 
Finally, Arthos mentions in passing the role played by listening in Gadamer’s 
humanist view of rhetoric, which is “attendant on listening as much as speaking” 
(“Hermeneutic Version” 70, 71) and in his view of human agency. Regarding the latter 
Arthos writes that, for Gadamer, “The privilege attendant on being human is not 
principally as the agent or initiator but as a being granted the capacity to hear and 
respond” (“Humanity of the Word” 487). In his discussion of Gadamer’s idea of the 
eminent text as “an audible phenomenon,” Stewart, too, refers briefly to Gadamer’s inner 





This chapter identified five areas in Gadamer’s hermeneutics that communication 
scholars have found significant for the study of communication: his view of 
understanding, rhetoric, conversation, language, and listening. These areas are central to 
the question that drives this dissertation project, namely, What is the relationship between 
a constitutive theory of language and a life of wisdom? This project takes a first step 
towards answering this question by exploring Gadamer’s idea and practice of listening to 
language through a close interpretive reading of Gadamer’s texts.  
In doing that, this dissertation engages the conversation between our field and 
Gadamer in several ways. By exploring the constitutive role played by everyday speech 
in conceptual thought (chapter two) and the role of hearing and listening in understanding 
(chapter three), this dissertation shows how the hermeneutic practice of listening to 
language can further develop a hermeneutic consciousness in our field. By exploring the 
relationship between language and reason that underlies Gadamer’s practice of listening 
to language (chapter four), this project shows the interdependence of hermeneutics and 
rhetoric, shedding light on the epistemic role of rhetoric. Finally, by looking into the 
rhetorical implications of our being hearers of language (chapter five), this project 
answers the call in our field for a more robust theorizing of listening as a rhetorical and 
ethical practice, while also hoping to provide an incentive for further conversation 





BACK TO THE WORDS THEMSELVES 
 
We should never underestimate what a word can tell us, for language 
represents the previous accomplishment of thought. (Gadamer, “Relevance 
of the Beautiful” 12) 
 
What I taught above all was hermeneutic praxis. . . . In it what one has to 
exercise above all is the ear, the sensitivity for perceiving prior 
determinations, anticipations, and imprints that reside in concepts. 
(Gadamer, “Reflections” 17) 
INTRODUCTION 
When reading Gadamer, the reader comes across an interesting way of speaking 
about language as Gadamer delves into the exploration of particular philosophical 
questions. Here are some examples: “Generally we talk about the forms of 
communication of our time. Again, I wonder what is revealed by this expression. . . . the 
word communication as we use it today sounds somewhat odd” (“Culture and Media” 
174-175); and also, “There is something we also can learn from the German word for 
measure” (“From Word to Concept” 7-8); finally, “Once more we have something to 
learn from a word. This time it is the word ‘modern’ which provides the key to the 
mystery. The Ancients did not feel that the latest thing was automatically the best” 
(“Western View” 36). In all these cases, and others like them, the reader encounters 
Gadamer’s work in the history of concepts. Words are hermeneutic keys that provide 
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Gadamer with the proper access to the subject matter he is exploring. He turns to 
language for guidance because, in his view, language “represents the previous 
accomplishment of thought” (“Relevance of the Beautiful” 12). This attitude towards 
language defines Gadamer’s idea and practice of listening to language.  
As his texts amply testify, listening to language lies at the very core of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutic praxis. Gadamer’s practice of listening to language is a reflective 
(phenomenological) engagement of language that acknowledges the constitutive role 
played by ordinary language in conceptual thought. This theoretical acknowledgment 
translates into the hermeneutic practice of questioning our conceptuality and listening for 
its semantic field. Putting this in Gadamer’s terms, listening to language means listening 
to the concept for the word. 
Gadamer’s reasons for listening to language, which are developed in this chapter 
and the next two chapters, are as follows: First, we need to listen to language because 
language, not consciousness, is the critical element in understanding (“Text and 
Interpretation” 29; Truth and Method 473). Second, the ontological and hermeneutic 
primacy of language over subjectivity comes with the nature of our primary relationship 
to language—we belong to it (Truth and Method 474). Language is the medium in which 
we think and live, which makes us human (401). This makes us primarily hearers of 
language, instead of users (463). Third, language is an open medium that is binding as 
well as expansive (“Expressive Power” 349; Truth and Method 444, 448, 457; 
“Reflections” 37, “Boundaries of Language” 14). This means that the problems inherent 
in the binding nature of language as a medium can be attended to from within the 
medium itself, by acknowledging its expansive nature (“Text and Interpretation” 23; 
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“Culture and Media” 173). The expansive nature of language also renders it a tremendous 
resource for thought (“Boundaries of Language” 10; “Beginning and End of Philosophy” 
23). In other words, Gadamer does not believe in linguistic determinism.  
In what follows, I will provide a brief intellectual background for Gadamer’s idea 
and practice of listening to language. Then, I will explain the role played by the 
relationship between everyday speech and conceptual thought in Gadamer’s hermeneutic 
phenomenology and the practice of listening to language. The chapter will end with a 
look at the hermeneutic consciousness developed during the practice of listening to 
language.  
HEIDEGGER’S DESTRUKTION AND HERMENEUTIC OF FACTICITY 
As a phenomenological engagement of language, Gadamer’s practice of listening 
to language fits within the phenomenological turn towards language in continental 
philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century (“Reflections” 21). Jean Grondin points 
out the radicalness of the turn towards language at the time when he writes that 
“Gadamer tackled what was largely a philosophical terra incognita” (Philosophy of 
Gadamer 124). He adds that we cannot imagine the situation in Gadamer’s time because 
language has become so much a part of our philosophical landscape with all the varied 
forms of reflection on language following the 1960s. He mentions “the Oxford ordinary 
language philosophy, grammatical structuralism, psycho-analysis (Lacan), 
deconstruction, hermeneutics, and the last works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty” 
(124).  
Gadamer credits Heidegger with having made language the subject of continental 
philosophy by transforming Husserlian phenomenology (“Hermeneutics and 
 
34 
Logocentrism” 115, 122). Two interrelated ideas introduced by Heidegger that explain 
the shift from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to Heidegger’s existential or 
hermeneutic phenomenology, and also ground Gadamer’s idea and practice of listening to 
language, are Destruktion and hermeneutics of facticity. As Heidegger’s student, 
Gadamer was fascinated by his teacher’s interpretations of Aristotle. In his biography of 
Gadamer, Grondin writes that, although “Gadamer had acquired a good sense of the 
conceptual dimension of philosophy” from his other teachers, Hönigswald and Natorp, 
“with Heidegger the concepts came to speak again and sounded completely different 
[because] Heidegger’s concepts were no longer formal shells for arbitrary content; they 
were themselves bursting with an unheard-of phenomenal fullness” (Hans-Georg 
Gadamer 116). Behind Heidegger’s interpretations of Aristotle that captured his students’ 
attention lay his Destruktion of philosophical language. Heidegger’s phenomenological 
insights into Aristotle and Gadamer’s own philological work in Greek philosophy placed 
Gadamer on the way to his hermeneutic phenomenology. 
Gadamer explains how Heidegger’s Destruktion transformed Husserlian 
phenomenology: “the task of ‘getting back to the things themselves’ took on an entirely 
new dimension: that of a history of the ancestry of terms” (“Reflections” 22). Aware of 
the possible misunderstanding of the German concept Destruktion, Gadamer writes that 
Destruktion never had for Heidegger’s students—and he adds significantly, “at least for 
those who at the time really had an ear for the German language”—“the negative tone of 
destruction that clings to the foreign usage of this word by the British, the French, and 
others” (“Hermeneutics and Logocentrism” 121). He clarifies that Heidegger’s 
Destruktion consisted in uncovering the historical layers of the meanings of a concept, 
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“not in order to destroy something but to set something free” (“Reflections” 22, 24). It is 
meaning that is set free from “dogmatic distortions”—“terminological solidifications”—
that have accumulated with the conventionalization of language use (Gadamer, “History 
of Concepts” 6, 11).  
Heidegger’s Destruktion and, by extension, Gadamer’s listening to language 
come with the recognition of a different relationship between language and thought than 
the relationship captured by an instrumental view of language. Gadamer writes that, 
unlike science, in philosophy, each term “contains a certain saying-power within itself” 
(“Reflections” 22). This means that, unlike signs “that point to something,” philosophical 
terms “tell something of their own origin and from this they form a horizon of meaning 
which is supposed to lead speaking and thinking beyond themselves to the thing meant” 
(22). Gadamer himself moved away from an instrumental view of language as a result of 
listening to Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle (21).  
The aim of Heidegger’s Destruktion was to gain a deeper access to the 
phenomenon, to the subject matter (die Sache) he was exploring. Brice R. Wachterhauser 
clarifies a possible misunderstanding of the phenomenological imperative ‘back to the 
things themselves’ when he writes that it was not a call to the things ‘in themselves,’ as if 
humans could ever shake off their historical nature and reach an ahistorical, 
presuppositionless encounter with reality; it was a call “to ‘deep’ interpretations as 
opposed to ‘superficial’ interpretations of things worked out in terms of ‘fancies and 
popular conceptions’” (“History and Language” 28). Finding the proper access to the 
subject matter was one of Heidegger’s main concerns with philosophy in his time and his 
response to (or rather, rejection of) the scientific ideal of objectivity. The proper access to 
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the subject matter will become Gadamer’s concern too, motivating his work in the history 
of concepts.  
Heidegger’s Destruktion was grounded in his hermeneutic of facticity, which was 
the other idea that marked Heidegger’s response to the methodological crisis in 
philosophy at the time (i.e., the question of the proper access to the subject matter) 
(Risser, “From Concept to Word” 312). This is how Gadamer explains Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic of facticity as a radical move from previous conceptions of hermeneutics 
and Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology: “Before any differentiation of 
understanding into the various directions of pragmatic or theoretical interest, 
understanding is Dasein’s mode of being, . . . the original characteristic of the being of 
human life itself” (Truth and Method 259). Gadamer explains that Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic of facticity unfolded “the existential structure of understanding” 
(“Reflections” 26-27). Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity was part of his critique of 
Husserl by showing that “no freely chosen relation toward one’s own being can get 
behind the facticity of this being” (Truth and Method 264). Human existence cannot be 
transcended through reflection, including phenomenological reflection. And so, as Deetz 
notes, following Heidegger’s discovery that Husserl’s aim to suspend all presuppositions 
was impossible, phenomenology became existential or hermeneutic phenomenology 
(“Interpretive Research” 59). This meant that the object of phenomenological description 
became “a descriptive explication of modes of living or styles of being in the World” 
(59). Wachterhauser explains that “hermeneutical accounts differ from strict 
transcendental accounts in that they do not ground intelligibility in the private sphere of a 
pregiven, essentially changeless subject but in the public sphere of evolving, 
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linguistically mediated practice” (“History and Language” 6). The way Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic phenomenology promised to provide the proper access to the subject matter 
was, as James Risser writes, as “an interpretive movement that will continually gain 
access to the subject matter without having to rely on conceptual determination” (“From 
Concept to Word” 313). Given the existential ground and nature of human understanding, 
the Destruktion of philosophical terms provides the only proper access to the phenomena, 
to the subject matter.  
BACK TO EXPERIENCE 
The question of the proper access to the subject matter is intrinsically linked to 
what Gadamer saw as imperative for philosophy and authentic thinking: a relationship 
with praxis. Risser captures the necessity of grounding philosophy in praxis beautifully 
when he writes that all philosophical research should take “its orientation from the lived 
situation out of which and for the sake of which one is inquiring” (“Poetic Dwelling” 
375). Gadamer saw hermeneutic phenomenology as the way to ground philosophy in 
praxis, hence to provide philosophical, theoretical accountability for their ideas—i.e., an 
alternative to the modern ideal of scientific objectivity.  
As Gadamer tells us, the way hermeneutic phenomenology is able to ground 
philosophy in praxis is by operating a shift from first principles as the ground of 
knowledge to participation. Gadamer writes that he finds participation to be more suited 
to human reality than “the foundationalist account of the apodictic evidence of self-
consciousness” (“Hermeneutics of Suspicion” 64-5). From the Greeks Gadamer learns 
that thinking does not need a grounding in a principle; rather, “it must be based on 
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primordial world experience”—hence, he restores the epistemic value of human 
experience (“Reflections” 9).  
Experience is central to Gadamer’s hermeneutics. In his article “Rhetoric, 
Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology” Gadamer writes that “It is the task of a 
philosophical hermeneutics to reveal the full scope of the hermeneutical dimension of 
human experience and to bring to light its fundamental significance for the entirety of our 
understanding of the world” (274). Reflecting on his own philosophical and 
phenomenological work, he says that he tried hard to avoid “losing himself” “in 
theoretical constructions which were not fully made good by experience” (“Reflections” 
16).  
Gadamer’s restoration of the epistemic value of experience comes with his 
acknowledgment of the finite historical nature of human understanding. According to 
Gadamer, human finitude “precludes adequate knowledge a priori,” hence rendering the 
“finitude of our historical experience” the ground of all human understanding and 
knowledge (Truth and Method 416, 457). First of all, Gadamer writes, “experience is 
experience of human finitude. The truly experienced person is one who has taken this to 
heart” (357). Risser explains that, by starting with the finite nature of human knowledge, 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics rejects the possibility of “one, final, objectively correct 
interpretation” (Hermeneutics 119). At the same time, as Grondin observes, by grounding 
human knowledge in historical experience, Gadamer challenges the modern supremacy 
of method because “what can be methodologically controlled is only a tiny part of our 
life experience” (Hans-Georg Gadamer 285). 
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Of the two German words for experience, Erlebnis and Erfahrung, Gadamer 
identifies Erfahrung as the one that captures the finite, historical nature of human 
understanding (Truth and Method 356, 357). Unlike Erlebnis, Erfahrung foregrounds the 
event-like character of human understanding, i.e., the fact that understanding transcends 
human consciousness. Gadamer writes that “the special feature of historical experience is 
that we stand in the midst of an event without knowing what is happening to us before we 
grasp what has happened in looking backwards” (“Text and Interpretation” 24). In his 
essay “On the Tragedy of the Hermeneutical Experience,” Gerald L. Bruns points to the 
event character of hermeneutic experience when he writes that Erfahrung means “living 
through an event as against merely responding to it as a spectator” (76).  
With the event-character of hermeneutic experience comes its transformative 
power. Arthos explains Gadamer’s choice of Erfahrung over Erlebnis as follows:  
Erlebnis experience is not sufficient to make a life . . . because it is what is 
experienced and not who one becomes from the experience. Erfahrung is 
experience gained, experience held. . . . The verb erfahren literally means 
‘to learn.’ One learns by trial and error, through suffering, by undergoing 
experiences. As such Erfahrung is associated with the idea of wisdom 
gained through experience, practical wisdom, insight. (Speaking 
Hermeneutically 81-82)  
Grondin captures perfectly the transformative role of Erfahrung when he writes that 
“experience strikes us and becomes part of us, more deeply than any syllogism or 
analytical argument” (Philosophy of Gadamer 20). The idea expressed by the German 
Erfahrung is captured in the English phrase to learn something the hard way.  
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As learning, the hermeneutic experience (Erfahrung) is defined by negation and 
openness. Gadamer writes that “experience is initially always experience of negation: 
something is not what we supposed it to be . . . Every experience worthy of the name 
thwarts an expectation” (Truth and Method 354, 356). This “fundamental negativity” of 
experience comes with hermeneutic openness because “the negativity of experience has a 
curiously productive meaning” (353, 356). Gadamer explains what he means by this: 
“The dialectic of experience has its proper fulfillment not in definite knowledge but in the 
openness to experience that is made possible by experience itself” (355). Bruns provides 
a helpful clarification of the dialectic of negativity and openness in hermeneutic 
experience: “[Experience] throws what one knows, or rather what one is, into question, 
that is into that open place of exposure where everything is otherwise than usual” (77). 
Bruns further clarifies a potential misunderstanding when he writes that Gadamer’s idea 
of openness is totally different from the “open-mindedness of the liberal enlightenment,” 
being instead “a condition of exposure in which one’s conceptual resources have been 
blown away by what one has encountered” (78).  
The outcome of the dialectic of experience is a turn towards reality. Gadamer 
rightly observes that “Experience teaches us to acknowledge the real. The genuine result 
of experience, then—as of all desire to know—is to know what is” (Truth and Method 
357). Bruns writes that “Acknowledgment is how we connect up with reality as 
historicality or limit” (80). Indeed, since our access to reality is mediated by our historical 
situatedness, “Genuine experience is experience of one’s own historicity” (Gadamer, 
Truth and Method 357). This is how experience opens us to insight. If at one end of 
experience (Erfahrung) we have thwarted expectations, at its other end we find insight. 
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What makes insight “a necessary side” of “experience in the proper sense” is the fact that 
it “always involves an escape from something that had deceived us and held us captive” 
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 356). Risser points out the significance of the relationship 
between experience and insight in Gadamer’s hermeneutics: “through experience we are 
confronted with the insight that insights are finite and limited” (Hermeneutics 10). 
Gadamer’s restoration of the epistemic value of experience comes with his 
acknowledgment of the constitutive role played by ordinary language in conceptual 
thought. The message of Gadamer’s hermeneutic phenomenology that is also relevant to 
Gadamer’s idea and practice of listening to language is the following: if our thinking is to 
serve our practical life, instead of being mere theoretical, abstract constructions, the 
phenomenological cry Back to the things themselves! needs to be a return to the words 
themselves—i.e., where human experience comes into language. In his essay “Reply to 
My Critics” Gadamer defends the relevance of his hermeneutic thought for praxis as 
follows: “hermeneutic reflection discovers false hypostatizations of words, in the way 
Wittgenstein criticized psychology’s concepts by returning to the original hermeneutic 
situation of praxis-related speaking” (276). In Christopher Smith’s words, the principle 
that underlies Gadamer’s hermeneutics is that “native language as it is spoken is the root 
of all philosophy” (Hermeneutics and Human Finitude 109). The relationship between 
ordinary language and conceptual thought, between word and concept—which is the 
basic relationship in Gadamer’s idea and practice of listening to language—is the focus 
of the next three sections. 
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THE SELF-FORGETFULNESS OF LANGUAGE  
Making the concept the object of phenomenological reflection was the natural 
consequence of Gadamer’s realization that our primary, essential relationship to language 
is not instrumental, i.e., we do not primarily use language as we use a tool. Since the 
instrumental view of language presumes we are using language to pursue conscious 
goals, Gadamer’s shift away from an instrumental view is also a shift away from the 
presumption that our relationship to language is grounded in consciousness. Our natural 
use of language is unreflective. Gadamer calls this “the profound self-forgetfulness of a 
language that’s doing its job” (“History of Concepts” 6). In another essay, he asks, “For 
what is more unconscious and ‘selfless’ than that mysterious realm of language in which 
we stand and which allows what is to come to expression, so that being is 
‘temporalized’?” (“On the Problem of Self-Understanding” 50). Dennis Schmidt 
contends that the self-concealing character of language should constitute the starting 
point in any inquiry into the phenomenon of language (Lyrical and Ethical Subjects 104). 
Wachterhauser explains Gadamer’s idea of the self-forgetfulness of language beautifully 
when he writes: “when language functions properly it is self-effacing; it does not point to 
itself but allows the things themselves to become present in their inherent intelligibility” 
(Beyond Being 99). Interestingly, Grondin finds the “rudimentary character” of the third 
section of Truth and Method, where Gadamer explores the question of language, to be a 
consequence of the “maddening obscurity” of the subject matter itself, and he concludes, 
“In one sense, the more inarticulate and blurred an analysis of language, the more faithful 
it is to its object” (Philosophy of Gadamer 124), because in language “we are ‘projected’ 
into a network of intelligibility whose vessels are imperceptible to us” (128). 
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As both the discursivity of human thought and the nature of speech show, our 
unreflective relationship to language comes first, not our objectification (i.e., use) of it. 
Regarding the discursive nature of thought, Gadamer writes that “The verbal formulation 
is so much part of the interpreter’s mind that he [or she] never becomes aware of it as an 
object” (Truth and Method 403). Consequently, in his essay “The History of Concepts 
and the Language of Philosophy” Gadamer makes it clear that the object of his history of 
concepts is “not the isolated concept and those words corresponding to it in different 
languages . . . but rather the totality of a reciprocally upholding and sustaining 
conceptuality that itself arises as a linguistic whole out of the totality of our linguistic 
world orientation” (11, emphasis added). Conceptuality—as the object of Gadamer’s 
phenomenological reflection on language—needs to be understood both synchronically 
and diachronically.  
The synchronic dimension of conceptuality consists in the key ideas that define a 
culture or a group of people in a given historical time, and are fundamental to 
understanding the social values and patterns of thought and action of that culture or 
group. We think in concepts, we do not use or apply them. In Gadamer’s words, we 
acquire a growing familiarity with our mother tongue as the initial 
articulation of that world in which henceforth we make our way. Everyone 
knows what it means to have a feeling for language so that something 
sounds strange when it is not ‘right.’ . . . When we grow up in a language, 
the world is brought close to us and comes to acquire a certain stability. 
Language always furnishes the fundamental articulations that guide our 
understanding of the world. (“Contribution of Poetry to Truth” 114) 
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These are ideas that members of a linguistic community are socialized into, hence tend to 
take for granted. The synchronic dimension of conceptuality shows that understanding is 
more being than it is consciousness (“Hermeneutics and Logocentrism” 121). These key 
ideas are so much a part of how the members of a linguistic community understand 
themselves and the significant issues in the community that they provide the members 
with the sense of what is right and rational.  
Just like the discursive nature of human thought, the nature of human speech is 
such that generally we are not aware of the words we speak. Gadamer writes that 
“unconsciousness of language” continues to be “the genuine mode of being of speech” 
(Truth and Method 404-5). In one of his later essays he explains, “Nobody could utter 
one sentence if he [or she] were completely aware of what he [or she] was doing. If I 
were to attempt such total awareness I would not find a second word after the first” 
(“Hermeneutics of Suspicion” 62). The unreflective nature of human speech comes with 
the historical and ontological relationship between language and experience. In 
Gadamer’s hermeneutic phenomenology, the phenomenological return to the things 
themselves is a return to what Ferdinand de Saussure designated parole—in Gadamer’s 
words, to “the speaking word in its working reality” (“Hermeneutics of Suspicion” 62); it 
is a return to “the living meaning that resides in language as it is said . . . our customary 
usage of language” (“Aesthetics” 65). As Smith notes, Gadamer’s hermeneutics is a 
“philosophy of language as it is ordinarily spoken” (Hermeneutics and Human Finitude 
106).  
Gadamer’s hermeneutics favors speech over written texts for various reasons. One 
reason is that the constitutive nature of language first becomes apparent in speech, in 
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ordinary language. The things themselves are the things as they appear to us and in their 
significance to us, and these meaningful appearances are captured in speech, in our 
customary ways of speaking about our world.  
That the things themselves are meaningful appearances, not the things in 
themselves, comes with the existential fact that we cannot rise above our own existence 
to look upon it objectively, from outside it. This is why Gadamer found Husserl’s concept 
of life-world an excellent example of a “success in words” that reflected “a real turning in 
thinking” (“Practical Philosophy” 78). Life-world captures the constitutive relation 
between self and world very well, that is, the hermeneutic truth that the world is always 
our world, the world in which we live our lives.  
The realm of the given for human beings is always the realm of appearance and 
significance because the way we experience our world and the way we speak about it 
share the same ontological nature. According to Gadamer, it is a theoretical abstraction to 
see human experience and human language as distinct phenomena because “Experience 
is not wordless to begin with, subsequently becoming an object of reflection by being 
named” (Truth and Method 417). In Smith’s words, “for Gadamer there is no extra- or 
pre-linguistic reality that language could be said to picture. Language does not chart 
reality and give us information about it; it constitutes reality” (Hermeneutics and Human 
Finitude 110). Gadamer’s example of the expression sun setting is a good illustration of 
the relationship between experience and language: “When we speak of the sun setting, 
this is not an arbitrary phrase; it expresses what really appears to be the case. . . . what we 
see with our eyes has genuine reality for us” (Truth and Method 449). Speech captures 
the world as experienced as well as in its significance to us. Gadamer writes that his 
 
46 
hypothesis was that the “verbally-constituted experience of the world expresses not what 
is present-at-hand, that which is calculated or measured, but what exists, what man 
recognizes as existent and significant” (456). Idioms, proverbs, and sayings reflect this 
connection between everyday speech and that which is meaningful for a culture, its 
particular ways of seeing the world (i.e., appearance and significance). The relationship 
between perception, language, and culture has been well documented in a variety of 
fields. As Smith puts it, “The world of things among which we live is seen as it is 
because it is framed in the language we speak. And our task is to ‘get clear’ about what 
we say” (Hermeneutics and Human Finitude 113). The practice of listening to language 
can help us with this task. 
The fact that our customary ways of speaking about the world capture the world 
in its appearance and significance to us—i.e., the world is always already our world—
makes Gadamer call human speech or native language a “linguistic totality” (“Expressive 
Power of Language” 349). The idea of a linguistic totality refers to the universality of 
language; it speaks of the necessary historical relation between language and experience, 
hence between language and reason; it defines the realm of the intelligible in connection 
to language. This means that it points out the epistemically binding nature of language. 
Gadamer first introduces this idea in the third part of Truth and Method, where he 
elaborates his views on language: “It is the medium of language alone that, related to the 
totality of beings, mediates the finite, historical nature of man to himself and to the 
world” (457).  
By the idea of linguistic totality Gadamer critiques the restrictive view of 
language as an arbitrary system of signs and the loss of its epistemic value: “what really 
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opens up the whole of our world orientation is language, and in this whole of language, 
appearances retain their legitimacy just as much as does science” (449). Gadamer wants 
to restore the epistemic and ontological value of language as a linguistic totality, as a 
world orientation, hence he contrasts it to the merely signifying function assigned to it by 
modern science (“Expressive Power of Language” 350). With the advent of the modern 
ideal of scientific knowledge, Gadamer says, “natural language lost its unquestioned 
primacy, even if it did retain its own manner of seeing and speaking” (“Text and 
Interpretation” 28).   
Gadamer admits that language can have an instrumental function without 
subscribing to the instrumental view of the nature of language. Smith understands 
Gadamer’s “effort [to be] only to show that, though words can be tools, they are not that 
originally” (Hermeneutics and Human Finitude 318). And Schmidt explains that what 
Gadamer “requires [is] that we cease regarding language as a human activity, as 
something that we control, and instead treat it as opening up the realm of that which we 
call the ‘human’” (Lyrical and Ethical Subjects 3).  
Human speech as a linguistic totality is a binding and open, expansive totality. 
The idea of language as a linguistic totality does not mean closure. This is why in a later 
essay Gadamer found it necessary to clarify: “[O]ne should not confuse universality with 
totality. . . . Language is a universal and in no way a completed whole. The proximity of 
language and reason is announced especially in this common universality”  
(“Towards a Phenomenology” 20). The idea of completion or closure is as foreign to 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics as the idea of objectivity. The practice of listening to language is 
predicated precisely on the incompleteness and openness of human understanding. The 
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idea of totality is not static; it is not a given once and for all; a linguistic totality is a 
world orientation and a world horizon. “This way of language,” Gadamer writes about his 
view of language, “is not absorbed in making judgments and examining their claims to 
objective validity; rather, it is a way of language that constantly holds itself open to the 
whole of being. Totality, in my view, is not some kind of objectivity . . . is never an object 
but rather a world-horizon which encloses us and within which we live our lives” 
(“Reflections” 37). The idea of world horizon is interchangeable with the idea of world 
orientation as they both acknowledge the historical situatedness of native languages. A 
world horizon speaks of the openness that defines a hermeneutic view of understanding. 
Just as the horizon in nature, our world-horizon is not something static; instead, it moves 
along with the changes in our understanding of the world. In Truth and Method Gadamer 
writes, “The historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never 
absolutely bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never have a truly closed horizon. 
The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that moves with us” (304). 
Our world orientation or world horizon grows alongside our experience of the world. 
Anyone who speaks a foreign language well enough knows this. Gadamer himself 
acknowledged that, whenever people learn a foreign language, “while preserving their 
own relationship to the world, they extend and enrich it by the world of the foreign 
language” (Truth and Method 453). 
As the idea of language as a world-horizon or a world-orientation shows, 
Gadamer does not believe in linguistic determinism. He supports his view with 
phenomenological evidence. One such evidence is the natural process of concept 
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formation acknowledged by the diachronic dimension of conceptuality, which will be the 
focus of the next section.  
THE THINKING USE OF LANGUAGE 
As mentioned earlier, conceptuality has a synchronic dimension, which tends to 
be taken for granted, and a diachronic or historical dimension, which is usually 
overlooked. Gadamer refers to the diachronic, historical dimension of conceptual thought 
when he writes that “[w]e should never underestimate what a word can tell us, for 
language represents the previous accomplishment of thought” (“Relevance of the 
Beautiful” 12). The relationship between experience and language gives language its 
historical character, as “every language is constantly being formed and developed the 
more it expresses its experience of the world” (Truth and Method 457). The diachronic 
dimension of conceptuality was acknowledged in Gadamer’s work in the history of 
concepts. Any concept has a history. The diachronic dimension of conceptuality shows 
how history precedes, or rather defines, human reflection. Gadamer expresses this idea as 
follows: “language and its use precede the thought of thinkers. Of the history of human 
thought and action, language is the true prehistory in an immeasurable distance behind 
us” (“Historical Transformations of Reason” 3-4).  
As the coming into language of reality, everyday speech also constitutes, in 
Gadamer’s view, the site of the natural process of concept formation. He sees “the range 
of variation” and “the metaphorical ambiguity of natural language” as “the basis of the 
life of language and its logical productivity . . . on which all natural concept formation 
depends” (“Truth in the Human Sciences” 39; Truth and Method 414, 432). First, that 
which leads to the natural process of concept formation is the metaphorical nature of 
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language. Gadamer explains how the relationship between experience and language 
grounds the metaphorical nature of language:  
[I]f a person transfers an expression from one thing to the other, he [or 
she] has in mind something that is common to both of them; . . . [and] he 
[or she] is following his [or her] widening experience, which looks for 
similarities, whether in the appearance of things or in their significance for 
us. The genius of verbal consciousness consists in being able to express 
these similarities. This is its fundamental metaphorical nature . . . (Truth 
and Method 429) 
Metaphor is, for Gadamer, a logical and linguistic “generative principle”—i.e., “the 
spontaneous and inventive seeking out of similarities by means of which it is possible to 
order things” (431-2). Consequently, he deplores the marginalization and 
instrumentalization of metaphor when it is reduced to a mere rhetorical figure (432). 
Since the nature of language is metaphorical—i.e., it expresses similarities among human 
experiences—Gadamer finds the distinction between “the proper and the metaphorical 
meaning of a word” artificial (432).  
The other factor leading to the formation of new concepts, the polysemy that 
characterizes everyday speech, is (partially) the result of the finite nature of the human 
mind. This is how Gadamer describes the common human experience of not being able to 
say all that we want to say: “The word of human thought is directed toward the thing, but 
it cannot contain it as a whole within itself. Thus thought constantly proceeds to new 
conceptions and is fundamentally incapable of being wholly realized in any” (Truth and 
Method 426). Therefore, the contingency that defines the natural process of concept 
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formation, Gadamer explains, “comes about . . . through the human mind’s necessary and 
legitimate range of variation in articulating the essential order of things” (436). This leads 
to a “multiplicity of what can be thought” (269) and to the ambiguity specific to everyday 
speech.  
The hermeneutic role played by polysemy and semantic ambiguity comes with 
Gadamer’s view of speech as a search or a struggle: “Genuine speaking, which has 
something to say and hence does not give prearranged signals, but rather seeks words 
through which one reaches the other person, is the universal human task” (“Universality 
of the Hermeneutical Problem” 17). Elsewhere he defines speech as “the seeking and 
finding of the communicative word” (“Expressive Power of Language” 352). Smith 
writes, in this regard, that “Vagueness, ambiguity . . . is significant as an indication of the 
actual relationship which I have to language as a speaker of it. I am underway within the 
event of language, which continually transcends me. . . . Vagueness, accordingly, is a 
manifestation of the infinitude of language as a whole in relationship to the finitude of 
human speaking” (Hermeneutics and Human Finitude 311).  
The articulation of meaning in language constitutes a tradeoff between depth and 
clarity. For this reason, as Smith notes, Gadamer’s hermeneutics questions “language as 
precise designation” (Hermeneutics and Human Finitude 300). Because of the 
ontological relationship between speech and experience, because we perceive the world 
through our words and language defines the intelligible realm for us, precise designation 
comes with an impoverished thinking, with an oversimplified, hence potentially distorted, 
understanding of phenomena. This happens because, Gadamer writes, “the part of lived 
reality that can enter into the concept is always a flattened version—like every projection 
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of a living bodily existence onto a surface. The gain in unambiguous comprehensibility 
and repeatable certainty is matched by a loss in stimulating multiplicity of meaning” 
(Plato’s Dialectical Ethics 7). This idea is captured in Gadamer’s description of a 
technical term: 
For what is a technical term? A word whose meaning is univocally 
defined, inasmuch as it signifies a defined concept. A technical term is 
always somewhat artificial insofar as either the word itself is artificially 
formed or—as is more frequent—a word already in use has the variety and 
the breadth of its meanings excised and is assigned only one particular 
conceptual meaning. In contrast to the living meaning of the words in 
spoken language—to which, as Wilhelm von Humboldt rightly showed, a 
certain range of variation is essential—a technical term is a word that has 
become ossified. Using a word as a technical term is an act of violence 
against language. (Truth and Method 415)  
This is why Gadamer finds the modern preference for (or ideal of) univocity and linearity 
of meaning problematic (“Beginning and End of Philosophy” 23). A technical term is a 
sediment; it has no life in it. Therefore, it cannot produce new meaning, that is, it cannot 
take our thinking about a given phenomenon further or deepen our understanding of it. In 
Gadamer’s view, language should (and can) do that for us because its primary function is 
to make phenomena intelligible, to articulate the world. He calls this “the thinking use of 
words” (“Beginning and End of Philosophy” 23).  
The hermeneutic closure that comes with the general, precise meaning of concepts 
and terms also motivates Gadamer’s critique of the statement. He discusses the reliability 
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of the statement as a linguistic account of reality by looking at the concrete situation of a 
court trial: 
A person who has something to say seeks and finds the words to make 
himself [or herself] intelligible to the other person. This does not mean 
that he [or she] makes ‘statements.’ Anyone who has experienced an 
interrogation—even if only as a witness—knows what it is to make a 
statement and how little it is a statement of what one means. In a statement 
the horizon of meaning of what is to be said is concealed by methodical 
exactness; what remains is the ‘pure’ sense of the statement. That is what 
goes on record. But meaning thus reduced to what is stated is always 
distorted meaning. (Truth and Method 469) 
As Risser points out, the problem with the proposition for Hegel, and subsequently for 
Gadamer, is the inherent assumption that its object is known in advance (“From Concept 
to Word” 315). In another context he writes that the witness’ statement in court “is 
finalized completely without the living context of the conversation. . . . The usefulness of 
the witness’ statement depends on keeping him [or her] uninformed [as to the 
questionable points and arguments]” (“Boundaries of Language” 15). We know how easy 
it is to distort reality and meaning when the context is not considered. In Gadamer’s 
evaluation, such distortion comes with any linguistic account or act of communication 
that does not take into consideration the living context. Without its context, the statement 
flattens the meaning, it levels it. In its flattening function, the statement resembles 
another experience of language—translation. 
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Anyone interested in the hermeneutic practice of listening to language needs to 
take the issue of translation seriously. The example of Western conceptuality provided by 
Gadamer can help us understand why. Gadamer sees a problem with the fact that Greek 
concepts came to us through Latin because “Greek conceptual determinations were words 
in living language containing—for all their conceptual precision—a multiplicity or, to put 
it as would modern poetic theory, a ‘multivocity’ of semantic elements, which still go on 
speaking together in the background” (“Hermeneutics and Logocentrism” 122). Richard 
Palmer notes how Gadamer sees the history of Western philosophy as “a struggle against 
the hardening of living ideas and questions into metaphysical concepts” (535). This 
makes Gadamer describe our position in the West as “dangerously one-sided” (“Greeks” 
101). I believe he means by this that once Western thought made the natural move from 
speech to conceptual thought, it continued to apply concepts indiscriminately, without 
acknowledging the connection to the life experience from which the concepts sprang 
(“Beginning and End of Philosophy” 24). 
Gadamer’s understanding of translation as an experience of language that is 
relevant to the practice of listening to language can be summed up in four statements: any 
translation is flatter than the original; it is a highlighting (an interpretation); it cannot 
close the gap between the spirit of the languages; and it is incompatible with real 
thinking. The first observation Gadamer makes about translation that is relevant to the 
idea and practice of listening to language is that “Every translation that takes its task 
seriously is at once clearer and flatter than the original” (Truth and Method 386). 
Whenever we reach clarity, meaning is flatter, hence lacking to some extent in depth. 
Translation brings about a tradeoff between clarity and depth, because, according to 
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Gadamer, the act of translation is not different in kind from interpretation (386). Since 
every translation “is necessarily a re-creation of the text guided by the way the translator 
understands what it says, every translation is “a highlighting” (386). 
The third statement that Gadamer makes about translation that is important for the 
practice of listening to language can also be found in the third part of Truth and Method: 
“Where a translation is necessary, the gap between the spirit of the original words and 
that of their reproduction must be taken into account. It is a gap that can never be 
completely closed” (384). Here we come again across the idea of incompleteness. This 
idea is significant to Gadamer’s hermeneutics because it defines any authentic experience 
of language. As a historical articulation of our experience of the world, language is 
essentially finite and incomplete. Commenting on the passage just quoted from Truth and 
Method, John Sallis wonders about the meaning of the word spirit: “Is it anything other 
than their meaning, that which animates the sounds so that they are words and not just 
sounds?” (74). Schmidt attempts an answer to this question when he writes that the 
difficulties that come with translation come with the particular nature of each language, 
what he calls its “materiality,” i.e., the particular way a given language brings together 
sense and sound (Lyrical and Ethical Subjects 45).  
Translation flattens anyway, but scholastic Latin flattened Greek concepts even 
more by not preserving the living context captured in the Greek concepts. Gadamer 
writes about the incompatibility between the spirit of ancient Greek conceptuality and the 




In the language and the formation of philosophical concepts of the Greeks 
there still lives the immediacy of experience out of which those concepts 
were formed. . . . But what holds even more strongly as regards the 
thinking of the Greek philosophers . . . is that they created their thinking 
from the language people spoke. These philosophers profited from and 
built upon the artful development of the spoken language in Homeric and 
Hesiodic verse art, and they built upon rhetoric. (“Reflections” 25)  
Gadamer calls the translation of the multi-vocal ancient Greek into the univocal 
scholastic Latin “a mirroring process in which everything is distorted and nothing is 
preserved of that original movement of thought lying in the field between word and 
concept” (“History of Concepts” 8). Palmer explains that Latin translated Greek 
philosophy, which was grounded in colloquial Greek, literally and out of context, 
depriving the concepts of “their tentativeness and their original connotations in Greek 
usage” (535). 
Finally, in one of his interviews, Gadamer adds that “in translation there is no 
living thinking” (“Without Poets” 29). We can see this in the case of people who speak a 
foreign language by translating from their first language, as opposed to those who think 
in the foreign language when they speak it. The colloquial and grammatical accuracy of 
the speech is undoubtedly superior in the case of those who think in the second language. 
Also, it is only the latter who can understand and make use of the subtleties of meaning in 
a foreign language. The ability to think in a foreign language shows that language is not 
(essentially) a prison for thought. Also, when reading a translated text, we should 
consider this fact as essential to our thinking about the subject matter.  
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What Gadamer calls the self-forgetfulness of language points out that our 
unreflective use of language is natural. However, if we do not balance our unreflective 
use of language with a reflective engagement with it, the quality of our thinking will 
suffer as we will be working with a distorted, misleading, or superficial understanding of 
the matter at hand. The practice of listening to language acknowledges both the binding 
that comes with the synchronic dimension of conceptuality and our relationship to 
language as a linguistic totality and the potential for insight into the matter at hand that 
comes with the diachronic dimension of conceptuality and everyday speech as the site of 
concept formation.  
CONCEPT-HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
Listening to language translates a theoretical acknowledgment of the binding and 
expansive nature of language into the hermeneutic practice of questioning (our) 
conceptuality. Practicing listening to language means asking questions such as “Where do 
such concepts come from? What do they contain? What is unintended and unconscious in 
such concepts?” (Gadamer, “Beginning and End of Philosophy” 22). By questioning our 
conceptuality, the hermeneutic practice of listening to language makes conscious what 
has been taken for granted in our conceptuality and restores its connection to experience,  
namely, its historical dimension.  
The question is central to Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Gadamer defines hermeneutic 
practice itself as “a questioning of things” (Truth and Method 269) because the question 
is the epitome of (or the linguistic form that stands for) hermeneutic openness. “The 
essence of the question,” in Gadamer’s view, “is to open up possibilities and keep them 
open” (299). The absence of the hermeneutic openness represented by the question is 
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captured in English by statements such as That’s out of the question! or That’s not even a 
question. The question, therefore, is the opposite of the statement. From Plato Gadamer 
learned that a “[d]iscourse that is intended to reveal something requires that that thing be 
broken open by the question” (364). Also, the “art of questioning” presupposes the 
freedom from “the pressure of opinion” (366).  
It is important to clarify that the questioning that characterizes hermeneutic 
practice is not a subject-centered questioning because, in hermeneutic questioning, 
Gadamer writes, “the questioner becomes the one who is being questioned” (462). We 
saw this earlier when we discussed the event-character and transformative power of 
hermeneutic experience (Erfahrung). As an expression of hermeneutic openness, 
questioning acknowledges and works in tandem with the finitude and incompleteness of 
language and understanding (Gadamer and Ricoeur, “Conflict of Interpretations” 302).  
The questioning that defines the practice of listening to language should be 
understood first of all as the opposite of taking our conceptuality for granted. The aim is 
to become aware of our conceptuality, to engage it reflectively, mindfully, with our 
minds fully present—as opposed to unreflectively, mindlessly, out of habit. This means 
developing what Gadamer calls “concept-historical consciousness” (“History of 
Concepts” 10). It is important to know what this consciousness is and what it is not, as it 
constitutes Gadamer’s critique of the modern concept of consciousness.  
Unlike its modern counterpart, Gadamer’s hermeneutic consciousness grounds 
conscious reflection in history. This is why he uses the terms hermeneutic consciousness 
and historical consciousness interchangeably. Philosophical hermeneutics begins with the 
recognition of our historical situatedness. Therefore, the concept-historical consciousness 
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developed during the practice of listening to language is grounded in Gadamer’s view of 
understanding as “a historically effected event” (Truth and Method 300). The 
hermeneutic consciousness that corresponds to the view of understanding as a historically 
effected event is a “historically effected consciousness”—“a consciousness which 
partakes in history without being able to fully account for its participation” (Gadamer, 
“Writing and the Living Voice” 127).  
The concept-historical consciousness that is developed as we question our 
conceptuality is an awareness that concepts have a history, that they are historically-
bound linguistic accounts of phenomena. In other words, it is an awareness of the 
diachronic, historical dimension of conceptuality. Gadamer sees concept-historical 
consciousness as critical to responsible thinking that avoids theoretical constructions not 
grounded in praxis. “Conscientiousness and reliability in the employment of concepts 
requires a concept-history kind of awareness, such that one does not fall into the 
arbitrariness of constructing definitions,” he writes; “a consciousness of the history of 
concepts becomes a duty of critical thinking” (“Reflections” 18). Grondin notes in this 
regard that it was “the guiding insight of continental philosophers that it would be blind-
sighted to philosophize about the issues without taking into account the historical 
background and its import on the formation of our concepts” (“Continental or 
Hermeneutical Philosophy” 81). About Gadamer in particular Grondin writes that “His 
strength never lay in the area of conceptual construction, but rather in phenomenological 
concreteness, in conversation with history” (Hans-Georg Gadamer 268).  
For those of us who live in the West, Gadamer has given us a particular reason for 
practicing listening to language: we should question our conceptuality, rather than take it 
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for granted, because we are still thinking and speaking in Greek concepts, even though 
they reached us through Latin (“Without Poets” 29). The importance of uncovering the 
Greek and Roman “substance” of our philosophical language (i.e., its diachronic 
dimension, its history) lies in the fact that Greek and Latin provide us with the 
“fundamental” concepts that make Western thinking and being (i.e. the synchronic 
dimension of Western conceptuality) what it is (“Historical Transformations of Reason” 
4). This is one reason for Gadamer’s interest in the ancient Greeks. Uncovering the Greek 
content of our Western conceptuality also helps enrich our understanding of our concepts, 
as Gadamer says in one of his interviews (“Writing and the Living Voice” 68). This work 
of uncovering is done by questioning our conceptuality, by returning from the concept to 
the word. 
The other, related, reason for Gadamer’s interest in the Greeks is his belief that 
Greek philosophy is grounded in colloquial speech; hence, it provides an example of 
what thinking can be when what Gadamer calls the movement of thought that happens in 
the field between concept and word is kept alive (“History of Concepts” 8). This 
movement is kept alive by the hermeneutic practice of questioning (our) conceptuality. 
Gadamer writes in this sense: “What the history of concepts is able to accomplish 
consists in its passing back and forth on the road between word and concept, and in its 
keeping this road passable. In doing so, it helps constitute the meanings of a concept, for 
the concept-historical origins of a concept belong to that concept just like overtones 
belong to a tone” (“History of Concepts” 11). 
However, Gadamer tells us that concept historical consciousness is not a once-
and-for-all clarification of a concept by referring to its ancestry (“History of Concepts” 
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11). Concept-historical consciousness does not mean complete clarification of the 
meaning of a concept for several reasons. First, the finitude of the human mind constantly 
leads to the formation of new concepts. Second, Gadamer sees concept formation as a 
process that is open at both ends: neither does it explicate a concept in such a way that 
“the semantic field in which that concept originated would no longer have any say in its 
definition,” nor does it “begin with a supposed immediacy of experience—we always 
find it already standing in the midst of the linguistic interpretedness of the world, and it is 
always, therefore, already on the way to the concept” (“History of Concepts” 15). Third, 
concept-historical consciousness presupposes thematization, which means that there is 
always some aspect of the investigated phenomenon that remains in the background, 
hence not made conscious (10). Finally, as we saw earlier, language at work is defined by 
self-forgetfulness. The self-forgetfulness that defines language limits the clarification that 
comes with doing history of concepts (6). Joel Weinsheimer’s succinct description of a 
hermeneutic view of understanding captures the ambivalence and humility that define 
hermeneutic consciousness: “Understanding consists in sophisticated historical 
consciousness forever coming to grips with its own naivité” (“Meaningless 
Hermeneutics?” 165). This hermeneutic ambivalence and humility motivate the practice 
of listening to language. Ultimately, the concept-historical consciousness developed 
during the hermeneutic practice of questioning (our) conceptuality is a consciousness of 
the finitude of human understanding and of language as its articulation. This is reason 
enough for Gadamer to say that the rigor of hermeneutic praxis is “uninterrupted 




This chapter began the exploration of Gadamer’s idea and practice of listening to 
language by explaining its roots in the phenomenological turn to language initiated by 
Heidegger. Gadamer’s practice of listening to language is a reflective 
(phenomenological) engagement of language driven by a concern with the proper access 
to the subject matter (die Sache) and with the relationship between conceptual thought 
and praxis. As a phenomenological reflection, listening to language grounds thinking in 
praxis by acknowledging the epistemic value of experience and the constitutive role 
played by everyday speech in conceptual thought.  
A close textual interpretation of Gadamer’s views on the two poles of the practice 
of listening to language—conceptual thought and everyday speech—showed how 
language is both binding and expansive. The discursivity of human thought and the 
nature of human speech show that our natural use of language is unreflective. At the same 
time, since concepts come with a history and everyday speech is the site of the natural 
process of concept formation, the language in which we think and live is an open, 
expansive totality.  
Listening to language acknowledges both the binding and the expansive nature of 
language by engaging concepts reflectively, by inquiring into the origin and meaning of 
concepts. Through questioning (our) conceptuality, the practice of listening to language 
develops concept-historical consciousness. This means that it makes conscious what is 
taken for granted and it recovers the covered-up history of the concept. This is how the 
practice of listening to language moves us away from theoretical constructions divorced 
from praxis and provides us new, deeper insights into the subject matter. 
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This chapter’s exploration of the hermeneutic practice of listening to language 
engages the conversation between Gadamer and communication studies in several ways. 
First, it confirms Deetz’ and Hyde’s observations that hermeneutic phenomenology can 
help ground communication research in experience. Second, by reversing the movement 
of thought involved in concept formation, the practice of listening to language shows the 
potential for rhetorical invention inherent in language itself; it also provides a 
philosophical ground for the role played by metaphor in rhetorical invention. Third, the 
art of questioning that defines the practice of listening to language engages at a concrete 
level the need for a more robust hermeneutic consciousness in our field acknowledged by 
communication scholars. This study subscribes to Leonard C. Hawes’ belief that “a 
hermeneutic phenomenology of communication stands dialectically juxtaposed to a 
logical positivism of communication such that the former functions as a presuppositional 
critique of the latter” (30). The next chapter will further define the hermeneutic 
consciousness developed during the practice of listening to language as an intuitive sense 







TARRYING WITH LANGUAGE 
 
You have to listen to words. I have always told my students that they must 
develop an ear for the implications of the words they use. This is as 
important for the philosopher as it is for a musician to have an ear for the 
purity of sound. (Gadamer, “Culture and Media” 173)  
 
Each term we use contains a certain saying-power within itself. Our terms 
are not like signs that point to something but rather themselves tell 
something of their own origin and from this they form a horizon of 
meaning which is supposed to lead speaking and thinking beyond 
themselves to the thing meant. (Gadamer, “Reflections” 22) 
INTRODUCTION 
Gadamer often defines hermeneutic practice and hermeneutic consciousness with 
references to the ear or to a sensitivity for language. Here are a few examples. About 
Wilhelm von Humboldt he writes that “his sensitive ear . . . detect[ed] a difference in 
meaning between Kultur and Bildung” (Truth and Method 10). Referring to Freud, 
Gadamer says that his “sensitivity to language [was] reflected in his conceptual 
formulations” (“Expressive Power of Language” 350). Speaking of Derrida’s 
understanding of Heidegger’s concept of Destruktion, he writes: “I assume Derrida was 
not really familiar with its usage and thus chose what, to my feeling for language, is a 
peculiar and redundant verbal construction (namely, deconstruction) because he was 
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unable to hear anything but Zerstorung in Destruktion” (“Hermeneutics and 
Logocentrism” 121).  
About himself Gadamer says in one of the interviews that he “had a real talent for 
listening” (“Writing and the Living Voice” 66). He also writes that whenever he had to 
interpret a text, he listened “very closely . . . to the language . . . to what the text really 
wanted to say (Century of Philosophy 60). Gadamer credits Heidegger with having taught 
him how to listen to language, starting with reading the ancient Greeks. Under his 
teacher’s guidance, Gadamer and his fellow students stopped reading the Greeks “with 
academic eloquence using Latin conceptual language, which resounds throughout the 
language of modern science” (“Towards a Phenomenology” 23). Instead of speaking of 
“principle and the primary” for example, they would “say ‘arche’ and hear therein that it 
means both ‘beginning’ as well as ‘ruling’” (23).  
All these references point to the relationship between hearing/listening and 
understanding/interpretation that lies at the core of Gadamer’s hermeneutics and the 
practice of listening to language. The question addressed by this chapter is, What is this 
ear or sensitivity for language? The answer provided in this chapter brings up the ways 
in which hearing defines our relationship to language, i.e., how we are primarily hearers, 
not users, of language. This chapter further defines listening to language as a 
phenomenological engagement of language by explaining how the concept-historical 
consciousness at work in the practice of listening to language is an intuitive sense for the 
right words, that is, for appropriate ways of thinking and speaking about a given subject 
matter. This means that underlying the hermeneutic practice of listening to language is an 
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aesthetic, not an instrumental, relationship to language: we are expected to tarry with 
words the way we would with a work of art.  
HEARING, BELONGING, AND LANGUAGE 
Chapter two showed how our unreflective use of language is natural because we 
think in a particular conceptuality and we speak words without being aware of every 
word. This chapter will begin by explaining the role played by hearing in our unreflective 
use of language. In order to better understand Gadamer’s view of hearing and its 
relevance for the practice of listening to language, we need to take a look at what he calls 
the “circular structure of understanding” (“On the Circle of Understanding” 71).  
The hermeneutic circle 
Gadamer reminds us that the circular process of understanding “counts among the 
earliest insights of rhetoric and hermeneutics” (“Text and Interpretation” 48). We know it 
as the hermeneutic circle (Truth and Method 265). The hermeneutic circle has undergone 
several conceptions over the history of hermeneutics. Gadamer’s appropriation builds on 
Heidegger’s:  
A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He [or 
she] projects a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial 
meaning emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only 
because he [or she] is reading the text with particular expectations in 
regard to a certain meaning. Working out this fore-projection, which is 
constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he [or she] penetrates into 
the meaning, is understanding what is there. (267)  
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Risser remarks that Gadamer’s appropriation of the hermeneutic circle points out the 
event character of understanding, that is, that “understanding has the character of a 
process that one participates in rather than something constructed (by a subject)” 
(Hermeneutics 7). Gadamer notices the hermeneutic circle in the experience of music and 
in reading. To understand a musical piece, one must grasp it as a whole. He gives the 
example of someone who attends a concert but does not understand (the) music; that 
person will not know when to respond to it (“Hearing” 91). Understanding something in 
everyday life or understanding a text, just like understanding music, is not primarily or 
essentially defined by acquisition of information; it is about capturing meaning in its 
whole by anticipating it. The same anticipation of the whole characterizes the experience 
of reading. Reading was an important topic for Gadamer, who studied it for an entire 
semester in 1929 (“Hearing” 89). He sees a kinship between listening and reading 
because of their shared circular temporality (“Text and Interpretation” 48). Reading 
requires listening and understanding. He writes that “Whoever does not conceive of or 
reproduce texts in the totality of their articulation and modulation and structure cannot 
really read. Reading is not just the linking of word to word to word. . . . [It] is a silent 
way of letting something be said once more, and this assumes the anticipation of 
understanding” (“Hearing” 90). As with listening to music, Gadamer says that reading 
without understanding is not reading proper. He gives the example of someone who reads 
out loud without understanding what she or he is reading; the text makes sense neither to 
the reader nor to the audience (“Relevance of the Beautiful” 28). Moreover, the reader’s 
intonation betrays his or her lack of understanding. 
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The view of understanding as circular stems from the primacy and universality of 
interpretation. As we saw in chapter two, hermeneutic phenomenology starts with the 
hypothesis that there is no interpretation-free perception of the world. To any experience 
of the world (via a text, an encounter with a person, etc.) we bring our preliminary 
understanding of it, as shaped in the process of socialization.   
If there is no interpretation-free perception of the world, then there is no 
interpretation-free hearing. Gadamer captures this hermeneutic truth in the following 
description: 
We are always hearing—listening to something and extracting from other 
things. We are interpreting in seeing, hearing, receiving. In seeing, we are 
looking for something; we are not just like photographs that reflect 
everything visible. A real photographer, for instance, is looking for the 
moment in which the shot would be an interpretation of the experience. So 
it is obvious that there is a real primacy of interpretation. (“Hermeneutics 
of Suspicion” 59-60) 
Gadamer’s phenomenological observation is confirmed by Don Ihde’s insights recorded 
in his book Listening and Voice: Phenomenologies of Sound. Informed by Husserl’s and 
Heidegger’s phenomenologies, Ihde’s phenomenological account of listening and sound 
shows how a phenomenology of sound reveals an ontological relationship between a 
meaningful world and an intentional human being.  
The primacy of hearing 
The ear or sensitivity for language that is developed while listening to language is 
grounded in the unique hermeneutic role that Gadamer assigns to hearing. Of all the 
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human senses, hearing best reflects our ontological relationship with language. In other 
words, a phenomenological reflection on hearing shows that our relationship with 
language transcends human consciousness. In Truth and Method Gadamer writes that his 
“inquiry has been guided by the basic idea that language is a medium where [self] and 
world meet or, rather, manifest their original belonging together” (474). The idea of 
language as a medium corrects an instrumental view of the nature of language; this is 
how Gadamer explains it: “The words which we use in our speaking are much more 
familiar to us than this, so that we are in the words, so to speak. That is to say, words 
which are working never become objects. Rather, language is a medium, an element: 
Language is the element in which we live, as fishes live in water” (“Reflections” 22). 
Here we have the ontological ground of our unreflective use of language, which 
constitutes one of the reasons for practicing listening to language. When Gadamer speaks 
about language as a medium or the element in which we live, he corrects the view of 
language as an empty channel. Language is content, it “is the quintessence of everything 
that we encounter at all. . . . What surrounds us is language as what has been spoken, the 
universes of discourse (ta legomena)” (“Heritage of Hegel” 50). Arthos writes in this 
sense that the “word exists for Gadamer, as for the Greeks, beyond just the personal 
claim or intention of the speaker. . . . and it is something one needs to hear rather than 
see. Both of these principles are bedrock for philosophical hermeneutics. The word 
makes a claim on us, even though that claim does not emerge from a subjective will” 
(Inner Word 45). We experience the world in language, through hearing, hence 
Gadamer’s concept of linguisticality—“the universal linguisticality of man’s relation to 
the world” (“On the Scope” 19). Lawrence K. Schmidt writes that Gadamer’s concept of 
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linguisticality is supposed to indicate “the unity of language and reason found in the 
Greek term logos” (136). In Truth and Method Gadamer writes that hearing has an 
“immediate share in the universality of the verbal experience of the world” and this 
makes it “an avenue to the whole because it is able to listen to the logos” (462). In 
Gadamer’s reading, the Greek concept of logos means “‘speech,’ ‘language,’ ‘account,’ 
and finally all that expresses itself in speech, namely thought, reason. . . .  [At the same 
time] logos is not [only] ‘reason’ but ‘speech’—i.e., words which people say to each 
other” (“Culture and Words” 181). Wachterhauser confirms that, etymologically, the 
Greek logos “was intimately connected with the reason or the essence of things” as well 
as “to language and speech” (“History and Language” 28). 
It is in the framework of Gadamer’s appropriation of the Greek logos that we 
should understand Gadamer’s following statement: “Hearing means not just hearing; 
hearing means the hearing of words. This is a distinctive attribute of hearing. . . . Hearing 
permits the reception of human speech” (“Hearing” 87). Gadamer credits Aristotle with 
first seeing this (Truth and Method 462). He writes that, despite the fact that Aristotle 
pointed out “the universality of seeing” he also “knew no boundaries to hearing at all, 
because language is among the things one hears, and, as the logos, language encompasses 
simply everything” (“Reflections” 25). Smith refers to the ontological relationship 
between hearing and language when he writes that Gadamer saw that “we do not have 
atomic perceptions that we then proceed to signify; we do not hear sounds, but wind in 
the chimney, and ‘wind’ and ‘chimney’ exist for us only because language ‘lets’ them be 
what they are, ‘brings them into the clear’ as the things they are” (Hermeneutics and 
Human Finitude 113).  
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Because of the ontological relationship between hearing and language, the sense 
of hearing indicates that we always understand the world from within, as a participator. 
Gadamer puts it this way in Truth and Method:  
If we are trying to define the idea of belonging (Zugenhöreigkeit) as 
accurately as possible, we must take into account the particular dialectic 
implied in hearing (hören). It is not just that he who hears is also 
addressed, but also that he who is addressed must hear whether he wants 
to or not. When you look at something, you can also look away from it by 
looking in another direction, but you cannot “hear away.” This difference 
between seeing and hearing is important for us because the primacy of 
hearing is the basis of the hermeneutic phenomenon, as Aristotle saw. 
(462)  
The existential relationship between hearing and our belonging to the world or 
participation in our environment is an acknowledged fact. Comparing the two senses, 
hearing and seeing, John Dewey said that “Vision is a spectator, hearing is a participator” 
(qtd. in Levin 206). Our relationship to the world is not a subject-object relationship 
because we never find ourselves over against that which we want to understand. 
Whenever we understand something, we stand under that which we understand—i.e., the 
object of our understanding has priority over our consciousness. Hawes writes that a 
phenomenological involvement in the world brings about an understanding of phenomena 
“in the foundational sense” which means “to stand-under and see from beneath the taken-
for-granted or presupposed” (34). The connection between hearing and participation can 
also be observed in the experience of having ear plugs on while engaged in some activity; 
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that person is disconnected from his or her environment to the degree that the 
surrounding sounds are not heard. Hearing is also the last sense a person loses.  
The intricate relationship between hearing, belonging, and language defines 
understanding in a sense that precedes consciousness and semantics, as atunement to one 
another. The prosodic structure of language reflects this primary sense of understanding, 
which makes Gadamer consider the prosodic element the ground for the realm of 
communication (“Boundaries of Language” 14). He brings phenomenological evidence 
for his claim that the prosodic element of communication plays a crucial, primordial role 
in the experience of understanding “long before the articulation in semantic elements” 
(14). His evidence is the communication human beings have with their pets, the way 
children learn to speak, the idea of linguistic competence, and the natural process of 
concept formation. About pets Gadamer writes that when addressed, the pet “understands 
because it registers the prosodic aspect” (14). About children he asks, “What sort of 
communication occurs in learning to speak? It cannot yet be speaking. Without doubt it is 
an attunement with one another” (14). As for the idea of linguistic competence, Gadamer 
writes that the fact that there is such a term indicates that even those who subscribe to an 
instrumental view of language have to admit that language is more than just a system of 
rules (17). Also, Gadamer believes that the prosodic element lies at the basis of natural 
concept formation, because the condition for the natural formation of concepts is the 
“unlimited openness for further expansion” in language which is grounded in its 
“prosodic wealth” (14-15). Schmidt adds the poetic word, the foreign word, and the 
untranslated word as evidence for the essential relationship between language and 
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hearing: “When we hear a language spoken about which we have no knowledge, we still 
can recognize it as a language” (Lyrical and Poetical Subjects 109).  
Our default hearing 
We can now begin to understand the relevance of Gadamer’s view of hearing to 
the practice of listening to language. Since there is no interpretation-free hearing, and 
hearing grounds the participatory nature of human understanding (our belonging to the 
world), our default hearing of any discourse is a hearing into: we are hearing our own 
understanding of the subject matter into the respective discourse. The English expression 
reading into something refers to the same idea, namely, that our own understanding of a 
subject matter or a situation may prohibit us from hearing what a person or a text is 
saying. As we saw in chapter one, Stoltz’s discussion of hermeneutic listening captures 
this idea. Informed by Gadamer’s restoration of prejudice as the condition of all human 
understanding and acknowledging the human tendency to bring our preliminary 
understanding of a subject matter (i.e., our bias) into what we hear and listen to, Stoltz 
sees any act of listening—whether to a person or a text—as a listening for something 
(178). Stoltz’ use of the phrase listening for parallels Gadamer’s looking for something, 
both emphasizing the primacy and inescapability of interpretation in our perception of the 
world. The phrase hearing into emphasizes the idea of unreflective, routine hearing, i.e., 
by default. As such, it opposes the phrase to listen for that is used in this project to 
express the positive hermeneutic task of engaging language reflectively and mindfully.  
At this point in our discussion, the following question arises: Why is this default 
hearing problematic? When we hear our own understanding of a given subject matter 
into the discourse we are reading or listening to, instead of understanding what the 
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discourse is saying, we are experiencing hermeneutic closure. We do not understand what 
the text is saying because we are not hearing what “the text really wants to say,” as 
Gadamer puts it (Century of Philosophy 60). We experience hermeneutic closure 
whenever we forfeit the possibility of understanding, i.e., of reaching an insight into the 
matter at hand. Informed by Gadamer’s thought, Deetz explains why this happens: when 
our encounter with a discourse is centered either in the self or the other, “either would be 
covering up the objective demand of the subject matter with one’s subjective reaction” 
(“Reclaiming the Subject Matter” 232). The result, Deetz writes, is that, “to the extent 
that the object or other is silenced by the success, the capacity to engage in conceptual 
expansion and reach open consensus on the subject matter is limited” (232). The most 
that one can take out of an interaction with a discourse that one is hearing into is 
information, not insight. The Oxford English Dictionary defines insight as “internal 
sight,” as “sight or seeing into a thing or subject. . . . penetrating into things or seeing 
beneath their surface with the eyes of understanding.” Only by listening can one reach 
insight because seeing (i.e., understanding) is conditional upon hearing. The experience 
of reading reflects this relationship between hearing and seeing. “When we speak of 
hearing and seeing in reference to reading,” Gadamer writes, “it is obviously not a 
question of having to see in order to decipher writing but rather of having to hear in order 
to see (i.e. understand) what the writing says” (“Hearing” 87-88).  
In order to avoid the hermeneutic closure that comes with our default hearing of 
our own understanding of the subject matter into a discourse, and hear instead what a 
discourse is saying, we need to consciously listen for the word, that is, for the way in 
which the thing is articulated, called forth, evoked in a particular linguistic expression. 
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This means that we need to engage the time structure of understanding as presence and 
the evocative power of language, which define the event of understanding.  
THE EVENT OF UNDERSTANDING 
The self-presentation of meaning 
In Gadamer’s view, the temporality that characterizes understanding is defined by 
the idea of presence or self-presentation, not by succession. Whenever we understand, 
Gadamer writes, whether it is a text or a piece of music, we listen “until we ‘have it,’ and 
in the moment we ‘have it,’ the whole is there”—meaning in its whole is all of a sudden 
present (“Hearing” 91). He contends that such “suddenness of transition” defines any 
experience of understanding: the whole is present in an instant (91). We know this as the 
“aha” moment of insight. Again, Gadamer tells us, we see this in the experience of 
reading because “it is not succession as such that is constitutive for all reading, but . . . 
the presence of the non-simultaneous. Whoever does not conceive of or reproduce texts 
in the totality of their articulation and modulation and structure cannot really read” (90). 
Gadamer identifies the same sudden appearance of meaning in the experience of beauty: 
We have described the ontological structure of the beautiful as the mode 
of appearing that causes things to emerge in their proportions and their 
outline, and the same holds for the realm of the intelligible. The light that 
causes everything to emerge in such a way that it is evident and 
comprehensible in itself is the light of the word. (Truth and Method 483) 
The view of understanding put forward by Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics 
does not allow for more than moments of clarity. This is part of what Gadamer means by 
the event character of understanding when he writes that “what constitutes the 
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hermeneutical event proper is . . . not our action upon the thing, but the act of the thing 
itself” (Truth and Method 463). Ultimately, the Greeks, who have “no word for 
consciousness,” provided Gadamer with the idea about the nature of thinking as “the 
transparency of the rational, the light of which enters as from outside, by the door, . . . 
like a: ‘let there be light’” (“Historical Transformations of Reason” 5). The paradigm for 
“the overwhelmingness of this brightening presence as such” is “the experience of the 
divine” because “the divine cannot be represented save as standing in the constant 
presence of such clarity” (5). Unlike God, human beings cannot stand in the constant 
presence of such clarity. Each moment of clarity is followed by the absence of clarity. 
Gadamer also subscribes to Plato’s idea that “as with all human clarity and lucidity, 
[being itself] is clouded over by opaqueness, passing away, and forgetfulness” (Gadamer, 
“Heritage of Hegel” 60). 
The time structure of understanding as presence refers to this suddenness of 
transition when meaning in its whole becomes present in an instant, and also to the 
inexhaustibility of meaning that leads to fresh insights each time a subject matter is 
articulated in language. Gadamer refers to the inexhaustibility of meaning in language in 
terms of the relationship between concept and word: “the general concept meant by the 
word is enriched by any given perception of the thing [i.e., Sache], so that what emerges 
is a new, more specific word formation which does more justice to the particularity of 
that act of perception” (Truth and Method 429). The temporality of understanding as 
presence or self-presentation shows that the intelligible realm is inexhaustible. Gadamer 
explains how language captures this ontological relationship between the inexhaustibility 
of meaning and the finitude of human knowledge: “All human speaking is finite in such a 
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way that there is laid up within it an infinity of meaning to be explicated and laid out” 
(458). Schmidt writes in this regard that “the guiding sentence of hermeneutics, ‘being 
that can be understood is language’ means that ‘that which is can never be completely 
understood’” (“Putting Oneself in Words” 484). This is why Gadamer considers 
“uninterrupted listening” the only hermeneutic rigor (Truth and Method 465). 
The same inexhaustibility of meaning defines the work of art because its time 
structure is presence as well. Gadamer writes that “An artwork is never exhausted. It 
never becomes empty” (“Reflections” 44). He defines presence in relation to language as 
follows: 
[Presence is] something that emanates in a kind of self-generated present 
in such a way that the mystery and awesomeness of the passing of time, 
the progression of moments in the flow of time, are as if suspended. This 
is the basis of the art of language. It is able to give us a hold in the tarrying 
lapse of time. We do not really read a work of art for the information it 
offers but because it constantly brings us back to the unity of structured 
form that is articulated in even greater differentiation. (“Hearing” 91) 
If in chapter two we saw that we experience the world in language, this chapter is 
taking that hermeneutic truth further by exploring what it means to say that language is 
an articulation of the world—i.e., that language articulates that which is real and 
significant for us. Because of the time structure of understanding as presence, each 
articulation of the world in language is likely to bring insight into the subject matter, as 
the passage quoted above suggests. 
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The evocative power of language 
The word makes the thing present by evoking it. Gadamer defines “the universal 
nature of all speech” as “the fact that what the word evokes is there” (“On the 
Contribution of Poetry” 113). According to The Oxford English Dictionary, the verb to 
evoke comes from the Latin voc-are, which means “to call” in “to call forth; esp. to 
summon up (spirits, etc.) by the use of magic charms”; “to call (a feeling, faculty, 
manifestation, etc.) into being or activity”; or “to call up (a memory) from the past.” That 
language has an evocative power means that the thing is called forth or called into being 
in the word. We understand a given reality (in a certain way) because of a particular way 
in which the word calls it forth. Gadamer calls this “the miracle of the evocative power of 
language,” which is most associated with poetic or literary descriptions (“Hearing” 89). 
“We can even say that the poetic word proves its autonomy by means of this power,” 
Gadamer writes. “Only a pedestrian type of person would want to actually visit a 
landscape depicted in a poem or story in order to understand the work better” (89).  
The fact that the word evokes the thing shows that the relationship between 
language and phenomena is constitutive, not representational. We see this, Gadamer says, 
when we consider the relationship between language and philosophical thinking. It is the 
“saying-power” of the word that differentiates philosophical language from scientific 
terms: 
[I]n philosophy the use of language looks quite different. Each term we 
use contains a certain saying-power within itself. Our terms are not like 
signs that point to something but rather themselves tell something of their 
own origin and from this they form a horizon of meaning which is 
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supposed to lead speaking and thinking beyond themselves to the thing 
meant. (“Reflections” 22, emphasis added) 
About himself Gadamer writes that his coming “to heed the speaking power of words, a 
power which still goes on speaking in every linguistic usage and in its antecedents” 
meant for him “a slow process of reeducating [him]self to a viewpoint in marked contrast 
to that found in the predominant theory of signs, with its instrumentalist view of their 
function” (21).   
The speech function of language or its saying power is important to Gadamer 
because he thinks that “wherever words assume a mere sign function, the original 
connection between speaking and thinking, with which [he is] concerned, has been 
changed into an instrumental relation” (Truth and Method 434). As a result, the full 
potential of language is not engaged. What Gadamer calls “the life of language”—its 
productivity, power, and resourcefulness—is “a life that denies univocity and entrusts 
itself to the metaphorical range and evocative power of language” (“History of Concepts” 
10). Gadamer is against an instrumental view of language that reduces the nature of 
language to that of a sign because the essence of a sign, in his view, requires unequivocal, 
linear signification. Gadamer finds singular, unequivocal signification as contradicting 
the nature of language (i.e., language at work), hence making us move away from 
precisely what makes language relevant for human thought, viz., its metaphorical nature 
and evocative power, productive of depth of meaning. He writes in this regard that “an 
ideal system of signs, whose sole purpose is to coordinate all signs in an unambiguous 
system, makes the power of words—the range of variation of the contingent in the 
historical languages as they have actually developed—appear as a mere flaw in their 
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utility” (Truth and Method 414). When language is reduced to mere functionality—the 
word as a sign—its conceptual productivity (productivity for thought) is being denied and 
the concept is a dead end for meaning. In other words, we reach hermeneutic closure. 
There are two consequences of the fact that language evokes reality, instead of 
pointing to it, which are relevant for the practice of listening to language. First, as a 
(historical) articulation of phenomena, language is finite: a word can never evoke the 
thing in itself, as a complete whole. This is why Gadamer says that there is an unending 
process of concept formation, as we saw in chapter two. Also, because the “language of 
philosophy is so evocative, [so] full of connotations, . . . [o]ne can never say fully what 
one wants to say” (“Writing and the Living Voice” 69). This applies to everyday speech 
too, not just to philosophical language. When it comes to the articulation of reality in 
speech, there is always a remainder; Gadamer calls it “the unsaid”: “Thus every word, as 
the event of a moment, carries with it the unsaid, to which it is related by responding and 
summoning. The occasionality of human speech is not a casual imperfection of its 
expressive power; it is, rather, the logical expression of the living virtuality of speech that 
brings a totality of meaning into play, without being able to express it totally” (Truth and 
Method 458).  
Because no articulation of the thing in language can evoke the thing in itself 
Gadamer says that singular signification can lead to confusion and misunderstanding: “In 
the everyday use of language as well as within the so-called humanities, what increases 
speech’s wealth of association and extends its store of knowledge can lead to confusion 
when everything depends on the singularity of significations (“Expressive Power of 
Language” 352). He takes the word force as an example and contrasts the meaning of the 
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word force in colloquial speech to the meaning of the technical term: “A scientifically 
rooted concept of force has become so dissociated from the concept of force in the native 
tongue, with all the power of evocation force has there, that the word can be a source of 
misunderstanding, false oversimplifications, misleading superficiality, preservation of 
prejudices, and so on” (“Expressive Power of Language” 352). One way to understand 
what Gadamer means by singular signification leading to misunderstanding is to think of 
the way in which a simplified account of a situation can lead to confusion because the 
person who hears the account does not have access to all the elements of the situation that 
would reveal its complexity in relation to other elements of the situation. By moving 
from the concept back to the word, by exploring the different historical articulations of an 
idea (i.e., the history or etymology of a concept), the hermeneutic practice of listening to 
language enables us to hear the semantic complexity evoked by the word. 
As a reflective engagement of language, listening to language reverses the 
movement of thought involved in concept formation, i.e., it moves back from the concept 
to the word. Listening to language does that by engaging the metaphorical nature of 
language and its evocative power, which together account for the ways in which we form 
concepts. In Gadamer’s view, the evocative power of language, along with the 
metaphorical nature of language, defines what he calls “the life of language . . . [which 
is] a life that denies univocity” (“History of Concepts” 10). He describes the 
interdependence of the metaphorical nature of language and its evocative power as 
follows: “To the cognitive function of metaphor on the one hand . . . there corresponds on 
the other hand the ringing forth of the original realm of meaning, a ringing forth that 
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achieves the evocative effect of the word” (6). It is by hearing this ringing forth that 
listening to language reverses the movement of thought involved in concept formation. 
The second consequence of the evocative power of language is that meaning is 
not limited to authorial intent or to the individual consciousness of the author or auditor. 
The fact that words evoke reality instead of pointing to it says something about the nature 
of meaning. Gadamer sees the relationship between language and meaning as multi-
directional and multi-vocal, instead of linear and univocal, because thinking does not 
happen “in pure signs, but in suggestive words” (“History of Concepts” 12). In its 
evocative function, language suggests a way of perceiving reality; it does not point to it in 
an unequivocal fashion. The multi-vocal, suggestive nature of meaning is one of 
Gadamer’s phenomenological reasons for granting language priority over consciousness 
or intentionality in the constitution of meaning. He writes in this regard that  
To limit the understanding of meaning neither to mens auctoris nor to 
mens actoris is a point dear to [him]. To be sure this does not mean that 
understanding peaks in the explication of unconscious motives but rather, 
that understanding draws out the thread of meaning in all directions, 
beyond the limited horizon of the individual so that the transmission of 
history will speak. (“Reply” 291)  
The evocative power of language grounds the productive nature of understanding, which 
is what Gadamer is pointing to in this passage—as a corrective of the reproductive view 
of understanding that focuses on authorial intent. In Truth and Method he writes, “Not 
occasionally only, but always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its author [and auditor]. 
That is why understanding is not merely reproductive but always a productive attitude as 
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well” (264). The problem with a reproductive view of understanding is that it brings 
about hermeneutic closure. Nicholas Davey notes that  
Gadamer persistently resists the reduction of meaning to the subjectivism 
of the psychological. Any return to the motives of the speaker as the single 
criterion of meaning implies a final end to interpretation, which is 
something that Gadamer persistently refuses. As the meaning of an 
expression spoken or written always ‘means more’ than initially intended, 
any return to intentionality would limit the hermeneutic richness of the 
text. (“Other Side of Writing” 86)  
Listening activates the ontological relationship between language, thought, and 
phenomena that underlies Gadamer’s constitutive view of language and the practice of 
listening to language. For this reason, he thinks that the “logical analysis of philosophical 
sentences and arguments” can “always play only a secondary role” to listening (“History 
of Concepts” 14). Gadamer grants listening hermeneutic precedence over logic because 
through listening we gain insight into the matter at hand that reaches further than the 
author’s intended meaning and the auditor’s anticipations.  
In order to hear the semantic complexity evoked by the word, we need to tarry 
with words. Tarrying is the appropriate response to the self-presentation of language. As 
we tarry with words, we develop an intuitive ear for the right word, that is, for “the word 




THE ART OF LISTENING  
Tarrying 
The temporality that characterizes the practice of listening to language is the same 
as that which Gadamer identifies as specific to the experience of a work of art: tarrying 
(“Reflections” 44). This means that the kind of relationship with (or approach to) 
language that underlies the hermeneutic practice of listening to language is aesthetic. The 
term aesthetic is used here in Gadamer’s sense which, as Grondin explains, refers to a 
“receptiveness to what exceed[s] the boundaries of reason and science” (Hans-Georg 
Gadamer 21). By reason Grondin must be referring here to a restricted modern view of 
reason because Gadamer’s view of reason encompasses the true and the beautiful.  
Gadamer writes that “we learn from the work of art how to tarry” because in the 
experience of art “we tarry, we remain with the art structure, which as a whole then 
becomes ever richer and more diverse” (“Aesthetics” 77). Just as the work of art becomes 
richer and more diverse as we tarry with it, our understanding of a subject matter 
becomes richer and more diverse as we tarry with language. This happens because, when 
we tarry with language, we engage the temporality of understanding as presence, i.e., the 
self-presencing of language. James Risser explains Gadamer’s view of tarrying as a 
“going with the work” and adds that “Attending to the work in this way is what allows 
what is in the work to come out” (“Poetic Dwelling” 372). By tarrying with language we 
allow the thing to articulate itself anew in language, and this is how we arrive at new, 
deeper insights into the matter at hand. The outcome of tarrying, as Risser observes, is a 
coming “to know the world” that does not consist in “a knowing of facts” but of “what is 
essential” (“Poetic Dwelling” 377). Each time we tarry with language, we become aware 
 
85 
of, we hear some new, unheard before connotations, assumptions, or implications of the 
concepts we use. In his essay “The Experience of Truth for Gadamer and Heidegger: 
Taking Time and Sudden Lightning” Robert J. Dostal notes that Gadamer’s identification 
of tarrying as the temporality of understanding reflects his belief that “The experience of 
truth takes time” (63). Unlike Heidegger, Dostal continues, Gadamer understood “how 
important for the insight is unrelenting effort. It is the unrelenting effort that allows the 
flash of light to come. It prepares the way” (64). 
As the temporality of aesthetic experience, Gadamer contrasts tarrying with the 
temporal dimension of “the merely pragmatic realms of understanding” and he explains 
that “the Weile [the ‘while’ in Verweilen, tarrying] has this very special temporal 
structure—a temporal structure of being moved, which one nevertheless cannot describe 
merely as duration, because duration means only further movement in a single direction” 
(“Aesthetics” 77). However, as Risser writes, tarrying does not create a distance between 
us and practical life because when we tarry “we are drawn back to the questions of life as 
a whole, . . . not life in the abstract” (377). Dostal sees Gadamer’s tarrying as “a 
heightened experience of the unity of time, which as such, is tantamount to an experience 
of timelessness,” hence it should be understood in the context of his “phenomenological 
account of the human experience of time which rejects a one-dimensional number-line 
view of time and endorses a three-dimensional (past, present, future) understanding 
which takes the present, the ‘now,’ to be an ‘extended’ unity of the three dimensions 
rather than a point on a line” (63).  
Listening to language as a reflective (phenomenological) engagement of language 
is an aesthetic approach to language also because, when we tarry with language, we 
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experience language, we do not use it. To experience language means to engage its 
speech function, instead of merely its signifying function, to hear the words rather than 
use them. To experience language as speech means to hear its saying, to hear the 
address—i.e., what the word is saying, how the thing is evoked in the word. The speech 
function of language makes Gadamer say that “It is quite literally more correct to say that 
language speaks us than that we speak it” (Truth and Method 463). Commenting on 
Gadamer’s statement, Smith writes that the hermeneutic task for us is, then, nothing more 
than “to hear what [language] says” (Hermeneutics and Human Finitude 310). When we 
are listening for what the word is saying, for what it is evoking, we are acknowledging 
our primary relationship to language as hearers, not users; to use Gadamer’s words, we 
are acknowledging our existence as a “sensitive-spiritual existence”—that is, as “an 
aesthetic resonance chamber that resonates with the voices that are constantly reaching 
us” (“Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem” 8).  
To experience language as speech, to hear its saying, means to engage its power, 
instead of merely its utility. The driving force of the practice of listening to language is 
neither the listening subject’s purposes or ideas, nor the author’s intention, but the power 
and productivity of language. The practice of listening to language foregrounds the power 
of language for thinking, i.e., for reaching an ever deeper understanding of matters of 
significance to us. For Gadamer, understanding a subject matter always means a change 
in our self-understanding as well. In our relationship with language Gadamer identifies a 
“mystery . . . namely, that in a way [language] takes hold of us when we are taking hold 
of it” (“Articulating Transcendence” 9). When language is experienced, rather than used, 
what we hear makes an impact on us, it changes us. This is why the German word for 
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experience that defines the experience of understanding for Gadamer is Erfahrung, not 
Erlebnis, as we saw in chapter two.  
The question that arises here and needs to be addressed is, What is the nature of 
the ear for words that is at the core of Gadamer’s hermeneutic praxis? The next and last 
section of this chapter will answer this question.  
The intuitive ear 
Although the relationship between hearing, a sense of belonging to the world, and 
language confers upon the sense of hearing a particular hermeneutic role, Gadamer’s 
discussion of the relationship between hearing and language seems to allow for a view of 
hearing that goes beyond the audible realm. A justified question in this regard would be 
whether the deaf can practice listening to language, whether they can develop a linguistic, 
hermeneutic sensitivity for the semantic complexity of words. Reflecting on Gadamer’s 
view of hearing from the perspective of the deaf, Schmidt asks a similar question: “[I]s it 
the case that hearing has a character that might not be able to be interpreted in terms of 
sound?” (Lyrical and Ethical Subjects 108). Gadamer’s texts allow for the interpretation 
that the hearing that is associated with the practice of listening to language is an intuitive 
sense for language. The sense of hearing helps, but it seems to be secondary, or rather, it 
seems to reflect this intuitive sensitivity for language, this “inner ear” as Gadamer calls it 
in one of his essays (“Eminent Text” 23). Speaking about the way in which Goethe “drew 
a distinction between the sense of the eye, the physical eye, and the inner sense which 
finds adequate fulfillment in words alone” Gadamer tells us that he has been trying to 
understand “the basis and constitution of the intuitive perceptivity by which we judge the 
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quality of linguistic expression not only for the poet but for everyone who uses language” 
(“Hearing” 90).   
The goal of hearing the “ringing forth of the original realm of meaning” (“History 
of Concepts” 10) is to restore what Gadamer calls “the intuitional potential of the 
concept” (“Beginning and End of Philosophy” 22). Gadamer deplores philosophical 
thought that is reduced to “artificial constructions which . . . lapse more and more into 
ghostly symbols behind which it is no longer possible to glimpse any hint of a living 
linguistic intuition” and he sees this as part of the human tendency to “make use of forms 
and norms, schools and institutions without thinking about them in an original way” (21). 
The word original as used by Gadamer does not point to the thinker’s individuality or 
intelligence but to the subject matter (die Sache), which lies at the core of Gadamer’s 
view of meaningful reflection and authentic thinking. Gadamer believes that “in all 
thought, only pursuing what consistently follows from the subject matter can bring out 
what lies in it. It is the thing itself that asserts its force,” he adds, “if we rely entirely on 
the power of thought and disregard obvious appearances and opinions” (Truth and 
Method 464). The opposite of (original) thought is (popular) opinion, of which Gadamer 
writes that it tends to control “our entire thinking and knowing like a closed and 
impermeable layer” (“Truth in the Human Sciences” 42). The aim of the hermeneutic 
practice of listening to language is to deepen our thinking about significant matters, to 
help us think about them in a fresh, insightful way, one that breaks open taken-for-
granted, easy, popular views. The idea of insight is coterminous with the idea of depth.  
We can restore the intuitional potential of the concept, hence deepen our thinking 
about significant issues through a phenomenological engagement of language. Gadamer 
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describes phenomenological reflection as a reflection that engages description, creativity, 
intuition, and concretion—in other words, the opposite of abstract, methodical, logical 
thinking (“On Phenomenology” 113). As we saw in chapter two, Gadamer’s hermeneutic 
phenomenology aimed to return philosophical thought to its roots in praxis, and this 
meant avoiding theoretical constructions that were divorced from practical life. 
Following the ancient Greeks, Gadamer’s way to ground philosophical thought in praxis 
was to acknowledge the epistemic value of experience, hence the constitutive role played 
by everyday speech in conceptual thought.  
 Everyday speech can play a role in the quality of our conceptual thought because 
of its ontological connection to experience; in other words, our customary ways of 
speaking about the world capture the existent and the significant. This gives speech what 
Gadamer calls its “intuitive power” (“Reflections” 9). According to The Oxford English 
Dictionary, the word intuition comes from the Latin intuitiōn-em: “to look upon, 
consider, contemplate.” To intuit means “[t]o receive or assimilate knowledge by direct 
perception or comprehension; [t]o know anything immediately, without the intervention 
of any reasoning process.” The intuitive power of everyday speech comes with the fact 
that it provides immediate access to the things themselves, to the intelligible realm, 
without the intervention of deliberate reasoning.   
By engaging the evocative power of language, i.e., by listening for what the 
words evoke, call forth, we develop a sensitivity for the “living linguistic intuition” that 
resides in speech (Gadamer, “Beginning and End of Philosophy” 21). Dostal explains that  
although “Gadamer accepts the Platonic and Hegelian injunction that the truth requires 
the whole, . . . [he] does not want to accept a nonlinguistic intuitionism which would 
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suggest that we somehow have an intuitive grasp of the whole prior to speech” (64). 
Dostal adds that Plato and Aristotle provided Gadamer with the solution in what they 
identified as the “two aspects of the human grasp of truth . . . logos (language) and nous 
(intuition)” (64). Wachterhauser supports the idea that in Gadamer intuition is not 
separable from language:  
Hermeneutical thinkers can be characterized quite generally by their 
common concern to resist the idea of the human intellect as a wordless and 
timeless source of insight. The human intellect, pace Plato, Aristotle, 
Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, et alia, does not have the 
capacity for a ‘pure’ seeing of reality ‘in itself,’ a wordless intuition of 
reality sub specie aeternitatis. (“History and Language” 5) 
This sensitive ear for language is an intuitive, “inner sense” (Gadamer, “Hearing” 90) for 
“the intimate unity of word and subject matter” (Truth and Method 403) that comes with 
our primary relationship to language as hearers. The sense of hearing seems to be a 
sensory reflection (or the embodiment, the material counterpart) of the spiritual 
connection between a being whose existence is defined by understanding and a 
meaningful world. 
This intuitive sense for language is also a discriminating sense for Gadamer; it is a 
sense “by which we judge the quality of linguistic expression” (“Hearing” 87). Gadamer 
identifies the presence of the inner ear particularly in the experiences of reading and 
poetry, where “[o]ne has in the inner ear how the poetical text is really speaking, and no 
performance can fulfill the expectations of the inner ear” (“Eminent Text” 23). Davey 
captures beautifully the relationship between hearing and listening that defines a 
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discriminating sensitivity for language when he writes, “Hermeneutic listening is not a 
matter of acoustic responsiveness but a being able to discern within what one listens to, 
that which asserts itself as truth. . . . Listening is, then, the experience of hearing the 
words one is listening to simultaneously disappear into and yet light up and resonate the 
full depths of what they are saying” (“Other Side of Writing” 88, emphasis removed). 
The intuitive inner ear is a discriminating sense because it engages “the interplay of 
hearing and seeing” (Gadamer, “Hearing” 90). As we are listening for the semantic 
complexity of concepts, we begin to see into the matter at hand (Sache). Tarrying with 
language sharpens our intuition and this is how listening leads to insights.  
This intuitive sense for language that we develop as we tarry with language fits 
within the kind of knowledge that Gadamer sees as specific to the humanities. He 
identifies a “world-intuitive” function along with the scientific function of the humanities 
(“Reflections” 27). This world-intuitive function stems partly from their object of 
study—human existence and experience. Grondin writes that Gadamer saw that the 
knowledge specific to the humanities “was a completely different kind of knowledge, 
namely, participation in, not dominion over, the experience of meaning” (Hans-Georg 
Gadamer 268). Also, in his essay “Truth in the Human Sciences” Gadamer writes that the 
humanities reach their conclusions, hence truth, by way of an “intuitive leap” (27). 
Referring to Gadamer’s Truth and Method, Grondin notes insightfully that  
Gadamer’s subject was a sudden event of truth, which method could only 
limp along behind: truth and then method, truth before method. That this 
kind of truth exists, that we cannot live without it, and that method 
threatens to become one of the new idols—this is what Gadamer’s 
 
92 
‘hermeneutics’ wants to recall to our attention. (Hans-Georg Gadamer 
282) 
However, Gadamer believes that the intuitive leap by which the humanities reach truth 
does not diminish the “fruitfulness of [their] knowledge-claim[s]” (“Truth in the Human 
Sciences” 26). In fact, he finds the “intuition of the artist” superior to “the methodical 
spirit of research” when it comes to producing insights into the subject matter (26) 
because the “precision” of the musician is superior, in his estimation, to that of the 
mathematician (“From Word to Concept” 5). Gadamer asks, “[I]s the precision attained 
by the application of mathematics to living situations ever as great as the precision 
attained by the ear of the musician who in tuning his or her instrument finally reaches a 
point of satisfaction?” And he continues, “Are these not quite different forms of 
precision, forms that do not consist in the application of rules or in the use of an 
apparatus, but rather in a grasp of what is right that goes far beyond this?” (5). Grondin 
writes that Gadamer’s point in protesting against the marginalization of the humanities 
was to show that the “limits of knowledge and judging . . . exceed the limits of 
measuring” (Hans-Georg Gadamer 287). Indeed, the fruitfulness of the philosophical 
insights of thinkers such as those mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, who had a 
sensitive ear for language, and their “conceptual precision” are a clear testimony to what 
Gadamer calls “the conceptual and intuitive power of the language in which we live” 
(“Reflections” 9, 10).  
CONCLUSIONS  
Through a close textual interpretation of Gadamer’s views on the relationship 
between hearing, belonging, and language, this chapter explored the role played by 
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hearing in our unreflective, routine use of language as well as our reflective, mindful 
engagement of language. By acknowledging both unreflective and reflective hearing, the 
practice of listening to language shows that we are hearers of language in two senses. The 
first sense is a default hearing which comes with the primacy and inescapability of 
interpretation and hearing, and tends to lead to hermeneutic closure. The second sense of 
hearing, the sensitive ear for language that underlies Gadamer’s hermeneutic praxis, 
comes with our choice to listen for the semantic complexity evoked by the word.  
This chapter showed that, in order to move away from the hermeneutic closure 
that comes with the constitutive role of hearing and develop a sensitivity for language 
that leads to insights into the matter at hand, we need to relate to language aesthetically, 
not instrumentally. This means that we need to tarry with it, to experience language—i.e., 
its evocative power—rather than use it as a means that serves our purposes or retrieves 
for us the author’s intention. When we do that, we engage language as hearers instead of 
users. The outcome is an intuitive sensitivity for the relationship between words and 
things (phenomena) that guarantees new insights into the matter at hand.  
This chapter’s exploration of the hermeneutic practice of listening to language 
engages the conversation between Gadamer and communication studies in several ways. 
First, it further defines the hermeneutic consciousness needed in the discipline by 
grounding it in hearing and listening. A disciplinary hermeneutic consciousness that 
acknowledges the centrality of hearing and listening would also benefit communication 
pedagogy. By grounding communication in hearing and listening, this chapter answers 
the recent call in listening studies for more theorizing of hearing and listening as 
communication phenomena, instead of cognitive activities originating in the subject. A 
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hermeneutic phenomenology of hearing and listening also answers the call put forth by 
listening scholars and communication ethicists for a more robust ethics of listening, one 
that accounts for the constitutive role of hearing and listening.  
The next chapter will show how the intuitive ear for language developed during 
the practice of listening to language is grounded in the speculative nature of tradition. 
Although the insights into the subject matter arrived at through intuitive hearing are not 
verifiable, they are, as chapter four will show, perfectly compatible with theoretical 
accountability. The practice of listening to language develops philosophical and ethical 









[L]anguage is a medium where I and world meet or, rather, manifest their 
original belonging together. (Gadamer, Truth and Method 474) 
 
[N]o conceptual language . . . represents an unbreakable constraint upon 
thought if only the thinker allows himself [or herself] to trust language. 
(Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” 23) 
INTRODUCTION 
Gadamer talks about language in two related ways: he either personifies it, by 
referring to its spirit or wisdom, or exposes concepts as carriers of prejudices. Here are a 
few examples. In Truth and Method he writes that “to regard the metaphorical use of a 
word as not its real sense is the prejudice of a theory of logic that is alien to language” 
(429); a few pages later, we read that “we must keep the dignity of the thing and the 
referentiality of language free from the prejudice originating in the ontology of the 
present-at-hand as well as in the concept of objectivity” (456). “It is also meaningful” he 
writes elsewhere, “that language says that we strike an understanding. Here the wisdom 
of language tells us that . . . ” (“Towards a Phenomenology” 27). About “the ancient 
concept of mimesis” he contends that it “still seems to possess some truth” (“Art and 
Imitation” 100). Finally, Gadamer says that he became aware “that the language 
customarily used in German philosophy was not just full of preconceptions and 
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prejudices, but also full of depth and significance” (“Reflections” 21). These references 
point to the content of language and indicate that language can be a catalyst as well as a 
hindrance for thinking about a subject matter.  
This chapter completes the exploration of the hermeneutic practice of listening to 
language by grounding it in Gadamer’s dialectical hermeneutics as practical philosophy. 
Behind the practice of listening to language is Gadamer’s view of understanding as an 
event of tradition. Understanding as an event of tradition reveals the paradox of our 
belonging to language: The world comes into language in particular linguistic traditions 
and we recognize it in and through the language of particular traditions. Therefore, 
Gadamer’s practice of listening to language is a reflective engagement of traditions as 
conversation partners on the matter at hand. To listen to language means to listen to 
linguistic traditions for that which is significant, which can take us closer to the truth of 
the matter. This means engaging the dialectical nature of language, that is, engaging fully 
the ontological relationship between language and reason. The outcome is an undogmatic 
way of thinking that is guided by language, grounded in praxis, and on the way to truth.  
WE THINK IN LANGUAGE:  
GADAMER’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 
Gadamer’s historically-grounded view of reason makes his hermeneutic 
philosophy a practical philosophy and hermeneutic reflection a practical reflection, i.e., 
involving practical reason. He writes that “[r]eason exists for us only in concrete, 
historical terms—i.e., it is not its own master but remains constantly dependent on the 
given circumstances in which it operates. . . . [in other words] history does not belong to 
us; we belong to it” (Truth and Method 276). Wachterhauser believes that “the notion of 
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‘historicity’ is perhaps hermeneutics’ most central and most compelling claim” and 
explains that historicity “refers to the claim that the relation between being human and 
finding ourselves in particular historical circumstances is not accidental but rather 
essential or ‘ontological’ . . . [W]ho we are is a function of the historical circumstances 
and community we find ourselves in, the historical languages we speak” (“History and 
Language” 7). Risser explains why Gadamer’s hermeneutics is a practical philosophy: 
“The model of practical philosophy, which concerns the knowing with respect to action, 
starts from the fact that one is first formed by one’s education and citizenship. 
Accordingly, the reasonability in practical philosophy, unlike the reasonability at work in 
the methodological thinking of anonymous science, does not sever the connection 
between knowledge and life (Hermeneutics 8). Gadamer learned from Aristotle “that the 
preconditions for theorizing in such fields [as the humanities] are not neutral 
objectifications, but articulations of pre-given and lived patterns of social life” (Gadamer, 
“Practical Philosophy as a Model” 84).  
Therefore, Gadamer’s view of understanding as an event of tradition reflects his 
acknowledgment of the historical character of human rationality, hence his critique of a 
modern view of reason grounded in human consciousness. Risser goes as far as to say 
that “the central issue for philosophical hermeneutics is to account for the understanding 
that occurs by virtue of tradition” (“Poetic Dwelling” 369). Historical beings are defined 
by their belonging to particular speech communities and traditions of thought. Gadamer 
defines tradition as “a certain totality of normative orientations . . . [which] determines to 
a large extent the structure of our social life” (“Limitations of the Expert” 185). 
Gadamer’s tradition corresponds to Humboldt’s language-view and Husserl’s life-world, 
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hence it is synonymous with culture. Referring to Humboldt’s insight into the ontological 
nature of language, Gadamer writes that Humboldt’s importance for hermeneutics lies “in 
showing that a language-view is a worldview” (Truth and Method 443). Husserl’s 
concept of life-world points out that the world in which we live “never becomes an object 
as such for us” because we live in it “as historical creatures” (Truth and Method 246-
247). However, Warnke notes that Gadamer saw “Husserl’s appeals to the notion of 
transcendental subjectivity [as an effort] to surmount the variety of culturally and 
historically determined life-worlds” which for Gadamer meant “an ‘alienation’ of ‘the 
actual content of the concept of life’” (37); this is why, Warnke contends, Gadamer 
turned to “Heidegger’s forceful conception of ‘being-in-the-world’” (37).  
As a totality of normative orientations, tradition is hermeneutically binding 
because it provides our self-evident, implicit understanding of the world (i.e., self-
understanding and understanding of issues). Gadamer writes in this sense: “Long before 
we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand 
ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live” (Truth 
and Method 276). In other words, we think and speak as members of particular traditions 
before we are aware of what we are thinking and saying. As Wachterhauser puts it, “by 
learning our native tongue or by learning a specialized language of some field of study 
we inherit with it a past we have not shaped. . . . Language, so to speak, goes out ahead of 
the reflective understanding and shapes our grasp of the subject matter” (“History and 
Language” 9-10). Our belonging to traditions of thought and speech communities 
grounds our thinking in particular conceptualities and our unreflective, customary use of 
language (discussed in chapter two). The self-evident, implicit ways in which traditions 
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guide our thinking, speaking, and acting constitute part of Gadamer’s reason for defining 
understanding “less as a subjective act than as participating in an event of tradition” 
(Truth and Method 290); or, as he puts it elsewhere, “tradition is in play [or at work] in 
all understanding” (“Hermeneutics” 45). This is partly why Gadamer urges us to listen to 
what reaches us from traditions (Truth and Method 463). Listening to language is a 
reflective engagement of traditions.  
The self-evident character of our historically-grounded understanding of the 
world motivates Gadamer’s rehabilitation of the concept of prejudice, making him say 
that “the prejudices of the individual, far more than his [or her] judgments, constitute the 
historical reality of his [or her] being” (Truth and Method 276-277). Therefore, by 
prejudices Gadamer means “nothing other than our rootedness in a tradition” 
(“Beginning of Philosophy” 46). This is how Gadamer puts it: “Understanding always 
implies a pre-understanding which is in turn pre-figured by the determinate tradition in 
which the interpreter lives and which shapes his [or her] prejudices” (“Problem of 
Historical Consciousness” 108). When Gadamer presents prejudices as our rootedness in 
a tradition, he corrects the modern view of understanding in which “one is able to leave 
oneself out” of the experience of understanding (“Hermeneutics” 45). Wachterhauser 
writes in this regard that hermeneutics “understands itself as a critique of this notion of a 
noncontingent, ‘autonomous’ intellect . . . [and that] hermeneutical thinkers have insisted 
on the ‘finite,’ ‘dependent,’ and ‘contingent’ nature of all understanding” (“History and 
Language” 16). 
Gadamer captures the idea of our inherited, self-evident, prejudiced understanding 
in the phrase effective history: history is always at work in our understanding, whether or 
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not we are aware of it (“Reply” 291). Gadamer writes that he was aware of the effective 
history shaping his own understanding of philosophical questions—“a very definite 
German philosophical and cultural heritage” (“Reflections” 27). Arthos’ scholarship on 
Gadamer engages in depth the effective history at work in Gadamer’s thought, pointing 
out the hermeneutic value of the prejudices at work in his understanding, some of which 
Gadamer was not aware. Gadamer explains that the idea of a “historically affected 
consciousness” expresses his concern “with the philosophical issue of accountability” 
(27). He believes that “one who attempts to philosophize must first of all have an 
attentive ear for the language in which the thinking experience of many generations has 
been sedimented, long before we begin to attempt our own thinking” (“Limitations of the 
Expert” 181). Gadamer’s work in the history of concepts is a reflective engagement of 
the effective history at work in the thought of different philosophers. 
Since prejudices reflect our historical situatedness (in traditions), our access to 
any subject matter is through (mediated by) prejudices. However, Gadamer says, 
traditions can guide our thinking either behind our back or with our knowledge. About 
the first option he writes that “It is the tyranny of hidden prejudices that makes us deaf to 
what speaks to us in tradition” (Truth and Method 270). He clarifies that “a prejudice in 
the strict sense of that term cannot get hold of us unless we are sufficiently unconscious 
of it” (“Problem of Historical Consciousness” 156-157). When we are aware of our 
historical situatedness in traditions, the strict sense of the word prejudice no longer 
applies. Although our preliminary understanding of the world as shaped by socialization 
continues to guide our thinking even when we are aware of our historical situatedness, its 
guidance is of a different kind: we can discern the hermeneutic value of prejudices, that 
 
101 
is, which prejudices lead to insights into the matter at hand and which ones obstruct our 
access to it. Therefore, Gadamer says that the “critical task of hermeneutics [is] that of 
separating true from false prejudices” (“On the Circle of Understanding” 77). By true and 
false prejudices he means prejudices that take us to the truth of the matter or not, in other 
words, which can help us see new truths about a subject matter or distort our 
understanding of it. Naturally, this is a never completed task. This is how Gadamer puts it 
in the framework of explaining his idea of “effective-historical consciousness”: “This 
term is meant to imply that we are fully aware of the constitutive prejudices of our 
understanding. Of course, we cannot really know all of our prejudices because we are 
never in a position to reach an exhaustive knowledge of ourselves and to become 
completely transparent to ourselves” (“Beginning of Philosophy” 46). For historical 
beings, the only options when it comes to understanding are dogmatism or discernment, 
that is, being dominated by the prejudices of our time or discerning their hermeneutic 
value, hence the hermeneutic consciousness. Objectivity—total self-transparency—is not 
an option. Becoming aware of the effective history at work in our understanding means 
being aware of our hermeneutic situation.    
As historically situated, human beings always find themselves in a hermeneutic 
situation. The idea of a hermeneutic situation sheds light on Gadamer’s view of tradition 
as a worldview, a historical, cultural standpoint from where we engage the world. “The 
very idea of a situation means that we are not standing outside it and hence are unable to 
have any objective knowledge of it” says Gadamer (Truth and Method 301). Therefore, 
he defines a hermeneutic situation as “a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision” 
(302). Elsewhere he writes that “we are of necessity caught within the limits of our 
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hermeneutic situation when we inquire into truth” (“Truth in the Human Sciences” 40). 
However, the same position that limits the range of our vision also enables a view; in 
other words, any situation comes with limitations as well as a range of possibilities, hence 
the possibility for discernment. That is why Gadamer says that “essential to the concept 
of situation is the concept of ‘horizon.’ The horizon is the range of vision that includes 
everything that can be seen from a particular standpoint” (Truth and Method 302). 
Wachterhauser calls this Gadamer’s “perspectival realism” when talking about 
Gadamer’s constant interest in the relationship between universals and particulars 
(“Gadamer’s Realism” 150-151). 
As mentioned earlier, our historical situatedness in traditions grounds our 
unreflective use of language, in other words, our conventional uses of language. By 
conventional (uses of) language I mean any of the following: the conceptuality, 
vocabulary, terminology, or ways of speaking that are specific to a particular linguistic 
tradition or speech community, e.g., academic disciplines, neighborhoods, religions, 
political parties, and trades. Gadamer differentiates the routine, functional use of 
language, which he considers to be a “mere implementation of the meaning of words” (or 
the ritual character of language) from “authentic speaking” (“Towards a Phenomenology” 
29), which he defines as “having something to say” and seeking “words through which 
one reaches the other person” (“Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem” 17).  
Although Gadamer views the functional employment of language (i.e., its 
conventional usage) as a natural dimension of linguistic communities, the functional 
engagement of language comes with the danger of not acknowledging the constitutive 
role played by prejudices in thought. The problem with conventionalized language, 
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according to Gadamer, is the same as that with conceptual determination: they make a 
good host for the prejudices of one’s traditions, for “the truisms which have deposited 
themselves in linguisticality” (“Rhetoric” 281). In other words, we become so 
accustomed to thinking about issues in the concepts and terms provided by the 
intellectual traditions and speech communities we belong to that we find it difficult or 
impossible to think about those issues in different terms.2 That we find it difficult is 
understandable from Gadamer’s standpoint. This is why he writes, for example, with 
regard to the concept of play, that “we are so accustomed to relating phenomena such as 
playing to the sphere of subjectivity and the ways it acts that we remain closed to these 
indications from the spirit of language” (Truth and Method 104). We hear the established 
meaning, the prejudice of our time, into the discourse. This is why listening to language 
is important. As a reflective engagement of traditions, listening to language makes 
“concepts and their expressions speak once more, . . . [takes] them out of the merely 
functional context in which they are employed as overdetermined terms, and [brings] 
them back to their original role within language” (“Hermeneutics and Logocentrism” 
121). Describing the clarification of meaning that comes with doing history of concepts 
Gadamer writes that it “revives the enduring connections between concept-words and the 
natural usage of language” and it makes concrete “the conceptual meaning of assertions” 
by freeing it “from dogmatic distortions” (“History of Concepts” 5).  
Although it may be difficult to think in the terms of other linguistic traditions, it is 
possible, as our ability to think in foreign languages indicates. As linguistic beings, we 
are in language and this means that we think in language. However, we do not have to 
                                                 
2 Someone who is fluent (who can think) in a foreign language can testify to the hermeneutic 
difficulty of thinking about a subject matter in the terms of the host culture when those terms are 
very different from the terms of one’s mother tongue. 
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think in the same language. Being able to think about significant issues in different terms 
is essential because of the complex nature of any significant matter.  
Given the complexity of any subject matter of significance to us and the finitude 
of any linguistic articulation of the subject matter, thinking about a subject matter only in 
the terms provided by a particular tradition forms a dogmatic mindset: that person’s 
understanding of a subject matter is limited to the understanding captured in those terms 
(prejudices). The person tends to take one aspect for the whole thing, that is, one’s 
tradition’s view of the subject matter as the truth of the matter. The established meaning 
of the conventionalized term3 shares with the general meaning of the concept and the flat 
meaning of the statement the tradeoff between depth and clarity that comes with any 
articulation of meaning in language, that is, with the limits of our historical situatedness. 
This is why Gadamer sees unambiguous designation problematic. When clarity is taken 
as more than a provisional phase in our search for truth, meaning is distorted, hence 
Gadamer’s idea of “distorting prejudices” (Truth and Method 296).  
By contrast, someone who practices listening to language is aware of the fact that 
conventional language is the expression of a linguistic tradition, and not of the individual 
speaker or writer. In other words, when we engage language instrumentally and 
conventionally, language is not really at our disposal, that is, the meaning of the term is 
not reduced to what we intended. When we employ language conventionally, we are in 
what Gadamer calls “the area of mutual understandings by means of custom, which 
clearly . . . determines a large part of our being with-one-another” (“Towards a 
Phenomenology” 50). As the language of a speech community, conventional language 
                                                 
3 The very words term and terminology have a ring to them that makes one think of neutrality, of 
language as merely a tool. 
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constitutes a collective agreement on the good; in other words, it reflects the necessary 
relationship between logos and ethos that defines a speech community. Risser sees the 
“movement back to words” that defines Gadamer’s hermeneutics as an engagement of 
language intrinsically tied to ethos, in other words, an embodied (as opposed to abstract) 
logos (“From Concept to Word” 311). Referring to Aristotle’s discussion of the 
relationship between thought and speech in Topics, Gadamer corrects a mistaken view of 
the instrumental function of language: 
[T]he convention according to which the sounds of language or the signs 
of writing mean something is not an agreement on a means of 
understanding—that would already presuppose language; it is the 
agreement on which human community, its harmony with respect to what 
is good and proper, is founded. Agreement in using verbal sounds and 
signs is only an expression of that fundamental agreement in what is good 
and proper. (Truth and Method 431-2) 
As Grondin notes, Gadamer’s attention to the theme of ritual in his latest essays reflects 
his acknowledgment of the centrality of ethos to the concept of reason and the social 
reality of understanding: “Much of what we do, say, and are, is supported in its 
correctness by an ethos which, in its hidden effectiveness, is more practiced and applied 
than actually known consciously” (“Play” 56). Conventional language reflects the ritual 
character of natural language (the language spoken by a community). 
The meaning of the terms or concepts that we employ regularly depends on their 
implicit, contextual ground. In Gadamer’s view, a linguistic expression always says more 
than what was intended because of its implicit context. “What the expression expresses,” 
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Gadamer writes, “is not merely what is supposed to be expressed in it—what is meant by 
it—but primarily what is also expressed by the words without its being intended—i.e., 
what the expression, as it were, ‘betrays’” (Truth and Method 336). By the context of the 
conceptual expression Gadamer means “the context in the boldest sense”—that is, “not 
only the words but the whole life context” (“Hermeneutics of Suspicion” 63). 
Wachterhauser explains that Gadamer’s view of understanding fits within a hermeneutic 
“‘contextualist’ theory of meaning” which states that the “meaning of any phenomenon 
or proposition depends on the ‘whole’ of which it is a ‘part’ or, in other words, it depends 
on the ‘context’ in which it has a ‘function’. . . . in terms of other realities that we already 
understand in some way” (“History and Language” 12-13). Warnke notes in this regard 
that “Gadamer’s position does not merely overlook a distinction between understanding 
meaning and understanding significance; it denies one. . . . we understand [something] 
only in light of its significance” to us (68). 
When Gadamer engages in history of concepts, he is listening for what comes to 
expression in concepts beyond or apart from the author’s intention. He is listening for the 
historical ground and life contexts of a particular conceptuality. Grondin writes that the 
basic idea behind Gadamer’s history of concepts is that “the relevance of a language 
cannot be detached from the urgency that gave it birth in the life of a language, and in the 
contexts of discussion where it has been employed since” (Philosophy of Gadamer 142). 
These contexts of discussion infuse any given concept with “prior determinations, 
anticipations, and imprints” (Gadamer, “Reflections” 17). These form the semantic field 
of the concept, which comes with its belonging to a particular tradition. Gadamer’s 
analogy with music helps us understand the relationship between linguistic expression 
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and its contextual ground that defines his view of natural language (the language spoken 
by a speech community) and underlines the practice of listening to language:  
The concept-historical origins of a concept belong to that concept just like 
overtones belong to a tone. Just as music would be unthinkable in a system 
of tones artificially set up without overtones, so is the conceptual language 
of philosophy [or conventional language] capable of expression only by 
virtue of the resonance of the overtones that refer the circumscribed and 
selected field of a concept’s meaning back to the natural power of all 
concept formation, a power that lies in the life of language. (“History of 
Concepts” 11) 
The fact that the meaning of conventional language is conditional upon its context 
shows that, as an event of tradition, the experience of understanding is defined by 
recognition, not by cognition. The conceptualization of understanding as recognition 
foregrounds the historical embeddedness of human understanding: we are always already 
in language, in various speech communities and intellectual traditions from within which 
we understand the world. Differently put, we always understand something in a particular 
context, in relation to something we know already. This is one of the insights that 
Gadamer took from Plato. He writes that  
there is an equally profound and accurate insight to be had from Plato’s 
doctrine that all cognition is first what it is only as re-cognition; for a 
‘first’ cognition is as little possible as a first word. Even the freshest and 
most original perception, whose ramifications still seem entirely 
unforeseeable, is what it truly is only when its consequences have been 
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worked out, its connections with existing knowledge established, and 
when it has been absorbed into the medium of intersubjective 
understanding. (“Rhetoric” 279-280) 
If a discourse makes sense to us, it is because of some pre-understanding that we bring to 
it, be it the language of the discourse, the topic, the situation, or something else. When we 
understand, we understand something as something. Grondin writes how in his view of 
understanding as recognition, Gadamer follows Heidegger, who developed Husserl’s 
insight that “there is no empty consciousness because consciousness is always directed 
intentionally: it points towards the object ‘as’ this or that, in a certain aspect” (Hans-
Georg Gadamer 13). The positive hermeneutic role of the self-evident understanding that 
comes with traditions is that we need it in order to understand, i.e., recognize, anything. 
In other words, the nature of a ground is such that it is taken for granted and, at the same 
time, it may constitute an enabling condition, such as a foundation for something else. 
Because understanding is recognition, Gadamer grants prejudices hermeneutic priority 
over consciousness. He showed that the negative role played by prejudices in 
understanding is predicated on their primary function as a condition of understanding. 
This is what he says: “the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal 
sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. 
Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply conditions whereby 
we experience something—whereby what we encounter says something to us” 
(“Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem” 9).    
Although “the mode of being of tradition” is language (hence the 
conventionalization of language), Gadamer sees that the nature and content of language is 
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more than the expression of particular traditions (Truth and Method 463). In other words, 
Gadamer’s constitutive view of language is different from social constructivism. For 
Gadamer, conventional language carries not only prejudices specific to particular 
traditions, but also truths about the subject matter (“Reflections” 21). As an expression of 
tradition, conventional language is a linguistic account of matters of significance to us.  
WE THINK THROUGH LANGUAGE:  
GADAMER’S DIALECTICAL HERMENEUTICS   
At the foreground of Gadamer’s view of understanding is the subject matter: We 
exist, therefore we talk about matters of significance to us. These matters of significance 
define us as human beings, that is, they distinguish us from animals. Gadamer’s concept 
of the subject matter (die Sache) or the thing captures all that exists and has significance 
for human beings, i.e., “those units of our experience of the world that are constituted by 
their suitability and their significance” (Truth and Method 456). Elsewhere, Gadamer 
explains that by the thing he means “that in which one’s own life is sedimented” 
(“Articulating Transcendence” 9). After clarifying that Gadamer’s concept of the thing 
(die Sache) is different from Kant’s Ding-an-sich, Richard Bernstein provides a succinct 
and helpful intellectual framework for the centrality of the subject matter to Gadamer’s 
thought: 
[Gadamer] plays on the implications of Aristotle’s assertion, in the Ethics, 
that the appropriate form of knowledge and reasoning is conditioned by 
the subject matter; on the way in which Hegel, in the Phenomenology of 
the Spirit, is always directing us to die Sache in order to reveal the 
dialectical movement of consciousness; and on the significance of the call 
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for the ‘return to the things themselves’ in Husserl and the transformation 
of this demand in Heidegger’s ‘hermeneutics of facticity.’ (Beyond 
Objectivism 154)   
Gadamer’s ontology reverses modernity’s subject-object epistemology: the thing 
to be understood has ontological precedence over the understanding subject. This is why 
he says “Hermeneutics must proceed from the assumption that whoever wants to 
understand has a bond with the subject matter” (“On the Circle of Understanding” 75). 
Gadamer’s phenomenological evidence for this reversal of priority from the subject to the 
object is captured in the following statement: “Something awakens our interest—that is 
really what comes first! At the beginning of every effort to understand is a concern about 
something” (“Hermeneutics” 50). This is why the question takes central stage in 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Having a concern takes the form of a question; our concerns 
lead us to asking questions. Also, as individuals and as communities, we enter and exit 
the world, but the significant matters we care and talk about precede as well as outlive us. 
In his review of Truth and Method Campbell points out how the subject matter grounds 
Gadamer’s critique of consciousness as the critical element in understanding: “if we bring 
into being a meaning the author never intended, there is hardly anyone to be held at 
fault—the logos was quarterbacking our author’s game in the exact same way it 
quarterbacks ours. If what the author said was profound, our author could not see it all, 
nor shall we, nor shall those who come after us” (109, emphasis removed).  
The significant matters precede and outlive us because they constitute the content 
of language: “It is matters of fact,” Gadamer writes, “that come into language” (Truth 
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and Method 445). He calls this the “factualness (Sachlichkeit) of language” (453).4 The 
matters of significance that human beings talk about make the human environment a 
world and human communication language. Unlike animal communication, which 
“induces particular behaviors in the members of the species . . . human language must be 
thought of as a special and unique life process,” Gadamer writes, because “in linguistic 
communication, ‘world’ is disclosed” (Truth and Method 445-6). This statement refers to 
language as content (world) as well as a dialectical process (disclosed in communication).  
Because of language, human beings have a world, not an environment. Speaking 
about Humboldt, Gadamer writes that he did not realize, as Heidegger did, that this 
language-as-living-speech “is not just one of man’s possessions in the world, but on it 
depends the fact that man [or woman] has a world at all” (401). Having a world or being 
creatures who have language means two things. First, it means having a life-world 
because the world is always already our world. This idea is captured in Gadamer’s view 
of tradition as a worldview, as hermeneutically binding (as we saw in the previous 
section). In other words, the prejudices shaped by our traditions constitute the content of 
language. Second, having a world means becoming because, as historical beings, we are 
always on the way. This idea is captured in Gadamer’s view of language as “the previous 
accomplishment of thought” (“Relevance of the Beautiful” 12), hence his view of 
tradition as having “something to teach us that we could not know by ourselves” (Truth 
and Method xxxv). Wachterhauser captures this idea when he says that Gadamer’s 
tradition is a body of learning: “We proceed from language toward a better understanding 
of reality in the sense that we proceed from the received teaching of a body of learning” 
                                                 
4 It is interesting to observe the difference between Gadamer’s use of the expression matter of fact 




(Beyond Being 95). In his essay “Reply to My Critics” Gadamer explains that his idea of 
tradition does not incorporate “a preference for that which is customary, to which one 
must be blindly subservient” because “[a]lteration of the existing conditions is no less a 
form of connection to tradition than is a defense of existing conditions” (288). To 
Gadamer, “transmission [of tradition] . . . means learning how to grasp and express the 
past anew” because tradition “exists only in constantly becoming other than it is” (288). 
He writes,  
the word that has come down to us as tradition and to which we are to 
listen really encounters us and does so as if it addressed us and is 
concerned with us . . . on the other side, [we have] the coming into play, 
the playing out, of the content of tradition in its constantly widening 
possibilities of significance and resonance, extended by the different 
people receiving it. (Truth and Method 462) 
In explaining Gadamer’s idea of tradition, Bruns calls it “an endless give and take among 
multifarious voices,” which gives it an authority whose nature is “speculative rather than 
dogmatic” (“Structuralism” 21-22).  
Bruns is referring here to Gadamer’s productive view of understanding, which 
Gadamer captures as follows: “The paradox that is true of all traditionary material, 
namely of being one and the same and yet of being different, proves that all interpretation 
is, in fact, speculative. . . . This means that assimilation is no mere reproduction or 
repetition of the traditionary text; it is a new creation of understanding” (Truth and 
Method 473). Risser puts it beautifully when he explains the sense of new that defines 
Gadamer’s productive view of understanding: “Philosophical hermeneutics recognizes 
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that temporality demands a creative repetition in all our projects” (Hermeneutics 34). 
This is what makes the human world different from the animal environment. Gadamer 
writes that having language “involves a mode of being that is quite different from the 
way animals are confined to their habitat” and gives the example of learning foreign 
languages which do not cause an alteration of our “relation to the world, like an aquatic 
animal that becomes a land animal; rather, while preserving their own relation to the 
world, they extend and enrich it by the world of the foreign language” (Truth and Method 
453). The productive nature of understanding stems from the speculative, dialectical 
nature of language. Language is an interpretation of the world.   
As mentioned earlier, the subject matter is at the core of Gadamer’s hermeneutics: 
We exist, therefore we talk about matters of significance to us. The matters of 
significance that human beings talk about make the human environment a world and 
human communication language. By language Gadamer means any of the following: 
speech, genuine speaking, talk, discussion, conversation, discourse—Gadamer’s Sprache. 
In what follows we are going to look at what it means to say that the primary function of 
language is to reveal, to articulate the world (i.e., that which is significant for human 
beings). 
The ancient Greeks captured the world-revealing function of language in the 
concepts of logos and dialectic. The following passage from Gadamer’s essay “Truth in 
the Human Sciences” helps clarify the relationship between language and reason captured 
by the Greek logos and by Gadamer’s famous saying Being that can be understood is 
language: “Speech, logos, is often translated—correctly—as reason insofar as for the 
Greeks it was quickly discernible in speech that that which is primarily kept sight of and 
 
114 
safeguarded are the things themselves in their intelligibility. It is the reason of things 
themselves that allows itself to be presented and communicated in a specific manner of 
speech” (36). This is why Gadamer considers the emphasis on subjectivity in modernity 
“a distorting mirror” and takes inspiration from the Greeks, who were not caught in “the 
aporias of subjectivism” (Truth and Method 460) because “they did not conceive 
understanding as a methodic activity of the subject, but as something that the thing itself 
does and which thought ‘suffers’” (474). The last sentence defines the Greek idea of 
dialectic which the Greeks saw as the “expression of the logos” (460).  
The world-revealing function of language as its primary ontological function 
means that language is an interpretation of the world. The world or the subject matter 
comes into language (language reveals it) and we recognize it in language (language 
means interpreting it). Going back to the Greeks, Gadamer writes that “we have the 
Logos--that is, language that exists in delun, the revealing of matters of fact. Thus we not 
only point to facts but also recognize them for what they are. Now that is what we mean 
by the life-worldiness of language. Language itself is one interpretation of the life-world” 
(Truth and Method 350). This statement captures the paradox of the original belonging of 
self and world in language (hence of understanding as an event of tradition) which comes 
with the fact that language is a speculative medium: “All understanding is interpretation,” 
Gadamer writes, “and all interpretation takes place in the medium of a language that 
allows the object to come into words and yet is at the same time the interpreter’s own 
language” (389). This is how Gadamer defines the “speculative unity” that characterizes 
the being of language (and which encapsulates his ontology of language): 
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To come into language does not mean that a second being is acquired. 
Rather, what something presents itself as belongs to its own being. Thus 
everything that is language has a speculative unity: it contains a 
distinction, that between its being and its presentations of itself, but this is 
a distinction that is really not a distinction at all. (475) 
Arthos explains that, by fitting within “the broader movement of dissociation from the 
dualist mindset endemic to Western rationalism,” Gadamer’s dialectical view of 
understanding “develops a kind of transitivity that undermines conventional polarities by 
confusing, straddling, and bleeding their boundaries” and it does that not “out of any taste 
for subversion, but rather because it finds these tensions in the natural work of language” 
(Speaking Hermeneutically xv). Arthos provides a list of these dichotomies, all of which 
begin in the subject-object distinction (xv-xvi).5  
Because of the speculative character of language, Gadamer finds the relationship 
between word and thing to be more intimate than correspondence:  
words name things in a much too intimate and intellectual way for the 
question of the degree of similarity to be appropriate here. . . . The ‘truth’ 
of a word does not depend on its correctness, its correct adequation to the 
thing. It lies rather in its perfect intellectuality–i.e., the manifestness of the 
word’s meaning in its sound. (Truth and Method 410-411)  
Therefore, Gadamer understands the word to be more than the articulated word; “it seems 
necessary to separate the concept of the word from its grammatical sense, as I myself 
                                                 
5 The dichotomies Arthos lists are subject-object, person-work, self-world, reader-text, reality-
appearance, essence-contingence, thought-expression, self-other, individual-social, law-case, 
individual-particular, timeless-historical, past-present, certain-probable, whole-part, literacy-
orality, product-process, theory-practice, empirical-normative (Speaking Hermeneutically xvi). 
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have sought to do,” he writes. “The word is that which says something, above the 
distinctions of grammatical parts such as sentences, words, syllables, and so forth” 
(“Hermeneutics and Logocentrism” 124). As we saw in chapter three, the primary 
function of language for Gadamer is its speech function, not its signifying function; 
words evoke things. Language is saying. The present participle saying indicates first, that 
neither the world nor the word has ontological priority; second, that language (Sprache) 
is a dialectical process, in other words, the mode of being of language is defined by 
incompleteness (“Towards a Phenomenology” 25). Language is the subject matter 
revealing itself again and again. This makes Gadamer turn to the Christian idea of 
incarnation and the corresponding concept of the inner word. This is what he writes: 
There is, however, an idea that is not Greek which does more justice to the 
being of language, and so prevented the forgetfulness of language in 
Western thought from being complete. This is the Christian idea of 
incarnation. . . . The mystery of the Trinity is mirrored in the miracle of 
language insofar as the word that is true, because it says what the thing is, 
is nothing by itself and does not seek to be anything. . . . It has its being in 
its revealing. . . . [T]he human relationship between thought and speech 
corresponds, despite its imperfections, to the divine relationships of the 
Trinity. The inner mental word is just as consubstantial with thought as is 
God the Son with God the Father. (Truth and Method 418, 421) 
Therefore, about the inner word he writes that it “is certainly not related to a particular 
language, nor does it have the character of vaguely imagined words that proceed from the 
memory; rather, it is the subject matter thought through to the end” (Truth and Method 
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422). The idea of the inner word points to the intimate connection between thing, 
thought, and word: “The starting point for the formation of the word is the substantive 
content (the species) that fills the mind” (426). This makes language “a totality of 
meaning” that transcends any particular view of the subject matter (458). This is how 
Gadamer describes it: “To be sure what comes into language is something different from 
the spoken word itself. But the word is a word only because of what comes into language 
in it. Its own physical being exists only in order to disappear into what is said. Likewise, 
that which comes into language is not something that is pregiven before language; rather, 
the word gives it its own determinateness” (475).  
Gadamer’s phenomenology of language as speech, speaking, or conversation 
indicates the intimate relationship between thinking and speaking. Because of the 
ontological relationship between thing, thought, and word, to speak is to interpret. To 
speak is to articulate the subject matter. Speaking requires, presupposes understanding in 
order to be speaking proper, and this differentiates it from the ritualistic character of 
conventional language (discussed in the first section). Gadamer remarks that, in order to 
be speaking proper, speaking “requires understanding—understanding of the words that 
are spoken, also our own words” (“Hearing” 87). He gives the example of recitation of 
birthday poems by children and notes that this recitation is not genuine ‘saying’ because 
it “reduces the delivery of language to an extreme of unthinking memorization in which 
understanding plays no part” (90). About the spoken word he writes that it “interprets 
itself to an astonishing degree, by the manner of speaking, the tone of voice, the tempo, 
and so on, and also by the circumstances in which it is spoken” (Truth and Method 393). 
Wachterhauser writes that, according to Gadamer, “in finding ‘the right words’ we have 
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the thought (and hence an understanding of the object) for the first time. Thought comes 
to fruition in language and not just to outward expression. It is first by articulating a 
thought in some language that the thought itself becomes distinct and understandable” 
(“History and Language” 30). Two experiences of language illustrate the “intimate unity 
of language and thought” (Truth and Method 402). One such experience is conversation: 
if we have difficulty understanding a particular topic, talking about it with someone often 
leads to a clearer and deeper understanding of it. Another experience is free writing, not 
by accident also called writing to think. Conversations and writing, by virtue of requiring 
the articulation of the subject matter, lead to an increased understanding of it. Also, the 
way we speak reflects the degree or quality of our understanding of a subject matter. 
Wachterhauser refers to this relationship between speech and understanding when he 
notes that “Our understanding of some phenomenon will vary in sophistication and depth 
in direct proportion to both the number of different ways we have of speaking about it” 
(“History and Language” 31). Therefore, he sees “a complex and nuanced language [as] a 
necessary condition for understanding what something is and how it is related to other 
realities” (31).  
The quality of speech is a reflection of the quality of thought because the subject 
matter is the content of language. At the same time, speaking itself increases our 
understanding of a matter because language is a speculative medium. By the speculative 
nature of language (Sprache), one of the things Gadamer means is that “the finite 
possibilities of the word are oriented toward the sense intended as toward the infinite” 
(Truth and Method 469). Gadamer’s view of speaking is related to his view of thinking. 
He defines thinking in terms of Greek dialectic, which is grounded in the finitude of 
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human knowledge. Gadamer writes that Plato saw philosophy as “something for human 
beings, not for gods. Gods know, but we are in this ongoing process of approximation 
and overcoming error by dialectically moving towards truth” (“Hermeneutics of 
Suspicion” 64). Therefore, Gadamer writes,  
thinking means unfolding what consistently follows from the subject 
matter itself. It is part of this process to suppress ideas ‘that tend to 
insinuate themselves’ and to insist on the logic of thought. . . . Here 
dialectic is nothing but the art of conducting a conversation and especially 
of revealing the mistakes in one’s opinions through the process of 
questioning and yet further questioning. Here, then, the dialectic is 
negative; it confuses one’s opinions. But this kind of confusion means at 
the same time a clarification, for it opens one’s eyes to the thing. (Truth 
and Method 464) 
As the linguistic form that defines thinking, questioning is always a self-
questioning as well. In other words, that which triggers the dialectical movement of 
understanding that leads us to new truths about the subject matter is a concern. As 
mentioned earlier, Gadamer believes that “At the beginning of every effort to understand 
is a concern about something” (“Hermeneutics” 50). The form taken by a concern, in 
Gadamer’s thought, is the question. Having a concern, having a question about a 
particular matter means placing in question our previous understanding. Grondin points 
out the dependence of hermeneutic truth on questions. Die Sache is revealed by 
questions. He then explains how the centrality of the question to Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
answers the accusations of essentialism: just as there is no thing in itself, there is no truth 
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in itself, that is, “independent of the questions and expectations of human beings” 
(“Hermeneutics and Relativism” 48).   
Our concerns are not separated from our life in traditions; in fact, our concerns 
and questions arise from within our hermeneutic situation. This means two things: first, 
that our prejudices play a key role in our arrival at truth, hence Gadamer’s idea of 
“justified prejudices productive of knowledge” (Truth and Method 279). Our prejudices 
are the key players in the event of understanding, in the act of interpretation. Gadamer 
writes that “To interpret is precisely to bring one’s own preconceptions into play so that 
the text’s meaning can really be made to speak for us” (397). Second, the fact that our 
questions arise from within our hermeneutic situation means that, although from a 
hermeneutic situation we can only see a limited view of the thing, what we recognize is 
the subject matter itself because “the subject presents different aspects of itself at 
different times or from different standpoints” (284). By the subject matter itself Gadamer 
means an essential aspect of it which stands out, in other words, a truth that we need to 
consider. He writes: 
Recognition as cognition of the true occurs through an act of identification 
in which we do not differentiate between the representation and the 
represented. . . . When I recognize someone or something, what I see is 
freed from the contingency of this or that moment of time. It is part of the 
process of recognition that we see things in terms of what is permanent 
and essential in them. (“Art and Imitation” 99) 
Warnke notes that by truth Gadamer means that “an aspect of human experience has been 
separated out from others, given an emphasis of its own and thus illuminated for all. To 
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this extent,” she adds, “his conception has affinities with Heidegger’s account of truth as 
aletheia or disclosure; it makes an uncovering of some aspect of the world, our lives, a 
text or the like that was previously occluded” (58). As Wachterhauser insightfully puts it 
when accounting for Gadamer’s Platonic resemblance between truth and beauty, “We 
interpret only because the truth ‘shines forth’ from the variety of linguistic accounts of 
some phenomenon and compels us, as it were, to make greater sense of what we find 
already there” (“Gadamer’s Realism” 158). In bridging the intelligible and the beautiful 
realms, Gadamer’s concept of truth is rhetorical, as the following passage indicates:  
The idea is always that what is evident has not been proved and is not 
absolutely certain, but it asserts itself by reason of its own merit within the 
realm of the possible and probable. . . . what is evident is always 
something surprising as well, like a new light being turned on, expanding 
the range of what we can take into consideration. (Truth and Method 485-
486)  
This is why Gadamer’s view of truth can be defined in relation to the phenomenon of 
play: “the play of language itself, which addresses us, proposes and withdraws, asks and 
fulfills itself in the answer” because “In understanding we are drawn into an event of 
truth and arrive, as it were, too late, if we want to know what we are supposed to believe” 
(490). As an event of tradition, understanding is an event of truth. 
All these ideas indicate that Gadamer’s dialectical hermeneutics revisits the idea 
of human agency. The ontological priority of the subject matter over the subject does not 
mean that the subject is inconsequential. Quite the contrary. The person is important 
because the subject matter is recognized through the person’s prejudices. That which 
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opens up the subject matter anew, in a different light, is the person’s concern, the 
person’s question. Arthos captures this beautifully in the terms provided by the 
phenomenon of play:  
If in a game of badminton the focus is on the shuttlecock, still we 
ourselves are always in that movement and lend our ingenuity to its 
adventure. This ambiguous role of being the pivot and not the goal is the 
person. If language is a kind of alembic for the transmutation of the stuff 
of life, then being myself and not another is what sparks the gap between 
word and thing, the initial irritation that moves the game. (“Humanity of 
the Word” 490, emphasis removed) 
Consequently, Arthos writes that “The person is never dissolved in Gadamer, but is 
always simply understood in an active state of relation, of transubstantiating effects, both 
to others and to things” (489). We could say that the preposition that defines a 
hermeneutic approach to human agency is through, not by. If our prejudices define us as 
historical beings, it is through our prejudices that we arrive at truth, provided that we 
become aware of our historical situatedness in tradition, hence of the constitutive role 
played by prejudices in our understanding; in other words, provided that we hold them 
lightly as we pursue the truth of the matter. This dialectic between prejudice and truth 
that defines Gadamer’s hermeneutics and underlies the practice of listening to language is 
captured in Gadamer’s view of hermeneutic consciousness. Hermeneutic consciousness 
has a dialectical nature, holding prejudice and truth together, in a productive tension:  
a hermeneutically trained consciousness must be, from the start, sensitive 
to the text’s alterity. But this kind of sensitivity involves neither 
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‘neutrality’ with respect to content nor the extinction of one’s self, but the 
foregrounding and appropriation of one’s own fore-meanings and 
prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that 
the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth 
against one’s own fore-meanings. (Truth and Method 269) 
As Gadamer sees it, the practical reflection that defines the experience of understanding 
is “dialectical in its highest measure,” that is, “always concretely motivated already, 
prejudiced to be sure, but also challenged to a critique of prejudices” (“What Is Practice” 
82). In discussing Gadamer’s idea of prejudice and the hermeneutic task of discerning 
between distorting and productive prejudices, Grondin introduces the notion of 
“vigilance” as defining a hermeneutic kind of knowledge that keeps one’s eyes on truth 
while aware of one’s own limited (self-)understanding (Philosophy of Gadamer 95).  
Finally, Bernstein captures very well the hermeneutics of trust that defines 
Gadamer’s thought when he says that Gadamer argued that “we can take our historical 
situation and the practices that are constitutive of it seriously, and at the same time we 
can develop a critical perspective on it that is at once informed by an understanding of 
our history and is oriented to an open projective future” (“What Is the Difference” 359). 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics of trust is most evident in his idea and practice of listening to 
language. Not only is language not a prison for thought, language provides us with the 
way to transcend our linguistic boundaries, if we trust it to guide our thinking; in other 
words, if we choose to think with language.  
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THINKING WITH LANGUAGE: 
GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS OF TRUST 
The hermeneutic practice of listening to language engages fully the relationship 
between language and reason. We saw in the previous sections that, as social beings who 
belong to traditions, we think in language. In other words, language and reason are 
always historically situated (understanding is always prejudiced). At the same time, as 
linguistic beings, we also think through language because the mode of being of language 
and reason (the nature of understanding) is dialectical. Gadamer’s practice of listening to 
language shows us the hermeneutic and rhetorical possibilities that come with the 
relationship between language and reason when we (choose to) think with language. To 
listen to language means to think (along) with language because we trust it to guide us to 
the truth of the matter. To think (along) with language means to engage traditions 
reflectively, as conversation partners on the matter at hand.   
Gadamer’s practice of listening to language is grounded in a hermeneutic of trust. 
He does not believe in linguistic determinism. That is why he writes that he discovered 
“that no conceptual language, not even what Heidegger called the ‘language of 
metaphysics’ represents an unbreakable constraint upon thought if only the thinker allows 
himself [or herself] to trust language; that is, if he [or she] engages in dialogue with other 
thinkers and other ways of thinking” (“Text and Interpretation” 23). His work in the 
history of concepts shows a trust in language as traditionary content and as a dialectical 
process. To trust language as traditionary content or expression of tradition means to 
engage it as a linguistic account of the matter at hand. To trust language as a dialectical 
process means to listen for the matter at hand to reveal itself anew. In other words, 
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thinking with language is defined by questions and good will. If questioning is what the 
person who listens to language does, good will is the spirit underlying the questioning.  
The challenge that Gadamer’s hermeneutics presents to anyone interested in 
genuine thinking is to think (along) with a discourse, instead of criticizing it. Writing 
about his work with Plato’s texts, he writes: “To philosophize with Plato, not just to 
criticize Plato, that is the task” (“Reflections” 32). To think along with a discourse, 
instead of against it, captures what Gadamer calls the “undogmatic dialectic” that 
characterizes genuine conversations (22). This is a different kind of thinking, not centered 
in the thinking subject, but in the subject matter. Gadamer’s work in the history of 
concepts is but a conversation with the thinkers’ traditions which led to the formation of 
those concepts.  
First, engaging a tradition reflectively as a conversation partner on the matter at 
hand means taking its linguistic account of the matter seriously. This acknowledgment 
translates into asking questions driven by the matter at hand and grounded in an 
awareness of the hermeneutic relevance of the contextual ground. The key idea behind 
such questions is captured in the following question: What does this tradition or 
standpoint see about this particular issue that I/we do not see from where I stand but 
perhaps should? Other possible questions are, What does this way of speaking about the 
issue reveal about it? What is the life-context that led to this way of speaking and 
thinking about this matter? Gadamer writes that to think with the Other means to place 
oneself in the Other’s point of view, which further means openness to being persuaded 
and even working at making one’s interlocutor’s case stronger: 
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When we try to understand a text, we do not place ourselves in the 
author’s inner state; rather, if one wants to speak of ‘placing oneself,’ we 
place ourselves in his [or her] point of view. But this means nothing else 
than that we try to let stand the claim to correctness of what the other 
person says. We will even, if we want to understand, attempt to strengthen 
his [or her] arguments. (“On the Circle of Understanding” 69)  
As the questions mentioned above and this passage reveal, the reason behind the 
questions is not psychological (empathy) but hermeneutical and rhetorical. One of the 
outcomes of hermeneutic questioning is learning to think along with other ways of 
thinking about significant matters, learning to think about significant matters in different 
terms; in other words, learning to see “through the prejudice of another” as Gadamer puts 
it (“Reply” 283). As Risser writes in this sense, the goal of the hermeneutic conversation 
is “to think with the other and to come back to oneself as if to another” (Hermeneutics 
16). According to Gadamer, the task of learning from one another is intrinsic to the 
linguistic turn: “But the linguistic turn, which is grounded in the linguisticality of the 
human being . . . contains the idea that we as human beings have to learn from each other. 
We do not need just to hear one another but to listen to one another. Only when this 
happens is there understanding” (“Hermeneutics” 39). As a thinking along with the 
Other, the question is the linguistic expression of good will.  
Therefore, engaging a tradition as a conversation partner on the matter at hand 
means tarrying with another way of thinking about the matter at hand. As Dostal notes, 
for Gadamer “the exemplary experience of truth comes when we take the time to dwell 
on the matter at hand (Sache selbst) in conversation with another” (49). Gadamer is very 
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serious about truth as a rhetorical and ethical endeavor. He writes about hermeneutic truth 
that, “If we regard it as something that is simply aesthetic, non-binding, and lacking in 
existential seriousness, we are obviously failing to see how fundamental is the finitude of 
[the human being] for the hermeneutic experience of the world” (Truth and Method 488). 
It is one’s pursuit of truth that lies behind the good will that defines listening to language.  
Both learning and listening are conditional upon good will. We know from 
personal experience how our good will towards another person makes us hear differently, 
and how the absence of good will makes us deaf to what the Other is saying, so that we 
hear our own prejudices into his or her discourse. From Plato Gadamer takes the insight 
that good will constitutes the spirit of genuine thinking (“Expressive Power” 348). 
Tarrying with the language of a discourse resembles Plato’s dialectic, as an “art of 
thinking,” because, like his dialectic, it “consists not in trying to discover the weakness of 
what is said, but in bringing out its real strength” (Truth and Method 367). “By 
hermeneutics,” Gadamer explained in 1996, “I understand the ability to listen to the other 
in the belief that he [or she] could be right” (qtd. in Grondin, Hans-Georg Gadamer 250). 
Comparing Gadamer’s view of rationality to MacIntyre’s, Warnke describes Gadamer’s 
view as “a willingness to admit the existence of better options” and she adds, “The 
awareness that one’s knowledge is always open to refutation or modification from the 
vantage point of another perspective is not a basis for suspending confidence in the idea 
of reason but rather represents the very possibility of rational progress” (173).  
The good will that underlies the practice of listening to language is a sign of the 
person’s trust in language as a speculative medium, that is, as productive of insight if one 
takes the time to dwell with it. To engage traditions reflectively as conversation partners 
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on the matter at hand means to listen for the subject matter to reveal itself anew. As the 
person takes time to ask questions of a given tradition’s account of the subject matter, the 
established meaning of the concept or the term is opened up and its contextual ground 
starts resonating.  
The end of the practice of listening to language is genuine community. As 
Barthold notes about Gadamer’s idea of truth, “Hermeneutical truth, i.e., the event of 
understanding, is an ethical affair to the extent it requires embarking on a common 
pursuit with another” (xx). Gadamer’s practice of listening to language can help form 
what Davey calls “a community of border crossers” (Unquiet Understanding 49). “This is 
a community of those who recognize that they are indeed dependent upon the other for 
becoming other to themselves,” a community whose members develop “the ability to be 
responsive to, to adapt to, and to pass between different cultural borders” (49). Davey’s 
metaphor of border crosser resonates with Gadamer’s metaphor of linguistic circle. “Each 
one is at first a linguistic circle,” Gadamer writes, “and these linguistic circles come into 
contact with each other, merging more and more” (“Universality of the Hermeneutical 
Problem” 17). As Barthold rightly observes, “Gadamer tells us that speech has another 
role apart from giving an account that aims to clarify the subject matter; it also aims to 
draw others into an understanding that fosters productive understanding” (31). Gadamer’s 
idea and practice of listening to language shows that our recognition of truth—in its self-
evidentness as well as its validation—is a collective endeavor. When we trust language 





This chapter completed the exploration of Gadamer’s idea and practice of 
listening to language by grounding it in his view of understanding as an event of 
tradition. Understanding as an event of tradition reveals the paradox of our belonging to 
language: The subject matter comes into language in particular linguistic traditions and 
we recognize it in and through the language of particular traditions. This means that 
when we think, we think in the language of our linguistic traditions. However, thinking 
also means, for Gadamer, pursuing what follows from the subject matter, that is, 
engaging the speculative nature of language. If we want to avoid the dogmatism that 
comes with our belonging to linguistic traditions and benefit from the wisdom of 
language, we need to learn to think (along) with language, that is, we need to trust it to 
guide us towards the truth of the matter. 
Therefore, someone who practices listening to language is aware of conventional 
language as an expression of tradition and engages it reflectively as a linguistic account 
of the subject matter. This acknowledgment translates into tarrying with other ways of 
speaking about a subject matter, asking questions that are driven by the subject matter, 
and listening for the subject matter to reveal itself anew. The end of engaging traditions 
reflectively as conversation partners on the matter at hand is genuine community.  
The next chapter will continue the conversation between Gadamer and 
communication studies by exploring some ways in which Gadamer’s practice of listening 
to language can help communication scholars and practitioners think and speak wisely. 
This exploration will begin by engaging rhetorical and hermeneutical approaches to the 
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study of listening and will continue by discussing the relationship between the practice of 






CONTINUING THE CONVERSATION: THE WISDOM OF LANGUAGE 
 
You must sharpen your ear, you must realize that when you take a word in 
your mouth, you have not taken up some arbitrary tool which can be 
thrown in a corner if it doesn’t do the job, but you are committed to a line 
of thought that comes from afar and reaches on beyond you. (Gadamer, 
Truth and Method 547-548) 
INTRODUCTION 
Subscribing to Gadamer’s belief that being insightful and discerning is “part of 
the vocation of [the human being]” (Truth and Method 356), this dissertation has 
explored Gadamer’s idea and practice of listening to language in order to understand the 
relationship between a constitutive theory of language and a life of wisdom. This 
concluding chapter considers some ways in which the hermeneutic practice of listening to 
language can assist communication scholars and practitioners in becoming discerning and 
insightful. This exploration begins with a brief summary of the hermeneutic practice of 
listening to language.  
LISTENING TO LANGUAGE: A SUMMARY 
Gadamer’s practice of listening to language is central to his hermeneutic praxis 
and defines the art of understanding as an art of questioning, listening, and thinking. 
When we practice listening to language, we place ourselves in the position to hear the 
wisdom of language by not taking concepts for granted, by experiencing language instead 
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of using it, and by letting our thinking about significant matters be informed by 
alternative ways of speaking about them. In what follows I will summarize what the 
practice of listening to language consists in, Gadamer’s reasons behind it, and its benefits 
for those who practice it.  
Gadamer’s practice of listening to language has its roots in the phenomenological 
turn to language initiated by Heidegger at the beginning of the twentieth century. At the 
core of this hermeneutic practice is a concern with the proper access to the subject matter 
and a grounding of thinking in praxis. Listening to language is theoretically grounded in 
Gadamer’s constitutive view of language, which can be summed up as follows: language, 
not consciousness, is the critical element in understanding or communication of meaning; 
our primary and most consequential relationship to language is as hearers, not users, of 
language; and, the nature of language is both binding and expansive, hence the problems 
that come with its binding nature (via hearing) can be attended to from within language 
itself by engaging its expansive nature (through listening).  
First, the hermeneutic practice of listening to language is a reflective engagement 
of language that acknowledges the constitutive role played by customary ways of 
speaking in conceptual thought. Consequently, someone who listens to language tends to 
stay away from theoretical constructions that are not grounded in experience and employs 
concepts reflectively and mindfully. This means that, instead of taking their established 
meaning for granted (i.e., approaching language instrumentally), the person who listens 




By reversing the movement of thought involved in the natural process of concept 
formation (that is, from word to concept), this hermeneutic questioning of concepts opens 
up the general, established meaning of the concept and restores the intuitive power of 
ordinary language to conceptual thought. As a result, the person develops a concept-
historical consciousness that enables him or her to engage issues and ideas in a manner 
that is philosophically grounded and consistent.  
Second, the hermeneutic practice of listening to language is a reflective 
engagement of language that acknowledges the constitutive role played by hearing in 
understanding; that is, it acknowledges our primary relationship to language as hearers. 
Someone who practices listening to language does not relate to language instrumentally, 
as a user of language, but aesthetically, as a hearer who belongs to a meaningful world 
that discloses itself in words. Acutely aware of the evocative power of language, the 
person who listens to language submits to its guidance by tarrying with language, 
listening carefully for the ways in which words evoke the subject matter.  
As a result, the person develops an intuitive ear for the right words. By this 
Gadamer means a sensitivity for language that can judge the linguistic quality of 
conceptual expressions, i.e., the way in which concepts evoke things. This sensitivity is 
responsible for the conceptual precision that characterizes the thinking of those who tarry 
with language.  
Third, the hermeneutic practice of listening to language is a reflective engagement 
of language that acknowledges the constitutive role played by prejudices in our pursuit of 
truth. Therefore, someone who listens to language is aware of the binding power of 
conventional terms on thought, which comes with our historical situatedness, our 
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belonging to particular intellectual traditions and speech communities. At the same time, 
he or she trusts the productive dialectic inherent in language to reveal new truths about 
the subject matter.  
As a result, someone who listens to language engages traditions or other ways of 
thinking as conversation partners on the matter at hand, listening for the subject matter 
to reveal itself anew. As the person learns to think along with other ways of thinking, he 
or she begins to hear the subject matter resonate in particular conceptualizations of it. 
What is developed in the process is an undogmatic kind of thinking that is guided by 
language, grounded in praxis, and on the way to truth.   
As the exploration of Gadamer’s practice of listening to language has shown, 
once we acknowledge that we are first of all (ontologically) hearers of language, listening 
becomes a critical element in understanding. The relevance of listening as a socio-
cultural practice to the public sphere has been acknowledged in philosophy and 
communication studies. The next section will explore some ways in which rhetorical and 
hermeneutic approaches open up the study and practice of listening.  
THE SOCIAL PRACTICE OF LISTENING 
By bringing the rhetorical and hermeneutical paradigms into the study of 
listening, philosophers Gemma Corradi Fiumara, David M. Levin, John Uhr, and 
Matthew Meyer, and communication scholars Krista Ratcliffe, Daniel M. Gross, Paula S. 
Tompkins, Molly Stoltz, and others make the case for listening as a necessary practice in 
Western culture. Whether they call it “political listening,” “rhetorical listening,” 
“hermeneutic listening,” or “listening to logos,” these scholars point out the centrality of 
listening to cultural criticism, social justice, and democratic deliberation. All these 
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approaches to listening would subscribe to Gross’ definition of listening as “a 
differentiated and deeply social phenomenon” as well as his estimation that listening “has 
been neglected as a rhetorical art” (74, 77). This view of listening as a social 
phenomenon and practice corrects the socio-cognitive view still prevalent in 
communication studies that treats listening as a skill. These approaches also contribute to 
a more robust theorizing of listening as an ethical practice. Pat Gerhke sums up the view 
of other communication scholars when he writes in the 2011 special issue of the 
International Journal of Listening: “right now, the field of listening is in a prime position 
to benefit from a more sustained and clear focus on ethics, while the field of ethics is in 
dire need of a more sophisticated theory of listening” (2).  
First of all, because of particular social changes, we are in danger of losing our 
ability to listen if we do not practice it. In Gadamer’s view, learning to listen means 
“rising above the universal leveling process in which we cease to notice anything—a 
process encouraged by a civilization that dispenses increasingly powerful stimuli” 
(“Relevance of the Beautiful” 36). According to Fiumara’s evaluation of the Western 
ethos, a society saturated by information (brought to us by technology) leads to the 
tendency to seek out the interesting, which, in turn, makes us immune to human suffering 
and forms indifference in us (172). By contrast, she sees listening (paradoxically) as “a 
way of avoiding passivity” as we learn to avoid “the blunting mechanisms in our cultural 
machinery in order to be able to heed something, and to ‘dwell’ with it,” that is, to “begin 
to draw upon the unusual, without aspiring to consume it as ‘interesting’: and, through 
the same concern, [to] familiarize ourselves ever more with that which is ordinary until it 
actually becomes disconcerting” (171-2). In a voice resonant with Fiumara’s, and also 
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informed by Heidegger’s reflections on Heraclitus, Meyer does not see much hope for 
listening as a practice as long as “many people (as speakers and listeners) are satisfied 
with ‘you catch my drift,’ ‘know what I mean,’ and so on” (58). He adds that  
this type of so-called agreement that something has been communicated is 
one in which the speaker has not reflected thoughtfully and the listener 
already assumes to know what will be said. In this background, were one 
to attempt to fully explain oneself, the speaker would find rather untrained 
ears. (58, emphasis added) 
His last words make one think of Gadamer’s hermeneutic praxis about which Gadamer 
writes that “[i]n it what one has to exercise above all is the ear” (“Reflections” 17). In a 
voice that resonates with Gadamer’s, Levin urges us to assume responsibility for our 
hearing and develop it “beyond what normal living, normal socialization, minimally 
requires of us . . . as a practice of compassion, increasing our capacity as listeners, to be 
aware of, and responsive to, the interrelatedness and commonality of all sonorous beings” 
(47).  
Similarly, Uhr points out the current need for political listening when he writes 
that, “If democracy means self-government, then the powers and public persuasion 
exercised by the media weakens the prospect of direct democracy by making it harder for 
the people individually to ‘hear themselves think’ and collectively to listen to 
themselves” (266). He adds that “the basic problem about political listening was 
originally identified by Hobbes in terms of inattentive publics” (267). Therefore, he 
brings in the idea of “auditory democracy,” which “acknowledges the role of people as 
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auditors, delegating governing powers to their political representatives over whom they 
retain important levels of audit and accountability” (240). Uhr’s question is  
whether in the political sphere there are distinctive practices and 
institutions capable of assisting the civic listening process; and whether 
one can construct a model, not simply of a listening government, but more 
democratically, of a listening polity inspired by recent philosophical 
investigation of ‘the listening self’ (243) 
He is referring here to Levin’s philosophical inquiry The Listening Self: Personal 
Growth, Social Change and the Closure of Metaphysics. Pat Arneson’s “political 
listening” follows Uhr’s observation that the theorizing of the public sphere, democracy, 
and deliberation needs to bring in “listening in” in addition to “speaking up” (168). 
Arneson is interested in the social change initiated by women who were able to 
discriminate between more helpful and less helpful traditions because they attentively 
listened “to/with the ways [they were] multiactively situated” (168). Arneson’s idea of 
political listening is a reminder of Gadamer’s emphasis on the importance of a reflective 
engagement of traditions. Uhr’s, Levin’s, and Arneson’s inquiries point to the need and 
potential for thinking about listening at the intersection of private and public. Since it is 
accessible to everyone, Gadamer’s practice of listening to language can assist us in 
moving listening back into the public sphere, starting at the individual level, by forming 
discerning, reasonable communicators.  
Similar to Uhr’s interest in the role of citizens as auditors is Gross’ interest in 
revisiting the history of rhetoric from the perspective of the listener (the implicit listener 
of Aristotle, for instance). Some of his questions, which constitute the ground of his 
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graduate course on listening from a rhetorical perspective, are: “how do we configure our 
listening differently depending on the public space we occupy; or how are we culturally 
configured to listen to the past; or how are different social roles, such as master and slave, 
differently configured around listening?” (78). His questions remind one of Lipari’s 
invitation, addressed to communication theorists, “to rethink communication through the 
lens of listening” (“Listening, Thinking, Being” 359). Gross deplores the move of “the art 
of listening” from the public sphere “into the domain of so-called soft social science, 
most importantly, psychoanalysis” and points out the implications “for our cultural self-
understanding,” namely, that “we are now configured as creatures who pursue meaning in 
the folds of our unconscious” and “public spaces . . . are no longer spaces to lose oneself 
or perform a social role. . . . they are places where we find ourselves and our intimate 
others” (79). Just like Arneson, he considers studying listening from a rhetorical 
perspective of benefit to “the study of subordinate populations, the public sphere and its 
limitations, and traditions of passive disobedience” as it draws our attention “to the ways 
in which listeners are ethically and emotionally constituted” (78).  
By revisiting the history of rhetoric from the perspective of the listener, Gross 
problematizes the study of the listener and places it in a larger theoretical framework. 
Gadamer’s practice of listening to language provides the ontological ground for such 
theorizing by showing how the listener is first of all (ontologically) a hearer of language. 
In doing that, Gadamer’s practice of listening to language puts flesh on Lipari’s “listening 
being” which she sees as “not an actual state or principle, but a horizon toward which we 
might travel” (358). One of the benefits of grounding the practice of listening 
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ontologically is that it brings to the fore the relationship between the nature of language 
and the practice of listening, rather than keeping the former in the background, assumed.  
Language needs to come to the fore of our efforts to theorize listening. From 
Gadamer’s standpoint, listening is primarily an experience of language. In his 2011 
article “Rethinking Conceptual Approaches to the Study of ‘Listening’” Robert N. 
Bostrom contends that “fundamental issues in the nature of language are basic to the 
building of any theory of communication, and especially so in listening” (11). However, a 
survey of the current state of the study of listening in relation to language confirms 
Meyer’s conclusion that “we have not come far enough in our reflections on language . . . 
if only evinced by the fact that we tend to take our understanding of words rather 
casually, . . . equally problematically, we tend to focus on the meaning educed in 
statements as rigorously intended” (64). A few rhetorical and hermeneutical approaches 
to listening point, directly or indirectly, to the interdependence between a theory of 
language and a theory and practice of listening. 
Although they come to the study of listening from different perspectives, Ratcliffe 
and Tompkins identify the practice of rhetorical listening as necessary in creating social 
justice. Behind both Ratcliffe’s and Tompkins’ concept of rhetorical listening lies a 
constitutive view of language. By rhetorical listening they both mean a reflective 
engagement of our discourses in order to affirm and include unheard or unseen Others. 
Ratcliffe’s concept of rhetorical listening is grounded in Heidegger’s reflections on 
Heraclitus, hence in logos, which Ratcliffe defines as “a system of discourse within 
which a culture reasons and derives its truths” (23). “Within this more inclusive logos” 
writes Ratcliffe, “lies potential for personal and social justice. Perhaps through listening, 
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people can engage more possibilities for inventing arguments that bring differences 
together, for hearing differences as harmony or even as discordant notes” (25). Therefore, 
Ratcliffe defines rhetorical listening as “a stance of openness that a person may choose to 
assume in relation to any person, text, or culture” (xiii)—and here comes her particular 
interest—“[that] may be employed to hear people’s intersecting identifications with 
gender and race (including whiteness) the purpose being to negotiate troubled 
identifications in order to facilitate cross-cultural communication about any topic” (17). 
Tompkins, on the other hand, defines rhetorical listening as “an attentiveness to 
communicative connection in an effort to discern the traces of Others obscured or hidden 
by language and communication practices that create rhetorical absence rather than 
presence” (77). If for Tompkins rhetorical listening involves empathy and moral 
imagination, Ratcliffe’s rhetorical listening is a questioning of the logos of others and her 
own logos with regard to two specific cultural biases—gender and race. Ratcliffe’s 
concern is, therefore, “if and how [she] ever participate[s] in white discourses in ways 
that might unknowingly erase the desires and material existence of others” (40). 
Therefore, rhetorical listening requires, according to Ratcliffe, continually asking, 
“What’s at stake? For whom? And why?” (97).   
Ratcliffe’s thorough, creative, and practical reflections on rhetorical listening 
show the potential for theorizing listening as a social practice when we approach it as an 
experience of language. Meyer’s and Fiumara’s approaches to listening, informed by 
Heidegger’s reflections on Heraclitus, also see listening in relation to language, even 
though their approaches are not as practical as Ratcliffe’s. Referring to the idea of 
listening to logos, Greg Schneider concludes that this view of listening “could have a 
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profound effect on the way that listening is taught and studied in the future” by 
encouraging “a more difficult, but potentially more profitable, listening activity . . . 
listening for the nuances and implications of language, over and above the meanings of 
the speaker” (68). Schneider finds this approach to listening particularly promising for 
rhetorical criticism and commends Ratcliffe’s work because it “shows us the practical 
and critical possibilities of listening to the logos” (68).  
The relationship between listening and language has implications for the ways in 
which we theorize ethical listening, for instance, the ways in which we understand the 
role played by bias in listening. David Beard contends that only when the constitutive 
role of hearing is taken into consideration can we talk significantly about an ethics of 
listening or understand what ethical listening is. He urges communication scholars 
interested in the study of listening to start considering the constitutive role of hearing, i.e., 
“to account for the ways that our acoustic environments give contour to our sense of self 
. . . [because] we [never] stop making sense of our auditory environment . . . [being] 
always already interpreting and being shaped by sound (7). The discussion of, or 
reference to, bias in several studies (Ratcliffe, Levin, Meyer, Stoltz, Bodie, Wolvin) 
indicates first, that there is a space created for hermeneutic approaches to listening; 
second, it indicates the need for a careful engagement of the complex relationship 
between listening and understanding. Naturally, as Meyer writes, “listening will always 
require restraint on the part of the listener” (60), just as ethical listening requires an 
“active self-revision” (Huglen 175). If restraint means “a resolution to give our full 
attention” to the Other (Meyer 60), which defines a dialogic view of listening (Floyd, 
Shotter), Gadamer would agree. However, Gadamer would find a view of listening “that 
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does not anticipate or expect, but waits for the revelation of new possibilities for 
understanding through listening” (Meyer 65) both unrealistic (defined in terms of a false 
dichotomy) and problematic. In its acknowledgment of the constitutive role that prejudice 
plays in listening and understanding, Gadamer’s idea and practice of listening to 
language provides communication scholars interested in theorizing (ethical) listening 
with a realistic and productive way to address the relationship between a listener’s 
prejudices and ethical listening. Moreover, grounded in a view of understanding as 
phronesis, Gadamer’s practice of listening to language takes the discussion of ethical 
listening to a deeper level, thus answering Lipari’s question regarding the “theoretical 
transformations [that could] emerge when listening is conceptualized as phronesis itself” 
(“Listening, Thinking, Being” 359). 
The rhetorical and hermeneutical approaches to listening surveyed here confirm 
Gross’ claim that the absence of a rhetorical perspective on listening means that “crucial 
angles on the topic have been neglected” (78). The next section will explore the 
relationship between the practice of listening to language and wisdom by bringing 
together Gadamer’s appropriation of Aristotle’s phronesis, on the one hand, and 
communication and philosophical scholarship on practical reason, on the other hand. In 
its relevance to a life of wisdom, Gadamer’s practice of listening to language answers the 
call for social practices that develop practical wisdom and provides a philosophical 




THE WISDOM OF LANGUAGE 
Gadamer’s understanding and Aristotle’s phronesis  
Gadamer’s idea and practice of listening to language is central to his view of 
understanding, which, in turn, is grounded in Aristotle’s phronesis. He claims that the 
latter provided him with a model for his view of understanding and that his philosophy is 
nothing but phronesis6 (Truth and Method 324; Century of Philosophy 54). This also 
means, for Gadamer, a return to Socratic wisdom, the “consciousness of not knowing” 
(“Reflections” 31). Gadamer reminds us that Aristotle defines phronesis as the 
knowledge that guides the praxis of a being who is becoming. Both Aristotle’s phronesis 
and Gadamer’s understanding are a kind of knowledge that cannot be detached from 
being, hence from becoming (Truth and Method 312). Gadamer points out that any 
genuine understanding is a self-understanding as well as a “coming to an understanding 
about something” with others (“On the Problem of Self-Understanding” 51; Truth and 
Method 180). In other words, like phronesis, the experience of understanding 
presupposes application and dialogue.  
Moreover, human beings are acting beings—that is, beings who need to know and 
decide for themselves; this makes phronesis a moral practical knowledge (Truth and 
Method 313). As moral knowledge, phronesis requires “an inner link with the ethos,” and 
this link differentiates it from techne (“Reflections” 31). Aristotle differentiates between 
phronesis and techne as follows: while “prudence is a disposition with true reason and 
ability for actions concerning what is good or bad for man” (1140b), “to think by art is to 
investigate how to generate something . . . [that is] art must be concerned with production 
                                                 
6 In his book Back to the Rough Ground: Practical Judgment and the Lure of Technique Joseph 
Dunne shows how all of Gadamer’s concepts can be traced back to Aristotle’s phronesis. 
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and not with action” (1140a). Gadamer defines ethos as “a habituation which has grown 
to become second nature. . . a way of behaving and an attitude which is able to give an 
account of itself” (“Culture and Words” 184). If phronesis is the ethical know-how that 
requires an insight into the good, techne is the know-how that lacks any necessary 
connection to the good. Or, as McGee puts it,  
we do not describe technical mastery as wisdom, for it consists of 
habituated familiarity with the applications of a technology—cabinet-
makers do not ‘decide’ in exigent circumstances; in fact, virtually all of 
their ‘decisions’ are determined by the possibilities of their techne. By 
contrast, the phronimos is ‘always already in the situation of having to act’ 
in exigent circumstances (23).  
Gadamer’s efforts to point out the fundamental difference between phronesis and 
techne have been recognized by communication scholars such as McGee, Hariman, 
Arthos, and Deetz. His efforts are grounded in his belief that our ability for deliberate, 
responsible action has been endangered by modern science. Gadamer believes that “with 
all our technical and scientific progress we still have not learned well enough how to live 
with each other and with our own progress” (“From Word to Concept” 10-11). For this 
reason, he adds, “hermeneutics asserts something nobody today can deny: we occupy a 
moment in history in which we must strenuously use the full powers of our reason, and 
not just keep doing science only” (11). Moreover, the human reliance on experts, which 
replaces the act of deciding for oneself, is a human tendency that has been magnified, 
Gadamer writes, with the advent of modern science (“Limitations of the Expert” 188). 
McGee concurs when he writes that “[w]herever in society we once would have looked to 
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find an example of the phronimos, we find instead an expert whose ethos consists of 
credentialed mastery of the techne of his or her field” (24). This is why Gadamer claims 
that phronesis “is even more badly needed now with more complex societies and the 
developments of science” and he adds that the solution is “a responsible application of its 
results, something for which society as a whole and its political organization must take 
responsibility” (“Limitations of the Expert” 192). This responsible application can be 
effected by phronesis, which asks, Should we do this (just because we can)?  
Because phronesis cannot be taught, only exercised within human practices, the 
answer to this contemporary problem is more practices that develop phronesis. Just like 
Gadamer, MacIntyre advocates practice as an alternative to the overwhelming presence 
of “bureaucratic expertise” as well as to “the fictions of rights and of equality” that make 
up the texture of modern consciousness (After Virtue 155; “Bernstein’s Distorting 
Mirrors” 40). Practices are important because they develop virtues. The accounts of 
practice given by MacIntyre in his book After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory as well as 
by Eugene Garver in Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art of Character build upon Aristotle’s 
belief that virtues cannot be taught; instead, they are acquired by being exercised within 
socio-cultural practices. Gadamer writes in this sense that “Aristotle has made it clear that 
practical reason and practical insight do not possess the teachability of science but can be 
exercised in praxis” (“Reflections” 31).  
Given the relationship between thought and speech that underlies the practice of 
listening to language, this project suggests that the practice of listening to language forms 
phronesis as discernment and reasonableness, as thinking and speaking wisely. The 
practice of listening to language can form discerning and reasonable thinkers and 
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speakers by requiring and developing an awareness of the norms that guide our lives (the 
ethos of our language-worlds), an appropriate application of those norms to particular 
situations (a sense of the right measure), and reasonableness. These three characteristics 
of phronesis will be addressed in the following three sections.  
Thinking in language: awareness 
Gadamer writes that, although both phronesis and techne “imply a practical 
knowledge fashioned to the measure of the concrete tasks before them,” as moral 
practical knowledge, phronesis means being “aware of the normative viewpoints [one] 
follows and know[ing] how to make them effective in the concrete decision demanded by 
the practical situation” (“Problem of Historical Consciousness” 138; “Heritage of Hegel” 
48). He reminds us that, as the kind of knowledge connected to being, phronesis “stands 
always already within a living network of common convictions, habits, and values—that 
is to say, within an ethos” (“Practical Philosophy” 79). Writing in Gadamer’s spirit, 
Weinsheimer clarifies for the modern reader that “the good judgments of phronesis do 
not lose their claim to be rational; they are no less logos for being grounded in ethos. 
There is no standard of certainty higher than the self-evidence of what ‘we all share with 
the deepest inner clarity’” (Foreword xiii). An inherent problem of societies and cultures 
is that they come with a sense of self-evidentness, hence with a level of comfort that 
makes us act out of habit and following the herd instinct, without much reflection. This is 
why a first necessary step in a life of wisdom, of thinking and speaking wisely, is an 
awareness of the ethos of our life-worlds, of the normative rules we follow. This means 




The inevitable presence of ethos or commitment in human discourse distinguishes 
phronesis from techne and makes philosophers like Charles Taylor and Eugene Garver 
denounce the modern illusion of objectivity. According to Taylor, deliberation, debate 
and understanding depend on what he calls “strong evaluation” and practical argument 
starts with “what we are already committed to” (“Explanation” 212; 213). Therefore, 
Taylor accounts for the current problems in public discourse by identifying its grounding 
in the modern illusion of neutrality, that is, in a “blind acceptance of an apodeictic mode 
of reasoning” (215). In rhetorical studies, Walter R. Fisher contends that his attempt to 
restore the rhetorical to communication theory and the public space, through what he 
calls “narrative rationality,” follows his identification of technical discourse as 
predominating both scholarship and practice (xiii). The anthropological bent of his thesis 
adds force to his dismantling of the modern, elitist illusion of value-free rationality. 
Against the modern ideal of the expert, Fisher’s reasonable person would be someone 
who can articulate the values that make up one’s narrative background and is able to 
discern the reasonableness of a discourse based on the logic of good reasons. Also, as we 
saw in chapter one, communication scholars Deetz and Stewart have pointed out the 
problems that come with the reliance of our discipline on eighteenth-century concepts as 
well as with the insufficient reflection on the presuppositional commitments of our 
theoretical inquiries.  
How does the practice of listening to language help us develop an awareness of 
the norms that guide our lives? When we practice listening to language we employ 
conventional ways of speaking reflectively by questioning their self-evident, established 
meaning. Through questions, the familiar is made strange and we become aware of the 
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implicit ground of our thinking, speaking, and acting that comes with our belonging to 
particular traditions of thought and speech communities. In other words, we become 
aware of their/our ethos, their/our presuppositional ground. We are developing a 
hermeneutic consciousness, that is, an awareness of the particular ways in which 
traditions guide our thinking, speaking, and acting.  
A simple question such as, What does X mean? makes the familiar strange, that is, 
it opens up the established meaning of a linguistic expression as we tarry with our 
customary ways of speaking and listen for their implicit context. By asking What do we 
(as a community) mean by X? we become aware of language as an expression of 
tradition, we come to an understanding of what it means to speak as a member of that 
tradition; in other words, our thinking in the language of our traditions that happens 
behind our back is brought before us. Naturally, this bringing before us is never 
complete. When we listen to language we also habitually ask, Do I/we want to commit to 
this way of thinking and acting regarding X? As this question indicates, someone who 
practices listening to language recognizes the ontological and rhetorical interdependence 
of being, thinking, saying, and doing.  
Someone who listens to language knows that logos is inseparable from ethos. To 
speak is to commit ourselves to a certain way of life. We are, or rather, we become our 
words, just as our ways of thinking about matters shape the ways we act in relation to 
them. As a result of questioning the taken-for-granted meaning of conventional speech, 
the self-evident understanding of the world (that is, self-understanding and understanding 
of issues) that comes with our belonging to particular traditions is either embraced as a 
genuine commitment and conviction or discarded as mere popular opinion. This is what 
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the practice of listening to language as a hermeneutic reflection does for us,7 which 
makes Arthos call hermeneutics “the depth dimension of rhetoric” (“Hermeneutic 
Version” 77).  
Thinking through language: appropriateness 
Gadamer writes that in order for human beings “to make the right use of human 
knowledge” a “distinctive capacity is required,’ namely, “striking the ‘right measure,’ 
finding what is appropriate” (“From Word to Concept” 5). He adds that we experience it 
“in the wonder of harmonious tones sounding together, or in the harmonious feeling of 
well-being that we call ‘health’” (5). Reflecting on Aristotle’s phronesis, Gadamer writes 
that “As far as [he] can tell, Aristotle himself had the same thing in mind when he used 
the term phronesis . . . rather in the sense that there is a ‘measure’ that the things 
themselves possess” (“Greeks” 97). 
Therefore, the second problem that Gadamer and contemporary scholars identify 
in the predominance of techne over phronesis as a mode of reasoning rests with the 
different kind of application required. About the application that defines practical reason 
Gadamer writes that it “cannot evolve by mere rules,” because “for the application of 
rules there exists in turn no rule;” instead, it “is something which must be done by the 
reasoning man himself” (“Practical Philosophy” 82; “Heritage of Hegel” 49). Taylor 
notes, too, that the application that defines practical reason is not simply the application 
                                                 
7 The kind of hermeneutic reflection that defines Gadamer’s practice of listening to language 
would also benefit communication pedagogy. For example, how would our teaching of 
communication skills and critical thinking look like if informed by the hermeneutic practice of 
listening to language? A disciplinary hermeneutic consciousness that acknowledges our primary 
and most consequential relationship to language as hearers would be especially helpful in 
teaching interpersonal and intercultural communication—for example, in the study and practice 
of rhetorical sensitivity, a concept developed by Roderick P. Hart and Don M. Burks in 1972 and 
already applied to the teaching of interpersonal communication (Darnell and Brockriede). 
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of a formula. In discussing the nature of a practice in his article “To Follow a Rule,” he 
makes praxis conditional upon hermeneutics: we follow a rule by constantly interpreting 
what the rule means.   
 Although both social practices and professional expertise require application, 
social practices require the application that characterizes practical reason. Gadamer 
defines the expert as “someone who can give us true directions for acting because of his 
[or her] superior knowledge and the superiority of his [or her] experience” (“Limitations 
of the Expert” 184). Although he acknowledges the necessity of experts for the 
management of “complex theoretical and technical processes,” he explains how a socio-
political reliance on experts is problematic: a “society of experts” is “a society of 
functionaries . . . for it is constitutive of the notion of the functionary that he [or she] be 
completely concentrated upon the administration of his [or her] function.” This is 
problematic because it leads to “the degeneration of practice into technique and—through 
no fault of the experts themselves—to a general decline into social irrationality” (“What 
Is Practice?” 74). The following passage helps explain why Gadamer sees a socio-
political over-reliance on expertise as leading to social irrationality:  
[I]t is an error to think that ‘the experts’—the business and economic 
experts, the environmental experts, or the military experts—can take away 
from us our praxis in society and relieve us from decisions on matters we 
all have to deal with as political citizens working with each other. . . . This 
specialization and arrangement in a fixed structure of tasks is . . . not the 
whole of a societal existence. In reality, our praxis does not consist in our 
adapting to pregiven functions or in the thinking out of suitable means for 
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achieving pregiven purposes. That is technology. Rather, our praxis must 
consist in prudent choices as we pursue common goals, choices we arrive 
at together and in practical reflection making concrete decisions about 
what is to be done in our present situation. That is societal reason. 
(“Practical Philosophy” 84, emphasis added) 
We are familiar with this problem whenever someone uses the phrase It’s not my job to 
evade responsibility for social engagement. When personhood is reduced to the person’s 
function, the person withdraws from general social deliberation, thus reducing the 
collective processes that constitute social rationality. In the same vein, MacIntyre’s 
understanding of internal goods (in addition to external goods) as the characteristic that 
defines a (social) practice explains why expertise is dangerous: concerned only with 
applying means to external ends, expertise as deliberation jeopardizes the very existence 
of the civic practice of deliberation. The application that comes with phronesis is 
different because it requires discernment or judgment, i.e., it questions both means and 
ends. That is why, to MacIntyre, neither the Manager, nor the Therapist—two of the 
“characters” of contemporary Western ethos—is capable of moral deliberation (After 
Virtue 30). By “characters” MacIntyre means the moral representatives of a culture, who 
morally legitimate “a mode of social existence” (28). Whereas moral deliberation 
presupposes the dialectic of means and ends where ends as well as means are questioned, 
the two characters of the Western culture are concerned only with the means, while ends 
are “given” and outside their concern (30). The prevalence of a bureaucratic and 
psychological register that pervades all aspects of our contemporary social life makes 
MacIntyre’s observations more than pertinent today.  
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The same social concerns motivate the turn to civic humanism in rhetorical 
studies. Hariman, Michael Leff and Dilip P. Gaonkar, who engage prudence from a 
Ciceronian perspective, deplore the neglect of civic humanism in rhetorical scholarship. 
Gaonkar accounts for this neglect by “a disciplinary consciousness obsessed with abstract 
epistemological questions” (201). Leff brings as evidence the exclusive association of 
decorum with style—an association that is grounded in the divorce between style and 
proof (61). According to Leff, the hope for the restoration of substance to rhetoric rests 
with the concept of decorum or propriety, which he defines as “the process of mediation 
and balance connected with qualitative judgement” (62). This happens as decorum 
mediates the “ambiguous” relationship between action and production that is present in 
practical discourse (58, 62). In a voice similar to Hariman’s observations on the 
provisional, yet powerful, manifestation of phronesis (311), Leff writes, “Decorum has 
no substantive stability across situations, since it represents a constantly moving process 
of negotiation. . . . Nevertheless, the achievement of decorum in a given situation 
establishes a maximum point of balance and stability” (62).  
Gadamer draws an analogy with the field of health care that is helpful in 
understanding the different kind of application required by phronesis and praxis on the 
one hand, and techne and expertise on the other hand. He deplores the fact that “the large 
area of actual health care, which today is called preventative medicine, has been 
neglected—in the mistaken reliance upon the competence of modern medical science” 
(“Limitations of the Expert” 192). Preventative medicine requires phronesis, is defined 
by the verb to care and is done by the patients themselves. Medical science, on the other 
hand, requires techne, is defined by the verb to fix and can only be done by the medical 
 
153 
experts. The application that defines practical wisdom resembles the guiding care 
required by preventative medicine (not accidentally called health care, as Gadamer 
observes) and it is different from the fixing function of techne—the kind of knowledge 
required by medical science. In other words, preventative care is the right measure one 
tries to find for healthy living, and it is badly needed to complement “the measuring that 
measures” which defines medical science (“From Word to Concept” 7). In one of his 
discussions of artistic and scientific knowledge, Gadamer writes that both kinds are 
equally necessary and important because they engage different kinds of “measuring:” 
“the measuring that measures, and the ‘right measure,’ the appropriate” (7).  
The care that characterizes the wise person, and, by extension, the listener to 
language, is the latter’s response to the measure that the things themselves possess. In 
other words, a life of wisdom acknowledges that there are limitations imposed on our 
behavior by the particular nature of phenomena, hence there are implications of not 
acknowledging those limitations. Gadamer refers to this in his writings as “the nature of 
the thing:” “some laws are entirely a matter of mere agreement (e.g., traffic regulations), 
but there are also things that do not admit of regulation by mere human convention 
because the ‘nature of the thing’ constantly asserts itself” (Truth and Method 319). His 
example of the sphere of ethics illustrates the sense for the right measure that defines 
phronesis: 
despite all the variety of moral ideas in the most different times and 
peoples, in this sphere there is still something like the nature of the 
thing . . . [the guiding principles of ethics are not] mere conventions, but 
really do correspond to the nature of the thing—except that the latter is 
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always itself determined in each case by the use the moral consciousness 
makes of them. (320) 
The right measure that defines phronetic reasoning is the result of the dialectic between 
the nature of the thing and the particular situation. The focus of practical wisdom, and of 
the practice of listening to language, is the thing itself, the matter at hand about which we 
need to decide; and this means an openness to constant revision in light of the particular 
case.  
How does the practice of listening to language help us develop a sense for the 
right measure? The movement from general to particular required by phronesis is the 
reverse movement of thought that is involved in theorizing. Gadamer writes that the inner 
tendency of human reason towards theorizing (or philosophy) requires generalization—
i.e., surpassing our practical situation (“Practical Philosophy” 80). The problem with 
generalizations, according to Gadamer (following Aristotle), is that, when we theorize, 
the particular case loses some of its own urgency and moral challenge; this is the natural 
outcome of “the human capacity to distantiate everything linguistically” (80). Practical 
wisdom reverses this movement by reintroducing the moral urgency for which the 
generalization is applicable.  
Likewise, when we practice listening to language, we are moving away from 
unquestioningly employing concepts or terms in their generally-accepted meaning 
towards understanding the particular hermeneutic situation and life-context that led to the 
formation of that way of speaking. Also, the hermeneutic consciousness developed as we 
engage traditions reflectively is a consciousness of the hermeneutic situation, of its limits 
as well as possibilities for understanding and action. The movement from general to 
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particular that defines the hermeneutic practice of listening to language is a dialectical 
movement. This means, among other things, that it is a movement that aims to reach 
insight, not closure. When we employ the language of discourses reflectively, as 
linguistic accounts of the subject matter, we are engaging the dialectic that defines the 
nature of language: we are listening to traditions (the many or the particular) for the 
subject matter (the one or the universal). In other words, our reflective engagement of 
traditions is driven by the subject matter, by the thing itself. In the back and forth of 
thinking with other ways of thinking we develop a sense for appropriate ways to think 
and speak about issues of significance to our speech communities. By appropriate I mean 
in tune with both the nature of the phenomenon or issue in question and the life of the 
respective speech community. By thinking through language, we develop an 
understanding of what is at stake in a particular situation.  
Thinking with language: reasonableness 
Finally, Gadamer reminds us that Aristotle’s phronesis is different from deinotes.8 
As reasonableness, phronesis “is meant to bring us to consensus and to mutual 
understanding,” which he opposes to deinotes, which is ”the possibility of those terrible 
men who can comprehend everything immediately and can master and decide 
everything” (Century of Philosophy 62). Gadamer calls this “will to power,” not practical 
wisdom (62). The wise person (Aristotle’s phronimos) is a reasonable person, who 
reaches his or her decisions in cooperation with other people who have a stake in the 
issues. Therefore, the ground of phronesis for Gadamer is dialogue. He writes in this 
regard that he “became initially aware of phronesis, the reasonableness of practical 
                                                 
8 Deinotes is Aristotle’s term for cleverness, which is different from phronesis.  
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knowing, through Heidegger” and adds that he “subsequently found a better basis for 
phronesis, which [he] developed, not in terms of a virtue, but rather in terms of the 
dialogue” (20-21).  
How does the practice of listening to language help us become reasonable 
communicators? As the following passage from Gadamer shows, the Other is already 
present in the ontological ground of the practice of listening to language:  
But the linguistic turn, which is grounded in the linguisticality of the 
human being contains the idea that we as human beings have to learn from 
each other. We do not need just to hear one another but to listen to one 
another. Only when this happens is there understanding. (“Hermeneutics” 
39) 
As Gadamer’s practice of listening to language indicates, the linguistic turn constitutes a 
rhetorical and ethical turn towards the Other. For Gadamer (following the Greeks) this 
means a turn towards phronesis, as he says in an interview: “phronesis is evidently the 
most important of all the developments of practical philosophy, of ethics; and one must 
further acknowledge that this was all there was in ethics at the outset of Greek history” 
(Century of Philosophy 78). The practice of listening to language requires us to learn how 
to listen to other views, even how to make the Other’s case stronger, in order to learn 
from the Other. Aware of the ways in which our prejudices make us deaf to truth, unable 
to recognize it, the practice of listening to language underscores the importance of good 
will in understanding.  
Because of its commitment to truth, the practice of listening to language comes 
with a genuine interest in the Other. This is why Gadamer writes the following: “what I 
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have gradually developed is not Mit-sein but Miteinander [‘with-one-another’]. . . Mit-
sein is, in truth, a very weak idea of the other, more a ‘letting the other be’ than an 
authentic ‘being-interested-in-him’” (Century of Philosophy 23). The turn towards the 
Other that comes with the hermeneutic practice of listening to language is a turn towards 
the Other’s tradition, a serious engagement of the Other’s view as an account of the 
matter at hand, hence, as potentially revealing a significant truth about it. When we listen 
to the Other’s discourse, we are listening to the unfamiliar for the significant; we are 
asking questions such as, What does this standpoint see about this matter that we do not 
see from where we stand but we should? or What is the difference (the Other, the 
standpoint) that makes a difference in this particular matter? Our aim is to discern how 
that tradition sheds light on the matter at hand. Listening (understood as an experience of 
language in pursuit of truth) and ethics (seen as a turn towards the Other’s account of the 
truth of the matter) meet in the hermeneutical and rhetorical virtue of discernment.  
The aim of hermeneutic listening—discernment of truth—indicates that 
Gadamer’s practice of listening to language offers an alternative to the postmodern 
engagement of difference. As Weinsheimer notes, in its insistence upon difference and 
condemnation of assimilation, postmodernism “leave[s] understanding quite unexplained 
because [it] conceive[s] of all understanding as assimilationist and hence equivalent to 
misunderstanding; but this makes the different simply unintelligible” (“Meaningless 
Hermeneutics?” 165). By contrast, as a thinking along with the Other’s standpoint, the 
hermeneutic practice of listening to language leads to an understanding of the limitations 
and possibilities of the Other’s hermeneutic situation, hence what the Other has to offer 
to a deeper understanding of significant issues.  
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The end of the practice of listening to language is authentic community. The 
Other is in the service of truth along with the Self. The focus and driving force of the 
hermeneutic practice of listening to language is the truth of the matter. And that is a 
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